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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I develop a model of the nature of attitudes, broadly construed as 
people’s evaluative tendencies towards other people qua members of social groups. I 
set out three desiderata for such a model: it should be conducive to explanations and 
predictions of people’s evaluative responses towards other people (D1), it should 
provide an appropriate guide to moral character assessment (D2), and it should be a 
model that all parties that use the notion of an attitude could possibly agree on 
(because this would simplify knowledge exchange between these parties; D3). 
According to a model that is prevalent in the contemporary psychological and 
philosophical literature on prejudice, people’s attitudes fall into two classes: implicit and 
explicit attitudes (both of which are specific kinds of mental states). I show that this 
account is not well motivated and argue that there is an alternative model of attitudes 
available that is more in line with desiderata D1, D2, and D3. Building upon an account 
by Machery (2016), I claim that attitudes are traits of people. As such, attitudes are 
neither implicit nor explicit, but they are typically grounded in sets of implicit and explicit 
mental states (e.g., conceptual associations, affects, beliefs, desires). Contra Machery, 
I argue that these attitudes are not properly characterised in aggregationist terms 
because this obscures relevant evaluative complexities of attitudes. Instead, these 
attitudes should be analysed as profiles of situation-specific evaluative response 
dispositions. This model does justice to the fact that people’s evaluative responses are 
strongly context-dependent. Taking this context dependence into account helps us to 
explain and predict people’s evaluative responses (D1) and to appropriately evaluate 
people’s moral characters (D2). Due to these benefits, the proposed model should 
appeal to different parties (philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary people) that rely 
on the notion of an attitude (D3). 
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Introduction 
 
 
We frequently refer to people’s attitudes in day-to-day conversation. For example, we 
may say that someone exhibits a negative or a positive attitude towards a particular 
group of people, say immigrants, or that someone possesses a racist or sexist 
attitude.1 Attitude ascriptions of this sort help us to explain and predict people’s 
responses towards other people as well as to convey information about a person’s 
character. It is important to note that attitudes are not only a folk psychological posit but 
that the notion of an attitude also plays a crucial role in academic psychology. As early 
as 1935, Gordon Allport noted in his seminal article “Attitudes” that “[n]o other term 
appears more frequently in the experimental and theoretical literature” (p. 798), and 
there is no doubt that the prevalence of the attitude notion in the psychological 
literature has persisted until today. Psychologists construe attitudes broadly as 
evaluations (evaluative mental states or evaluative tendencies) in regard to an entity 
(e.g., a social group) that become expressed in cognition, affect, and behaviour (Ajzen, 
1988; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). Attitudes are 
often said to have a valence (i.e., they are positive or negative) and to vary in strength 
(e.g., Fazio, 2007). In recent years, philosophers have shown an increased interest in 
this notion of an attitude (Frankish, 2016; Machery, 2016; Webber, 2013, 2016b).2 Yet, 
as I will point out shortly, it remains unclear how exactly we should conceive of the 
nature of attitudes. My goal in this thesis is to remedy this shortcoming. 
Although people may have attitudes towards all kinds of entities (e.g., objects, 
institutions, events, brands, or beliefs), I restrict my investigation in this thesis to 
attitudes towards social groups (or towards people qua members of social groups). I 
choose this focus because attitudes towards social groups have significant moral 
implications and are thus particularly interesting from a philosophical point of view. 
When I use the term “attitude” in this thesis, I am thus always referring to attitudes 
towards social groups (or towards people qua members of social groups). Yet, despite 
this focus, many of the conclusions that I reach in this thesis may equally apply to 
attitudes towards other kinds of entities. 
                                            
1
 It shall be mentioned that there are of course also other usages of the term “attitude” in 
ordinary discourse, such as when we say that someone “has quite an attitude” or when we say 
that someone “has a bad attitude”. I am not concerned with these usages in this thesis. 
2
 In this thesis, I am not concerned with any of the technical uses of the term “attitude” as they 
are prevalent in philosophy, such as in the notions of “intentional attitude”, “propositional 
attitude”, or “reactive attitude”. See Webber (2013) for an elaboration on the complex relation 
between what psychologists call “attitude” and the philosophical notions of intentional and 
propositional attitudes (pp. 1085-1087). 
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Consider the following case, which showcases how hard it can be to pin down a 
person’s attitude and which I use to motivate the questions that I am concerned with in 
this thesis. Sarah, who identifies herself as white, condemns racism. She endorses 
egalitarian values, believes that it is morally reprehensible to treat people differently 
because of their skin colour, and desires not to discriminate against black people. 
Many of her deliberate responses in regard to black people fall into line with her anti-
racist ideals. She is a physician and actively encourages young black people to study 
medicine because she is concerned about the underrepresentation of black people in 
the profession. She has repeatedly participated in rallies against the oppression of 
black people. When she hears someone making a racist joke, she calls that person out. 
Yet, Sarah’s spontaneous responses towards black people are often at odds with her 
anti-racist ideals. When speaking to black patients, she tends to keep more spatial 
distance and to make less eye contact than when speaking to white patients. 
Moreover, when walking home through a deprived neighbourhood in which crime and 
violence is rife, she reacts with anxiety when black people are approaching her but 
stays entirely calm when white people come her way. On a few occasions, she even 
mistook a harmless object held by a black person for a gun. This has never happened 
to her with respect to a white person. When made aware of these biases, Sarah feels 
genuine regret. She realises that her spontaneous reactions in regard to black people 
are at odds with her egalitarian values. Yet, she has a hard time changing her 
unintentional responses.3 
It shall be emphasised that the case of Sarah is not a far-fetched fiction. There is in 
fact abundant empirical evidence that people who endorse egalitarian values often also 
exhibit biases of the kind that Sarah exhibits.4 Studies have revealed, amongst others, 
that even egalitarian minded people often keep more distance and make less eye 
contact with black than with white interaction partners (Dotsch & Wigoboldus, 2008; 
Dovidio et al., 1997), and tend to mistake ambiguous objects in black people’s hands 
for guns when they are prompted to make quick “gun-or-no-gun” decisions in a 
computer simulation (Correll et al., 2002, 2007).  
Cases like Sarah’s raise a range of interrelated questions about the nature of 
attitudes that I want to address in this thesis:  
 
(Q1) How should we individuate attitudes? 
(Q2) What mental states underpin attitudes? 
                                            
3
 The philosophical moral psychology literature is replete with examples that resemble the here 
presented case of Sarah (e.g., Besser-Jones, 2008; Smith, 2004; Holroyd, Scaife, & Stafford, 
2017a) 
4
 Biases of this kind are often referred to as “implicit biases“. See Bronwstein (2017) and 
Holroyd and colleagues (2017b) for reviews, and Brownstein and Saul (2016a, 2016b) for an 
extensive collection of articles on the phenomenon of implicit bias. See also footnote 11 below. 
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(Q3) What is the ontological status of attitudes? 
 
It seems intuitive to say that Sarah’s responses towards black people fall into two 
classes. On the one hand, she condemns racism and engages in various behaviours 
that reflect her concern for black people. On the other hand, she exhibits various 
spontaneous responses that seem to reflect negativity towards black people. This is a 
common pattern that philosophers and psychologists alike have described as “aversive 
racism” (e.g., Brownstein & Madva, 2012a; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). Note that this 
intuitive characterisation leaves the question of attitude individuation open (Q1). Are we 
to say that Sarah harbours two conflicting attitudes towards black people (maybe a 
positive and a negative one)? Or are we to say that only one of these response classes 
is expressive of Sarah’s “real” attitude towards black people? Could we maybe even 
say that Sarah exhibits a complex attitude towards black people that includes all of her 
response tendencies towards black people? Note also that the question of attitude 
individuation is directly linked to the question about the mental states that underpin 
attitudes (Q2). Sarah’s attitude(s) towards black people could be based on associations 
in her memory (e.g., an association between her concept BLACK PERSON and her 
concept DANGER)5, on affective dispositions (e.g., her disposition to feel scared of 
black people), on beliefs of hers (e.g., her belief that it is problematic to treat people 
differently because of their skin colour), or maybe a cluster of all (or a number of) these 
states. This again relates directly to the question about the ontological status of 
attitudes (Q3). We could say that for any attitude X of Sarah, X can be identified with 
an individual mental state (e.g., her association between BLACK PERSON and 
DANGER or her belief that it is morally reprehensible to treat people differently 
because of their skin colour). Yet, we may also be inclined to say that her attitude is a 
complex trait of hers that is based on a variety of different mental states and 
dispositions (e.g., her association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER, plus her 
disposition to feel scared of black people, plus her belief that it is morally reprehensible 
to treat people differently because of their skin colour, etc.). In this thesis, I will argue 
for just such a trait view of attitudes. 
However, before I go about answering the aforementioned questions about the 
nature of attitudes, I will address in the next section (section I) the question as to what 
we need the notion of an attitude for (in ordinary discourse, in psychology, and 
philosophy). This will allow me to derive some desiderata for a model of attitudes. 
Throughout this thesis, these desiderata will guide my search for answers to questions 
Q1, Q2, and Q3. In section II of the present introduction, I will then elaborate on the 
conception of attitudes that is predominant in the contemporary psychology and 
                                            
5
 Throughout this thesis, I use capital letters when mentioning mental concepts. 
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philosophy of prejudice (what I call “the standard view”). This is the view that people 
possess distinct implicit and explicit attitudes. I will review what answers the standard 
view provides with respect to Q1, Q2, and Q3. In section III of the present introduction, 
I will provide a brief overview of my main argument against the standard view and in 
favour of an alternative trait view of attitudes, and in section IV, I will provide an 
overview of the content of the individual chapters of this thesis. 
 
I.  Desiderata for a model of attitudes 
 
Before we address questions Q1, Q2, and Q3 about the nature of attitudes, it is worth 
considering why we need the notion of an attitude at all. In short, there are two broad 
functions that the notion of an attitude fulfils: 
 
(F1) The notion of an attitude plays a role in explanations and predictions of people’s 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses towards other people. 
(F2) The notion of an attitude plays a role in the assessment of people’s moral 
character. 
 
Let us elaborate on these functions in turn. In both folk and academic psychology, the 
notion of an attitude plays an explanatory and a predictive role (F1). It should be noted 
that prediction and explanation of people’s responses are tightly linked to each other. If 
we can predict a certain response of a person (e.g., a person’s aversion of eye contact 
with black people) by pointing to the fact that the person possesses a certain attitude 
(e.g., by pointing to the fact that the person possesses a negative attitude towards 
black people), we can also retrospectively explain that response with reference to the 
fact that the person possesses that attitude. We may hope that knowing about a 
person’s attitude towards a social group might help us to predict a vast array of 
responses of that person towards members of the respective social group. Suppose 
that someone tells you that Chung, of whom you have no other information, has a 
negative attitude towards black people. This will certainly lead you to form some 
expectations about Chung’s responses in regard to black people. You may, for 
example, expect him to keep above-average distance to black interlocutors (Dotsch & 
Wigboldus, 2008) or to shortlist disproportionally few people with “black sounding” 
names when being on a hiring committee (Purkiss et al., 2006). In fact, knowing about 
Chung’s attitude may not only help you to predict his overt behaviour towards black 
people but also relevant aspects about his cognitions and affective responses (Dotsch 
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& Wigboldus, 2008; Dovidio et al., 1997).6 You may predict that negative stereotypes 
about black people will come to his mind and that he may feel scared or angry when he 
encounters or imagines black people. Similarly, you may draw on the fact that Chung 
has a negative attitude towards black people to explain, retrospectively, his responses 
towards black people. You may wonder why Chung kept so much distance to the man 
that he was talking to and come to the conclusion that this was likely because the men 
was black and Chung has a negative attitude towards black people. Its role in the 
explanation and prediction of people’s cognition, affect, and behaviour is also the 
reason why the attitude notion is so widely used in academic psychology. 
Psychologists assume that people’s reactions towards other people are, at least partly, 
driven by some sort of evaluative mental state or disposition, which is referred to as 
“attitude” (Ajzen, 1988: 1).  
Note that if we were told that Sarah has a negative attitude towards black people, 
we would frequently go wrong in our predictions of her responses towards black 
people. After all, Sarah exhibits a range of favourable responses concerning black 
people (she encourages them to study medicine, she participates in anti-racism rallies, 
etc.). Similarly, if we were simply told that Sarah has a positive attitude towards black 
people, we would presumably also form wrong predictions. We would, for example, not 
expect her to keep more distance towards black people than towards white people. But 
how should we then describe Sarah’s attitude towards black people to facilitate optimal 
predictions? In the next section, I present one suggestion, which I call “the standard 
view”. For now though, I want to stress that the notion of an attitude can only fulfil its 
explanatory and predictive function if it picks out exactly those features of an 
individual’s psychology that drive that individual’s evaluative responses towards the 
group in question.7 Ascribing a positive attitude towards black people to Sarah only 
picks out a subset of those features that drive her responses towards black people 
(e.g., her belief that it is morally reprehensible to treat people differently because of 
their skin colour). Similarly, ascribing a negative attitude towards black people to Sarah 
would direct our attention only to a part of what drives her responses towards black 
people (e.g., her fear of black gun violence). This brings me to my first desideratum for 
a model of attitudes: 
                                            
6
 The fact that attitudes become expressed in cognition, affect, and behaviour has long been 
recognised by proponents of the so-called tripartite model of attitudes, originally proposed by 
Rosenberg & Hovland (1960). 
7
 I deliberately use the broad notion “features of an individual’s psychology” to cover all those 
entities, such as mental states, mental processes, dispositions, or traits, that may possibly 
constitute attitudes. Similarly, I have a broad notion of “evaluative response” in mind. This 
includes all occurring cognitions, affects, and behaviours that express an evaluation. The 
occurrent thought “black people are dangerous”, the occurrent feeling of fear of black people, or 
the excessive distance that Sarah keeps towards black people all express a negative evaluation 
and thus count as negative evaluative responses on my account. 
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(D1) To optimally fulfil its explanatory and predictive function, our notion of a 
person’s attitude towards group X must pick out exactly those features of that 
person’s psychology that drive that person’s evaluative responses towards 
group X. 
 
In ordinary discourse, the attitude notion also fulfils a character evaluative function 
(F2). Note that when we say that someone exhibits a racist, sexist, or homophobic 
attitude, we convey information that the recipient of this message will use in her moral 
assessment of the person. For example, if we are told that Chung has a negative 
attitude towards black people, we may well come to the conclusion that Chung is 
morally corrupt. Note that our verdict about Chung’s character is only justified if we 
understand Chung’s attitude as a feature of his psychological make up for which he is 
morally evaluable. Sarah’s case is complicated by the fact that she endorses 
egalitarian values and regrets her unintentional biases against black people. One may 
thus argue that Sarah is an egalitarian and that her discriminatory tendencies are not 
part of what she really stands for (Glasgow, 2016).8 In short, her problematic biases 
may not reflect on her moral character. I elaborate on the question as to what kind of 
dispositions can be said to reflect on a person’s moral character in later chapters of this 
thesis (in particular chapter 2 and chapter 5). For now though, it is important to note 
that this points us to a second desideratum for a model of attitudes: 
 
(D2) To optimally fulfil its role in character assessment, our notion of a person’s 
attitude towards group X should be sensitive to any difference that there may be 
between aspects of that person’s psychology that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of that person’s moral character and those aspects that are not part 
of that person’s moral character. 
 
Note that this is not yet to say that there is in fact such a distinction to be made 
between evaluative tendencies of a person that form part of her moral character and 
those that are not. My claim is conditional: if there is such a distinction to be made, our 
model of attitudes should account for this.9 This is a requirement that has largely been 
neglected in the psychological literature. 
So far, I have mentioned two desiderata for a model of attitudes that can be 
derived from functions F1 and F2 of the attitude concept. These desiderata will guide 
my evaluation of views concerning what attitudes are, and how we need to individuate 
                                            
8
 This view can be motivated by Frankfurt’s (1971, 1988) account of agency, as I show in 
chapter 5. 
9
 In fact, I argue in chapter 5 that even those evaluative dispositions that the agent does not 
identify with or feels alienated from can and should be seen as part of her moral character.  
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them, throughout this thesis. Of course, it could turn out that there is no model of 
attitudes that would in fact fulfil both desiderata. That is, it could turn out to be the case 
that any conception of attitudes that would satisfy D1 does not satisfy D2 (and vice 
versa). However, if there is a model that fulfils both desiderata it should be preferred 
over models that only fulfil one of these. 
My goal is to develop a model of the nature of attitudes that is in line with the 
empirical evidence, that proves useful for psychological and philosophical research on 
issues such as prejudice, discrimination, sexism, or racism, and that can also guide our 
day-to-day attitude ascriptions. This is of course an ambitious aim as psychologists, 
philosophers, and ordinary people (folk psychologists) may possibly have different 
conceptions of attitudes. Note, for example, that academic psychologists may not 
necessarily be concerned about the character evaluative role of attitudes, while this is 
important to philosophers and folk psychologists (F1). Yet, I believe that it would be 
highly beneficial if all these parties could find common ground regarding their 
understanding of attitudes because this would simplify communication between 
academic disciplines as well as between academia and the general public. We may 
state this as a third desideratum: 
 
(D3) To facilitate communication on attitudes between academic disciplines as well 
as between academia and the wider public, our notion of a person’s attitude 
towards group X should ideally be a notion that psychologists, philosophers, 
and ordinary people can agree on. 
 
If philosophers and psychologists would use the same attitude notion, this would 
facilitate cross-disciplinary discourse on important issues such as discrimination. 
Moreover, if scholars in philosophy and psychology as well as ordinary people would 
use the same attitude notion, this would simplify knowledge exchange between 
academia and the wider public. It must be stressed that scholarship on socially 
pressing issues should aim to inform public discourse. This can only be achieved if 
scholars communicate their findings or arguments in a way that is widely accessible. It 
will be easier to inform the general public or policy makers about attitude research if the 
attitude notion used corresponds, at least roughly, to how ordinary people (folk 
psychologists) use the term. Of course, it may (sometimes) be the case that ordinary 
discourse about psychological phenomena is confused, in which case it may actually 
be advisable to replace folk psychological concepts with scientific ones (P. M. 
Churchland, 1981; P. S. Churchland, 1986; Stich, 1983).10 Yet still, if there are different 
alternative models of attitudes available that are scientifically (and philosophically) 
                                            
10
 See section 4.5 in chapter 4 for an argument to this effect. 
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sound, we may as well prefer the model that corresponds best to the folk psychological 
notion of attitudes in order to facilitate communication between academia and the wider 
public.   
 
II.  The standard view 
 
It has become common in psychology, and also in the philosophy of prejudice, to 
distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes (Machery, 2016). On this perspective, 
which I call the “standard view”, Sarah’s unintentional biases against black people 
(e.g., her tendency to keep distance to black people) are based on a negative implicit 
attitude (or as it is sometimes called an “implicit bias”)11. Implicit attitudes are 
commonly understood to operate outside of the person’s control (and awareness).12 As 
a consequence, they are often at odds with the person’s explicitly endorsed beliefs or 
values.13 By contrast, Sarah’s tendency to condemn racism is reflective of an explicit 
attitude of hers on this view because this tendency is based on her endorsed beliefs 
which are subject to control.14 In fact, what I call the standard view is a cluster of views, 
which share the central assumption that people possess implicit and explicit attitudes 
(e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Levy, 2014b). These 
views differ in many details, but there is a substantial agreement among proponents of 
the standard view as to the nature of attitudes. 
With respect to Q2, many proponents of the standard view claim that implicit 
attitudes are based on conceptual or affective associations (e.g., Sarah’s association 
between BLACK PERSON and DANGER or her association between BLACK PERSON 
                                            
11
 It must be noted that the term “implicit bias” is ambiguous. It can denominate an output, such 
as a judgment, decision, or behaviour, that is implicitly biased or a mental state (or mental 
process) that is implicitly biased (Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016: 81-82). Used in this latter way, 
the term “implicit bias” may well refer to the same entities as the term “implicit attitude”. 
However, in the philosophical literature at least, the term “implicit bias” is typically used for 
mental states with negative evaluative implications (see for example the articles in Brownstein 
and Saul, 2016a, 2016b). By contrast, the term “implicit attitude” is more broadly used for 
mental states that can have a positive or negative valence. In this thesis, I consistently use the 
term “implicit attitude” and not the term “implicit bias” as I am not exclusively concerned with 
negative evaluations. 
12
 Although some authors have characterised implicit attitudes as unconscious (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995), it is increasingly recognised, even among proponents of the standard view that 
people can become aware of their so-called implicit attitudes (Levy, 2014b; Wilson et al., 2000; 
see section 1.2.5 in chapter 1). This is why I put “awareness” here in brackets and why I do not 
follow Machery (2016) in calling the view that there are distinct implicit and explicit attitudes “the 
Freudian view” (see chapter 4 in this thesis). 
13
 Sometimes a person may possess an implicit attitude which content is perfectly in 
accordance with the content of her explicit attitude. Such conformity is according to proponents 
of the standard view a matter of coincidence rather than a matter of control that the subject has 
over her implicit attitudes.  
14
 In chapter 1, I distinguish two kinds of control. People may lack control over the acquisition of 
an attitude (rational control) or over the activation of an attitude and its influence on behaviour 
(intentional control). 
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and a negative affective reaction), whereas explicit attitudes are based on propositional 
mental states (e.g., Sarah’s belief that it is morally reprehensible to treat people 
different because of their skin colour). With respect to Q3, the standard view also 
provides us with a clear answer: implicit and explicit attitudes are not only based on 
mental states but are in fact to be identified with mental states (e.g., associative and 
propositional mental states, respectively). Accordingly, we may say that Sarah’s 
association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER is an implicit attitude of hers and 
that her moral belief is an explicit attitude of hers. With respect to Q1, however, the 
answer of proponents of the standard view is not so clear. On the one hand, 
proponents of the standard view often speak of “dual attitudes” when speaking about 
evaluative conflicts between explicit and implicit attitudes (Wilson et al., 2000), which 
may suggest that people have a single implicit and a single explicit attitude towards the 
respective social group. On the other hand, the claim that attitudes can be identified 
with individual mental states may suggest that people can in fact have several implicit 
and several explicit attitudes towards the same social group. I elaborate further on this 
point in chapter 1, where I present the standard view in more detail. A detailed 
examination of the implications of the standard view, and the empirical evidence that 
supposedly supports it, is crucial for assessing its validity. 
Here it shall already be mentioned that part of the appeal of the standard view 
stems from the fact that it seemingly fulfils D1 (though see next section). As mentioned 
in the previous section, when we ascribe either a positive or a negative attitude to 
Sarah, we only pick out a part of what drives her responses towards black people. Yet, 
by ascribing both a negative implicit and a positive explicit attitude to Sarah we seem to 
provide a more holistic description of her psychology that helps us explain and predict 
her responses towards black people. Sarah is on the one hand likely to report that 
discrimination against black people is wrong, which we can predict on the assumption 
that she has a positive explicit attitude towards black people. On the other hand, Sarah 
shows subtle signs of discomfort in the presence of black people, which we can predict 
on the assumption that she has a negative implicit attitude towards black people. 
The standard view may also seem to satisfy D2 (though see next section). Recall 
that one may argue that Sarah is a self-identified egalitarian whose unintentional 
biases do not reflect on her moral character (see last section). By describing Sarah’s 
egalitarian beliefs as explicit attitudes and her spontaneous responses towards black 
people as expressive of implicit attitudes, the standard view may thus capture 
accurately the distinction between those aspects of her psychology that form part of her 
moral character and those aspects that do not reflect on her moral character (Levy, 
2014b, 2015, 2017a). 
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It is unclear in how far the standard view can satisfy desideratum D3. As I have 
mentioned, the standard view is the common conception of attitudes in the psychology 
and philosophy of prejudice. However, it should be noted that this conception of 
attitudes conflicts with the folk psychological conception of attitudes. When we ascribe 
attitudes to people in day-to-day life, we do not seem to pick out individual (implicit or 
explicit) mental states but seem to highlight general traits of people.  
 
III.  A preview of the argument to come 
 
In the following chapters, I will scrutinise the standard view and argue that there is a 
better model of attitudes available. According to a plausible version of the standard 
view, implicit attitudes are associative mental states over which agents have only 
indirect control, while explicit attitudes are propositional mental states that are subject 
to direct control. Yet, I will argue that this is not the best way to construe attitudes. 
Important motivations for distinguishing between implicit and explicit attitudes do not 
hold up to scrutiny. Firstly, the psychometric evidence does not establish that there are 
indeed two distinct classes of attitudes. Secondly, evidence suggests that to optimally 
explain and predict people’s evaluative responses, we do not actually need to 
distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes (Oswald et al., 2013; see desideratum 
D1). Thirdly, it is misguided to assume that the distinction between so-called implicit 
attitudes and so-called explicit attitudes marks a distinction between mental states that 
form part of a person’s moral character and mental states that do not form part of a 
person’s moral character (see desideratum D2). However, the problem with the 
standard view of attitudes is not only that it is not well motivated. The standard view is 
also at odds (as already mentioned above) with the folk psychological conception of 
attitudes (see desideratum D3). When we ascribe, for example, a sexist attitude to a 
person, we do not normally mean to pick out a particular belief or association but rather 
a general trait of the agent. I will argue that there is in fact a scientifically sound model 
of attitudes available that is better aligned with the folk psychological conception of 
attitudes and more conducive to our explanatory/predictive and character evaluative 
purposes.  
Regarding the question about the ontological status of attitudes (Q3), I claim that 
attitudes are traits of people that can be analysed as profiles of situation-specific 
evaluative response dispositions. Sarah, for example, can be said to possess an 
aversive racist attitude that consists of two situation-specific response dispositions: (1) 
the disposition to respond in a favourable manner towards black people in situations in 
which she has sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by 
her endorsed egalitarian commitments, and (2) the disposition to respond in a negative 
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manner towards black people in situations in which she does not have sufficient time 
(e.g., when she has to judge quickly whether a person poses a threat to her) or 
cognitive resources (e.g., when she is distracted by the conversation with her patients) 
to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments.  
In regard to the question about the mental states that underpin attitudes (Q2), I will 
argue that each attitude is grounded in a variety of distinct (implicit and explicit) mental 
states (see Machery, 2016, for a related view). Sarah’s aversive racist attitude, for 
example, may be based on her belief that it is wrong to treat people differently because 
of their skin colour, her desire not to discriminate against black people, various 
associations (such as the association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER), her 
disposition to feel scared of black people, etc. On my proposed view attitudes are 
neither implicit nor explicit. The implicit-explicit distinction applies only to the mental 
states at the psychological basis of the attitude. 
Concerning the question about attitude individuation (Q1), I will argue that there 
are different legitimate ways to individuate a person’s attitude(s), which depend on our 
interests and purposes as attitude ascribers. Given my brief description of the case of 
Sarah, it may be salient that she has an aversive racist attitude as described above. 
Yet, it should also be noted that my description of Sarah’s responses towards black 
people can only be incomplete. Sarah’s evaluative responses towards black people 
may vary dependent on a myriad of contextual factors that we can hardly all keep track 
of. I argue that attitude ascribers often need to extract salient or especially noteworthy 
patterns from a person’s more complex mesh of situation-specific response 
dispositions to give an intelligible account of that person’s attitude(s). The process of 
extracting relevant response patterns is influenced by our interests and purposes as 
attitude ascribers. As our interests und purposes may differ, we may end up with 
different ways to individuate attitudes. These different ways to individuate attitudes are 
all legitimate as long as they track actual dispositions of the agent and thus help us to 
explain/predict the agent’s responses and to convey accurate information about the 
agent’s moral character. 
 
IV.  The structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 1, I present those assumptions that 
motivate the standard view of attitudes and elaborate on how the standard view 
answers Q1, Q2, and Q3. This allows me to draw some initial conclusions about the 
extent to which the standard view satisfies the desiderata for a model of attitudes. In 
the first part of the chapter, I argue that the distinction between implicit and explicit 
attitudes can possibly be defended with reference to the following features: mental 
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structure (associative mental structure vs. propositional mental structure), rational 
control (reason-insensitivity vs. reason-responsiveness), and intentional control 
(automaticity vs. control). Awareness, by contrast, does not provide a feature that 
would allow us to distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes as recent findings suggest 
that people can become aware of their so-called implicit attitudes just as they can 
become aware of their so-called explicit attitudes (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 
2006; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001; Hahn et al., 2014; Scaife et al., 2016). I 
also elaborate on what the standard view implies for conceptions of evaluative agency 
and a person’s moral character (see desideratum D2). In short, explicit attitudes are 
generally assumed to form part of a person’s moral character, while implicit attitudes do 
not. In the second part of the chapter, I show that the distinction between implicit and 
explicit attitudes is also assumed to correspond to two different ways to measure 
attitudes (i.e., indirect and direct measures of attitudes). However, I argue that 
divergences between people’s responses on indirect and direct measures cannot prove 
that people possess distinct implicit and explicit attitudes, unless we already adopt a 
certain account of attitude individuation. Moreover, I discuss evidence that indicates 
that in order to optimally explain and predict people’s evaluative responses towards 
other people (see desideratum D1), we may not actually need to postulate the 
existence of two distinct classes of attitudes that correspond to what is measured on 
indirect and direct measures of attitudes (Forscher et al., 2016; Oswald et al., 2013).  
In chapter 2, I scrutinise some of the claims that proponents of the standard view 
have made about implicit attitudes (defined for the purposes of this chapter as those 
mental states that are measured on indirect measures of attitudes). I present a recent 
account by Mandelbaum (2016) according to which implicit attitudes are not, as usually 
assumed by proponents of the standard view, reason-insensitive associative mental 
states but in fact reason-responsive propositional mental states. I argue that 
Mandelbaum’s argument fails. Even if we grant Mandelbaum that the evidence that he 
bases his argument on is evidence of propositionally structured implicit attitudes, this 
does not establish that all or the majority of implicit attitudes are propositionally 
structured. Moreover, there are alternative explanations available for the effects that 
Mandelbaum discusses that are consistent with an associative account of implicit 
attitudes. It follows that proponents of the standard view may be right that implicit 
attitudes are associative mental states, while explicit attitudes are propositional mental 
states. However, even on the assumption that implicit attitudes are associative mental 
states, it is not correct that implicit attitudes are completely outside of the subject’s 
rational or intentional control. I emphasise that associative mental states are, at least to 
some extent, subject to indirect rational and indirect intentional control. Drawing on an 
argument by Holroyd & Kelly (2016), I further argue that this implies that implicit 
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attitudes can in fact form part of people’s moral characters. This undermines one 
important motivation to draw the distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes. That 
is, the distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes fails to mark a relevant 
distinction between what belongs to and what does not belong to a person’s moral 
character (see desideratum D2). Together with my conclusions from chapter 1, this 
suggests that the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes is not well motivated. 
I also highlight that the standard view’s identification of attitudes with individual mental 
states is out of line with the folk psychological conception of attitudes as traits. This 
may impede scholars’ attempts to inform public discourse with their research (see 
desideratum D3). I thus propose to examine whether there is an alternative model of 
attitudes available that is better aligned with the folk psychological conception of 
attitudes as traits while still being scientifically sound. 
In chapter 3, I turn to another distinction that is often made in regard to those 
mental states that are candidate (components of) attitudes: the distinction between 
stereotypes about and affect towards social groups (henceforth, “social affect”). Many 
scholars assume that this distinction is not only a conceptual distinction but that these 
concepts in fact correspond to distinct mental kinds (e.g., Amodio, 2008; Judd, Blair, & 
Chapleau, 2004; Valian, 2005). On this “two-type model”, stereotypes, such as Sarah’s 
association between BLACK PEOPLE and DANGER, can in principle occur 
independently of affective responses, such as Sarah’s fear of black people (and vice 
versa). Other scholars have replied with a “one-type model” according to which 
stereotypes inherently possess an affective valence and social affect inherently 
possesses stereotypic conceptual content (Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016; Madva & 
Brownstein, 2016). On my proposed view, one-type theorists are right in so far as 
stereotypes about social groups and affects towards social groups form tight clusters 
(what Madva & Brownstein, 2016, call “evaluative stereotypes”). I show that the 
empirical evidence that proponents of the two-type view have brought forward cannot 
establish that stereotypes and social affect can operate independently of each other. 
Moreover, I point out that by focusing on the interactions between stereotypes and 
social affect we can yield better predictions of discriminatory behaviour than by 
focusing exclusively on either stereotypes or social affect. Yet, I also argue, contra 
Madva and Brownstein (2016), that the proposed clusters (the evaluative stereotypes) 
are not unified mental states but are composed of different kinds of mental states (e.g., 
conceptual mental states and affective mental states) that are causally closely linked to 
each other. Although this may appeal to some proponents of the two-type model, I also 
emphasise that the causal interconnectedness between conceptual and affective 
mental states makes it appropriate to say that stereotypes are affective and that social 
affect has a conceptual or stereotypic quality (which is a key claim of proponents of the 
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one-type model). As stereotypes and affect jointly drive people’s responses towards 
other people qua members of social groups, it has to be acknowledged that both form 
part of people’s attitudes (see desideratum D1). This provides a further answer to the 
question of what kind of mental states underpin attitudes (Q2).  
In chapter 4, I develop my preferred model of attitudes. In short, I argue that 
attitudes are traits of people that can be analysed as profiles of evaluative response 
variation across situations (answer to Q3). I start out by discussing the recently 
proposed trait view of attitudes by Machery (2016) according to which attitudes “are 
broad-track dispositions to behave and cognize (have thoughts, attend, emote, and so 
on) toward an object […] in a way that reflects some preference” (p. 112). On this 
account, an attitude is based on a multitude of distinct mental states and processes 
(such as associative mental states, beliefs, emotions, and self-control processes; 
answer to Q2) and can be characterised in terms of an aggregate strength and 
valence. I highlight that the view that attitudes are traits is attractive because there are 
striking similarities in the explanatory, predictive, and character evaluative roles of trait 
and attitude ascriptions, and because the trait view of attitudes aligns well with the folk 
psychological understanding of attitudes. Yet, there is an objection that any view that 
holds that attitudes are traits must address. This is the situationist challenge according 
to which people’s responses are largely determined by aspects of situations that they 
encounter and not by inner response dispositions of the kind that traits are usually 
identified with (e.g., Doris, 2002). I present a reply that is open to Machery (2016). As 
attitudes are characterised in terms of an aggregate strength and valence on his 
account, one may insist that the situationist argument merely establishes that attitudes 
are oftentimes relatively weak and not that there are no attitudes conceived as traits at 
all. However, this reply comes at a price. By characterising attitudes in aggregationist 
terms, Machery (2016) obscures attitudes’ complex structure. His account masks 
evaluative conflicts and ambivalences, such as when people feel alienated by their own 
racist dispositions (see the case of Sarah) or exhibit both benevolent and hostile sexist 
tendencies. Moreover, his account does not do justice to relevant differences in the 
affective content of attitudes. I hold that my proposed model of attitudes, which 
describes attitudes as profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions, 
both fends off the situationist challenge and does justice to the described evaluative 
complexities of attitudes. Based on Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) influential cognitive-
affective personality system model, I argue that it is misguided to assume that it speaks 
against the existence of attitudes understood as traits if people exhibit different 
evaluative responses towards members of a particular social group in different 
situations. Quite to the contrary, I take it to be a defining feature of attitudes that they 
are composed of situation-specific response dispositions. However, as agents usually 
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exhibit innumerable situation-specific evaluative response dispositions in regard to a 
single social group, we need to read off the most relevant response patterns if we want 
to give an intelligible account of a person’s attitude. I discuss several ways in which the 
process of highlighting relevant response patterns (i.e., highlighting profiles of situation-
specific response dispositions) is influenced by the attitude ascribers’ interests and 
purposes. As the attitude ascriber’s interests and purposes may differ to some extent, 
there are different legitimate ways to individuate attitudes (answer to Q1).  
In chapter 5, I present a possible objection against my proposed profile view of 
attitudes. My account implies that an evaluative response disposition that an agent 
does not identify with (henceforth “non-endorsed disposition”) may nevertheless be 
partly constitutive of an attitude of that agent. For example, Sarah’s disposition to show 
negative responses towards black people when she does not have sufficient time and 
cognitive resources to reflect on her endorsed egalitarian commitments may form part 
of her attitude towards black people, even though she condemns racism and does not 
want to behave in a negative manner towards black people. Proponents of so-called 
real self theories may find this implication untenable because they hold that only those 
dispositions that the agent identifies with or that conform to the agent’s considered 
values and rational judgments constitute the persons “real self” for which she is morally 
evaluable (e.g., Frankfurt, 1971; Stump, 1988; Velleman, 1992; Watson, 1975). On this 
view, my model of attitudes may violate desideratum D2 because it is not appropriately 
sensitive to the difference between mental states that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of a person’s moral character and those mental states that are not part of a 
person’s moral character. I reply that the real self perspective is unconvincing for a 
number of reasons. I show that we in fact routinely take both endorsed and non-
endorsed evaluative response disposition into account when we evaluate the moral 
character of other persons, which is at odds with the real self account. I grant that 
some people (although not all people) are happy to accept that non-endorsed response 
dispositions do not reflect on their moral character. Yet, I insist that this is likely the 
result of a self-serving bias rather than an honest assessment. The real self view 
allows us to create a positive self-image because we can regard problematic response 
dispositions that conflict with our values as external to who we really are. However, the 
fact that the real self view helps us to feel good about ourselves is not a good reason to 
believe that this view should be adopted. Quite to the contrary, I regard the real self-
perspective as problematic because we are less likely to do something against 
problematic response dispositions that harm others if we believe that these dispositions 
do not reflect negatively on us as persons. This leads me to a pragmatic argument for 
the inclusion of non-endorsed response dispositions in our model of attitudes. By 
including non-endorsed response dispositions in our conception of attitudes, we can 
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encourage the perception that these dispositions reflect on our moral character and 
make it thus more likely that we will tackle problematic biases. 
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Chapter 1: The standard view 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I mentioned that there is a conception of attitudes that 
deserves to be called “the standard view” since it is predominant in both the 
contemporary philosophical and psychological literature on attitudes. This is the view 
that people possess distinct implicit and explicit attitudes.15 Following on from my 
earlier example, Sarah may be said to have a positive explicit attitude towards black 
people, which is reflected in her favourable deliberate responses in regard to black 
people, and a negative implicit attitude towards black people, which is reflected in her 
problematic spontaneous responses in regard to black people. 
In this chapter, I will describe in more detail how proponents of the standard view 
have characterised implicit and explicit attitudes and will elaborate on those 
psychological measurement procedures that supposedly identify people’s implicit and 
explicit attitudes. This investigation will reveal how proponents of the standard view 
answer (and in part fail to answer) those questions about the nature of attitudes that 
were introduced in the introduction to this thesis: 
 
(Q1) How should we individuate attitudes? 
(Q2)  What mental states underpin attitudes? 
(Q3)  What is the ontological status of attitudes? 
 
Moreover, my investigation will allow some initial conclusions about the extent to which 
the standard view satisfies the desiderata for a model of attitudes that were mentioned 
in the introduction to this thesis:  
 
(D1) To optimally fulfil its explanatory and predictive function, our notion of a 
person’s attitude towards group X must pick out exactly those features of that 
                                            
15
 See Fazio (1990, 2007) for a somewhat different perspective. Fazio does not distinguish 
between implicit and explicit attitudes, but what he describes as “attitude” corresponds roughly 
to what proponents of the standard view would call “implicit attitude”. According to Fazio (2007), 
attitudes are “associations between a given object and a given summary evaluation of the 
object” (p. 608) that can become “activated automatically from memory” (p. 610). On his view, 
people’s spontaneous evaluative responses are a function of these attitudes (Fazio et al., 
1995). People’s deliberate evaluative responses, by contrast, are often (but not necessarily) 
influenced by other mental states and processes (such as a person’s moral beliefs or self-
presentational motives) besides the attitude. On Fazio’s model, these other mental states and 
processes are not attitudes (or constituents of attitudes).  
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person’s psychology that drive that person’s evaluative responses towards 
group X. 
(D2) To optimally fulfil its role in character assessment, our notion of a person’s 
attitude towards group X should be sensitive to any difference that there may be 
between aspects of that person’s psychology that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of that person’s moral character and those aspects that are not part 
of that person’s moral character. 
(D3) To facilitate communication on attitudes between academic disciplines as well 
as between academia and the wider public, our notion of a person’s attitude 
towards group X should ideally be a notion that psychologists, philosophers, 
and ordinary people can agree on 
 
This chapter has two parts. The first part (section 1.2) is concerned with the question of 
how implicit and explicit attitudes are characterised by proponents of the standard view. 
It will become clear that the standard view has strongly been influenced by dual-
process models of cognition in psychology. In section 1.2.1, I will show that it is 
common among proponents of the standard view to identify explicit attitudes with 
propositional mental states, whereas implicit attitudes are commonly identified with 
associative mental states. In section 1.2.2, I will argue that this provides clear answers 
to the question of what mental states underpin attitudes (Q2) and the question as to the 
ontological status of attitudes (Q3). However, proponents of the standard view have 
largely neglected the question of attitude individuation (Q1). In section 1.2.3, I will 
elaborate on how the alleged distinction between (associative) implicit attitudes and 
(propositional) explicit attitudes relates to philosophical accounts of evaluative agency, 
rational control, and moral character. In section 1.2.4, I will show that other scholars 
have linked the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes to a distinction 
between automatic and controlled attitude activation. In section 1.2.5, I will then 
elaborate on the claim that implicit and explicit attitudes are distinguished by the fact 
that the former are unconscious, while the latter are consciously accessible. The 
upshot will be that the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes can possibly be 
defended by reference to mental structure, rational control (reason responsiveness), 
and/or intentional control, but that consciousness does not provide a reasonable 
criterion to draw this distinction.  
The second part of this chapter (section 1.3) is about the psychological 
measurement procedures that are supposed to reveal implicit and explicit attitudes. In 
section 1.3.1, I will present some examples of direct measures of attitudes that are 
supposed to reveal explicit attitudes and of indirect measures of attitudes that are 
supposed to reveal implicit attitudes. In section 1.3.2, I will argue that dissociations 
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between people’s results on indirect and direct measures of attitudes do not provide 
proof for the claim that people possess distinct implicit and explicit attitudes unless we 
already adopt a certain account of attitude individuation. In section 1.3.3, I will discuss 
recent meta-analyses that indicate that both indirect and direct measures of attitudes 
are relatively poor predictors of people’s evaluative responses towards other people. I 
take these results to suggest that we may not actually need to postulate the existence 
of distinct classes of implicit and explicit attitudes (a measured on indirect and direct 
measures of attitudes) in order to optimally explain and predict people’s evaluative 
responses.  
 
1.2  The nature of attitudes on the standard view 
 
The standard view of attitudes holds that there are two distinct kinds of attitudes. This 
view has strongly been influenced by dual-process models of cognition (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Although 
dual-process models differ in many details, there is a substantial overlap in the features 
that individual scholars ascribe to the two alleged classes of processes (that may or 
may not be claimed to operate in two different types of cognitive system). One type of 
process (often said to operate in “system 1”) is described as associative, automatic, 
unconscious, effortless, independent of attentional resources, fast, and impulsive. The 
other type of process (often said to operate in “system 2”) is typically described as 
propositional, rule-based, controlled, conscious, effortful, attention demanding, slow, 
and reflective (Frankish & Evans, 2009; Kahneman, 2012; Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000).16 Processes of the former kind are often described as “implicit”, while 
processes of the latter kind are commonly referred to as “explicit”. Influenced by this 
general framework of cognition, it has become common, both in social psychology and 
in the philosophy of prejudice, to distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes. It 
has been claimed that different kinds of mental states – mental states that allow for 
associative and rule-based processing – underlie implicit and explicit attitudes 
respectively (see section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2), that implicit attitudes are insensitive to 
reasons while explicit attitudes are reason-responsive (see section 1.2.3), that implicit 
attitudes operate in an automatic mode while explicit attitudes are controlled (see 
                                            
16
 The terms “system 1” and “system 2” were introduced by Stanovich (1999). This terminology 
highlights the assumption that people’s minds are divided into two distinct cognitive systems 
that give rise to two distinct kinds of cognitive processes. See for example Frankish and Evans 
(2009), table 1.1, or Sloman (1996), table 1, for summaries of the properties that are ascribed to 
the two systems. It shall be noted, however, that we may be able to distinguish two different 
kinds of cognitive processes without these processes issuing from distinct cognitive systems 
(e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). That is, dual-process theories are not necessarily 
dual-system theories.   
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section 1.2.4), and that implicit attitudes are unconscious while explicit attitudes are 
conscious (see section 1.2.5).  
 
1.2.1 Implicit attitudes as associative and explicit attitudes as propositional 
mental states 
 
As mentioned above, on predominant dual-process views in psychology there is a 
distinction to be made between associative and rule-based (or propositional) 
processes. It is often claimed that the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes 
maps onto this distinction: implicit attitudes are assumed to operate in an associative 
manner, while explicit attitudes are taken to operate in a rule-based (or propositional) 
fashion (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 
2004).17 As I will show in this section, this suggests an answer to the question as to 
what kind of mental states underpin attitudes (Q2). In the next section, I will then 
elaborate on what this implies for the ontological status of attitudes (Q3) and the 
question of attitude individuation (Q1). 
We can distinguish between association as a mental process and association as a 
mental state. The mental process is the time-dependent spreading of activation from 
one mental representation to associated mental representations. Associative 
processes presuppose the existence of associative networks of representations – what 
I call associative mental states. Implicit attitudes are understood to be associative 
mental states of this sort. That is, they are commonly understood to be underpinned by 
networks of associatively linked mental representations (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011).18 Commonly, the relevant representations are 
supposed to be concepts. Sarah from our example above may associate the concept 
BLACK PERSON with the concept DANGER. It is also often assumed that 
representations of positive or negative affective valence take part in these associations 
(De Houwer, 2014: 343; Mandelbaum, 2016: 630). For example, the concept BLACK 
PERSON may be associatively linked to negative affect in Sarah (and to the concept 
                                            
17
 See also De Houwer (2014), Levy (2015), Mandelbaum (2016), and Stammers (2016: chapter 
4) for characterisations of the difference between associative and propositional mental states 
and processes in evaluation. 
18
 Hughes and colleagues (2011) conclude their review of dominant models of implicit attitudes 
in psychology with the statement that these models share “the pre-analytic belief that implicit 
attitudes should be understood largely in terms of the formation, activation, and change of 
associations between mental representations” (p. 471). The perspective that implicit attitudes 
are associative mental structures is certainly the standard view in the psychological literature. 
To name just a few examples, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) claim that “implicit 
evaluations are the behavioral outcome of associative processes” (p. 1), Rydell and McConnell 
(2006) understand implicit attitudes as the products of “a slow learning, associative system of 
reasoning” (p. 1006), and Amodio and Devine (2006) argue that implicit evaluation and implicit 
stereotyping are based on affective and semantic associations, respectively.  
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DANGER).19 Saying that representations are associatively linked implies that if one 
representation becomes activated (e.g., the concept BLACK PERSON), its activation 
spreads over to those representations to which it is linked (e.g., to the concept 
DANGER and to negative affect; Collins & Loftus, 1975). Associative links can be 
unidirectional (e.g., when the activation of BLACK PERSON spreads over to DANGER 
but not vice versa) or bidirectional (e.g., when the activation of BLACK PERSON 
spreads over to DANGER and vice versa; Cox & Devine, 2015).20 Activation spreading 
is assumed to happen fast, effortless, without reflective control and independent of 
attentional resources – which is why it is often attributed to system 1 (see also section 
1.2.4 on the automaticity-control contrast). The connection strength between the 
representations determines how strongly the activation of one representation will affect 
the activation of connected representations. We may distinguish between occurrent 
and dispositional associative mental states. An association is occurrent when the 
representations that constitute the association are momentarily co-activated. However, 
even when the association is not currently activated, we may say that the association is 
present in a dispositional sense. By this I mean that due to the link between the 
representations, the representations have the propensity to become co-activated. For 
example, when we say that Sarah associates BLACK PERSON with DANGER, we do 
not normally mean that this association is currently activated but that it will become 
activated when she encounters or imagines a black person.  
It is generally assumed that associative mental states can only be changed over 
multiple experiences (De Houwer, 2014: 342; Mandelbaum, 2016: 632-635; Stammers, 
2016: 103-104).21 Encountering a black person who is clearly not dangerous will not do 
much to weaken Sarah’s association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER, but if 
Sarah repeatedly encounters black people who clearly pose no threat to her and if she 
is not confronted with any negative representations of black people (e.g., in the media 
or in conversation with other people) for a while, her association may weaken over 
time. The assumption that implicit attitudes have associative structure is often appealed 
to in order to explain why it is so difficult to change people’s implicit attitudes. Sarah’s 
tendency to keep more distance to black patients than to white patients persists despite 
                                            
19
 In chapter 3, I will elaborate on the question of how conceptual associations (such as Sarah’s 
association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER) are related to affect (the anxiety that 
Sarah experiences). I will argue that these kinds of mental states are causally tightly linked and 
jointly contribute to people’s attitudes.  
20
 Henceforth, when I simply speak of „association“, I mean associative mental states as they 
are characterised here. 
21
 It should be noted, however, that associations can presumably be acquired by a single 
experience. A clear case in point is taste aversion (Mandelbaum, 2016: 633-634). If you get 
seriously sick after eating a tomato, you will acquire a strong association between the taste of 
tomatoes and the feeling of sickness. Note that once acquired, it will take several positive 
experiences with tomatoes to get rid of your distaste for tomatoes. Acquiring associations is 
generally much easier than getting rid of them.  
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her belief that this tendency is problematic. This can be explained by the fact that 
Sarah’s implicit attitude is associative and thus can only be changed by changing 
certain external contingencies (Levy, 2014a: 99-100).   
Just like associative mental states, propositional mental states are understood to 
be composed of abstract mental representations. Yet, unlike associations, propositional 
mental structures possess a language-like syntax and a truth value. If one associates 
BLACK PERSON with VIOLENCE, this does not imply any particular relation between 
these two concepts. By contrast, a propositional structure containing BLACK PERSON 
and VIOLENCE, such as a belief with the content “black persons are violent”, specifies 
the relation between these concepts.22 Violence is here described as an attribute of 
black persons (see also De Houwer, 2014: 344-345, and Stammers, 2016: 99-100). 
The content of propositional mental states is assumed to be compositional. That is, 
their content is a function of the content of the constituent concepts and the syntax that 
links up these concepts (Margolis & Laurence, 2007: 562). Due to their internal 
structure propositional mental states can feature in inferential transitions. For example, 
if one holds the belief (or as we may want to say the attitude) “all black persons are 
violent” and the belief “John is a black person”, it is rational to infer that “John is 
violent”. We may call such inferences over propositional mental states “propositional 
processes”. 
Unlike associations, propositional mental states can be (but are not necessarily) 
eradicated by single experiences (De Houwer, 2014: 344; Mandelbaum, 2016: 635-
636; Stammers, 2016: 103-104). For example, someone who holds the belief that all 
Germans are industrious may possibly (although not necessarily) eradicate this belief 
upon encountering a lazy German person. By contrast, such an experience will do little 
to change an established association between Germans and industriousness. It is thus 
assumed that implicit attitudes qua being associative are difficult to change by one-off 
interventions, while explicit attitudes are much more amenable to such interventions 
due to their propositional structure (Levy, 2014a: 99-100). I will return to this point in 
section 1.2.3, in which I discuss the implications of the association-proposition 
distinction for philosophical accounts of evaluative agency, rational control, and a 
person’s moral character. Before I turn to that, it is worth examining what answers to 
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 I am assuming here a representationalist account of believing, according to which a person’s 
beliefs can be identified with particular mental representations (that have the right internal 
structure or that stand in appropriate causal relations with other mental states). By contrast, 
proponents of non-representationalist accounts of believing (dispositionalists, interpretivists, and 
also some functionalists), would deny that particular representational structures instantiate 
beliefs (Schwitzgebel, 2015). Most proponents of these alternative accounts of believing would 
grant that there are mental states with propositional structure but deny that any of these states 
underwrites believing (or desiring). I invite adherents of these accounts to substitute any 
reference to “belief” in what follows with “propositionally structured mental state”.  
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the questions concerning attitude individuation (Q1) and the ontological status of 
attitudes (Q3) the standard view provides.  
 
1.2.2 The ontological status of attitudes and attitude individuation on the 
standard view 
 
It has to be stressed that proponents of the standard view describe implicit and explicit 
attitudes not only in a way that suggests that they are based on (associative and 
propositional) mental states. Rather implicit and explicit attitudes are characterised in a 
way that suggests that they are in fact to be identified with (associative and 
propositional) mental states. This is apparent from the fact that proponents of the 
standard view describe attitudes as entities that can occur, be activated, be 
introspected and be retrieved (e.g., Levy, 2014b; Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000; 
see also Machery, 2016: 107-108). That is, they characterise attitudes as having a 
comparable ontological status to mental states such as beliefs, desires, intentions and 
emotions. The standard view thus provides not only an answer to the question as to 
what kind of mental states underpin attitudes (Q2) but also to the question as to the 
ontological status of attitudes (Q3). Note that in principle a psychological construct 
could be based on mental state(s), without being a mental state. For example, it has 
been claimed that attitudes are traits, which are based on a variety of different mental 
states, without being identical to them (Machery, 2016).23 This is not what proponents 
of the standard view have in mind. For them attitudes are clearly to be identified with 
mental states. Levy (2015), for example, posits that “[i]mplicit attitudes are mental 
states that appear sometimes to cause agents to act in ways that conflict with their 
considered beliefs” (p. 800, my emphasis).  
Despite providing clear answers to Q2 (the question as to what kind of mental 
states underpin attitudes) and Q3 (the question of the ontological status of attitudes), 
proponents of the standard view have largely neglected the question of attitude 
individuation (Q1). This is problematic because if it remains unspecified how we should 
individuate attitudes, we do not have a way to decide how many attitudes a given 
individual has (or can have) towards a given social group. In particular, we cannot say 
whether people can have attitudes that conflict with each other if we do not know how 
to individuate attitudes. In what follows, I elaborate on what the standard view entails 
with respect to Q1. 
The emphasis that is often put on the claim that people possess “dual attitudes” 
towards a particular social group seems to reflect the assumption that people 
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 In fact, I will defend a version of this view in chapter 4. 
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(normally) have exactly one implicit and one explicit attitude towards that group. 
Consider for example this passage from Wilson and colleagues (2000):  
 
We propose that people can have dual attitudes, which are different evaluations of the 
same attitude object, one of which is an automatic, implicit attitude and the other of which 
is an explicit attitude. (p. 102)  
 
This passage suggests the existence of just two attitudes, one implicit and one explicit, 
towards the attitude object.24 However, this simple perspective on attitude individuation 
is in conflict with the claim that attitudes are mental states, as can be seen when we 
consider once more the case of Sarah. With what would we identify Sarah’s implicit 
and her explicit attitude if she really had just one of each? To be sure, we may say that 
her implicit attitude towards black people is an association between the concept 
BLACK PERSON and the concept DANGER and that her explicit attitude is an anti-
racist belief, such as the belief that black people do not pose a threat to her. However, 
this is an overly simplistic picture of Sarah’s psychology. It is implausible to assume 
that Sarah associates only one attribute with black people. It is much more likely that 
she will associate black people with a range of stereotypical attributes, some of which 
may even have a positive valence (e.g., the concept MUSICALITY). Moreover, she will 
likely hold a range of different beliefs about black people that are expressive of an 
evaluation of black people (e.g., the belief that it is wrong to treat black people any 
different to white people, the belief that black people pose no threat to her, etc.). It 
would be unduly arbitrary to identify her implicit attitude with any particular associative 
link (e.g., the link between BLACK PERSON and DANGER) and to pick out one 
particular belief as her explicit attitude. 
In response, one may suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes are mental states 
with a complex structure. One could say that her explicit attitude is the entirety of her 
evaluative beliefs about black persons. However, note that although each of Sarah’s 
beliefs is clearly a mental state, the entirety of her beliefs about black people is 
certainly not a mental state. This is because her beliefs about black people can be 
tokened independently of each other. In some situations her behaviour may be guided 
by her belief that black people pose no threat to her (e.g., when she encourages young 
black people to study medicine) and in other situations her belief that it is wrong to treat 
black people any different to white people may be tokened (e.g., when she notices her 
inclination to keep more spatial distance and to make less eye contact with black 
patients than with white patients). In short, a set of beliefs fails to constitute a mental 
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 Wilson and colleagues (2000) acknowledge at the end of their article the possibility of multiple 
implicit and explicit attitudes, each of which is tied to a particular context. Nonetheless, their 
initial description of the dual attitude account is representative of how many scholars speak 
about the implicit-explicit distinction. 
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state because we should expect that components of a mental state always co-occur. 
Identifying Sarah’s explicit attitude with the entirety of her endorsed evaluative beliefs 
about black people is thus incompatible with identifying her explicit attitude with a 
mental state. If attitudes are to be identified with mental states (as proponents of the 
standard view claim), we need to acknowledge that Sarah has at least as many explicit 
attitudes towards black people as she has evaluative beliefs with regard to black 
people.25  
Similarly, we have to acknowledge that Sarah has multiple implicit attitudes 
towards black people if we want to maintain that implicit attitudes are to be identified 
with mental states. Relying on research on object representation, Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (2011) note that “the same attitude object may activate different patterns 
of associations in memory depending on the particular context in which the object is 
encountered” (p. 62). For example, Sarah’s association between BLACK PERSON and 
DANGER may become activated whenever she is approached by a black person on 
the street but her association between BLACK PERSON and MUSICALITY may be 
tokened whenever she encounters black people at concerts. The fact that Sarah’s 
association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER and her association between 
BLACK PERSON and MUSICALITY can, in principle, be tokened independently of 
each other, indicates that they are separate mental states. 
To sum up, proponents of the standard view often speak about attitudes in a way 
that suggests that people (usually) have only one implicit and one explicit attitude 
towards a given social group. However, as I have shown above, this is incompatible 
with the claim that attitudes are mental states because people harbour a multitude of 
relevant mental states with respect to a given social group. If implicit attitudes are 
associative mental states and if explicit attitudes are propositional mental states, 
people will likely have a multiplicity of implicit and explicit attitudes towards a given 
group. As the claim that attitudes are mental states (entities that can occur, be 
activated, be introspected, and be retrieved) is essential to the standard view, 
proponents of the standard view should accordingly acknowledge that people can have 
multiple implicit and explicit attitudes.  
A motivation for the claim that people possess dual-attitudes may be that this 
accounts for the conflict that people often experience between an endorsed 
commitment (i.e., an explicit attitude) and an automatic association (i.e., an implicit 
attitude). However, it needs to be stressed that conflicts of this sort can also be 
accounted for by an account on which people possess multiple implicit and multiple 
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 I say “at least” because explicit attitudes can arguably not only be identified with beliefs but 
also with propositional mental states of other kinds, such as desires. For example, Sarah may 
have the desire to interact with black people in the same way as she would interact with white 
people.  
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explicit attitudes. On such an account, a particular implicit attitude may be in conflict 
with one or several explicit attitudes (but maybe not all explicit attitudes). Conversely, 
one particular explicit attitude may be in conflict with one or several implicit attitudes 
(but maybe not all implicit attitudes).26 Attitudinal conflict is thus compatible with a 
multiple attitude account and does not carry any weight in favour of a dual-attitude 
account. I therefore suggest that the most defensible version of the standard view 
implies that people can possess several implicit and several explicit attitudes towards a 
particular social group. 
It shall already be mentioned that this view of attitudes is at odds with how the 
attitude notion is used in day-to-day discourse. For example, when we say that 
someone has a negative attitude towards immigrants, we do not seem to refer to an 
individual mental state (e.g., a belief or an association) of the agent. Rather we want to 
express that the agent is generally disposed to respond in a negative way towards 
immigrants. In short, we refer to a generic trait of the agent. The fact that the 
predominant view of attitudes in the psychological and philosophical literature on 
attitudes (the standard view) is so far detached from this folk psychological 
understanding of attitudes is worrying. As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, 
scholars in philosophy and in psychology will find it difficult to inform public discourse 
on such important issues such as discrimination if their notion of an attitude does not 
correspond, at least roughly, to how ordinary people use the term. However, before I 
explore whether there is an alternative model of attitudes available that better 
corresponds to the folk psychological notion of attitudes (while still being of use to 
psychologists and philosophers; see desideratum D3 of a model of attitudes), I will 
continue with my review of the standard view. We first need to understand the 
implications of the standard view before we can examine whether there is a more 
appropriate model of attitudes available. 
 
1.2.3 Implications of the association-proposition distinction for evaluative 
agency, rational control, and a person’s moral character 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I have mentioned that the notion of an attitude should 
be sensitive to the difference between aspects of an individual’s psychology that can 
rightly be said to be constitutive of that person’s character and those aspects that are 
not part of her character (if there is indeed such a difference; desideratum D2). As I will 
show in this section, by distinguishing between associative implicit attitudes and 
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 Also, there may of course be conflicts among the implicit attitudes and among the explicit 
attitudes of an agent. Yet, one should assume that conflicts between different explicit attitudes 
will normally be resolved fairly quickly by the person. See next section for Levy’s (2014b) notion 
of the “unification of the person” (p. 35).  
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propositional explicit attitudes the standard view may possibly fulfil this criterion. To 
show this, I will elaborate on how associative and propositional mental states are 
usually understood to relate to an agent, and link this to the notion of rational control. 
It has been argued that (certain) propositional mental states, such as beliefs, are 
agential mental states, while associative mental states do not have the right structure 
to be attributed to an agent (e.g., Gendler, 2008a, 2008b; Levy, 2014a).27, 28 The 
standard view thus has implications for how we conceive of moral agency. Levy is 
presumably the philosopher who has argued most extensively for the relevance of the 
implicit-explicit distinction on the basis of an account of agency (Levy, 2011, 2014a, 
2014b, 2015, 2017a). According to Levy (2014b), being an agent crucially involves the 
capacity to pursue projects over time, which in turn presupposes what he calls “the 
unification of the person”:  
 
[A]gency depends upon unification of the person; an agent has a relatively consistent set of 
beliefs and desires, and is able to ensure that she acts upon those beliefs and desires. 
This unification depends upon explicit attitudes, I propose, because only such attitudes can 
cause broad and integrated behaviors. Explicit attitudes are employed by the agent to 
impose unity effortfully, by being taken as premises in reasoning, and through their role in 
coordinating plans and projects. Pursuit of plans and projects requires rule-based 
processing, not associative. (p. 35) 
 
Levy argues here that rule-based (and thus norm-driven) reasoning over propositions is 
necessary to achieve consistency among one’s mental states and in one’s conduct. 
Contradictions among one’s propositionally structured beliefs and desires can be 
resolved by reasoning, leading to an integrated set of mental states, which forms the 
basis for coherent behaviour over time. By contrast, associations cannot play this 
integrative role in a person’s agency according to Levy (2014b). As associations are 
not able to feature in inferences, they cannot be brought into line with other mental 
states by reasoning. They simply track whatever contingencies between stimuli are 
present in a person’s environment, irrespective of what the person believes or desires. 
That is, rather than contributing to an agent’s projects and plans, associations often 
prevent the realisation of agential behaviour according to Levy. 
Levy (2014a: 99-100) links his conception of agency to the notion of rational 
control. With reference to Gendler (2008b), he argues that implicit attitudes are not 
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 See Stammers (2016: chapter 2) for an extensive review of the literature on this, what she 
calls, “substantial distinction view”. 
28
 Gendler (2008a, 2008b) calls these associative mental states “aliefs“ to contrast them with 
beliefs. Aliefs have according to Gendler representational, affective, and behavioural 
components. Gendler (2008a) mentions incidentally that the representational component of an 
alief may represent state of affairs “perhaps propositionally, perhaps nonpropositionally, 
perhaps conceptually, perhaps nonconceptually” (p. 643). Although she raises the possibility 
that the representational component of an alief may have propositional structure in this 
statement, she insists that aliefs are not reason-responsive and not subject to intentional 
control.  While I focus on Levy’s model at this stage, I will get back to Gendler’s model in 
chapter 3.  
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responsive to reasons. By this he means that their acquisition and change is not a 
function of what the agent takes to be facts that justify their acquisition and change but 
rather of mere regularities in a person’s environment. Whereas an agent’s beliefs and 
desires (which may form the basis of her explicit attitudes) can be updated in 
accordance with what the agent judges to be good reasons, implicit attitudes are not 
subject to such rational modification due to their associative structure. Levy (2014a) 
notes accordingly that implicit attitudes do not belong “to the class of judgment-
dependent attitudes” (p. 99). This implies that implicit attitudes can be acquired and 
persist, even though the agent judges their content to be factually wrong or to be 
morally problematic. In a later article, Levy (2015) admits that implicit attitudes may 
have some propositional structure but maintains that “[t]hey do not feature often 
enough and broadly enough in the kinds of normatively respectable inferential 
transitions that characterize beliefs” (p. 816).29 He argues that they form a sui generis 
class of mental states which he calls “patchy endorsements”. As patchy endorsements 
lack the inferential promiscuity of beliefs (i.e., the ability to interact in a normatively 
appropriate way with any other propositional state), they are not sufficiently reason-
responsive (i.e., judgment-dependent) to contribute to the unification of the person (see 
also Levy, 2017a).  
Levy’s (2014a, 2015, 2017a) view that implicit attitudes often compromise agential 
behaviour because we lack rational control over them is widely shared among 
philosophers (Gendler, 2008a, 2008b; Glasgow, 2016; Zheng, 2016). On this view, 
there is a fundamental difference between non-agential implicit attitudes and agential 
explicit attitudes, which is marked by the reason-insensitivity of the former and the 
reason-responsiveness of the latter attitudes. This distinction may have important 
implications for our assessment of a person’s moral character (and, on some accounts, 
also for moral responsibility).30 Consider again the case of Sarah. Sarah’s tendency to 
keep more spatial distance to black than to white interlocutors may plausibly not be 
subject to rational control. After all, this tendency persists despite the fact that Sarah 
believes it to be wrong to treat people differently because of their skin colour. 
Accordingly, proponents of the standard view could say that her tendency to keep 
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 See next chapter for an extensive discussion of the propositional account of implicit attitudes.  
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 Watson (2004), for example, contrasts two forms of moral responsibility: Responsibility as 
attributability and responsibility as accountability (see Fischer & Tognazzini, 2011, and Zheng, 
2016, for related distinctions). Whether someone is responsible for a response in the 
attributability sense depends on the relation between the response and the agent: individuals 
are responsible for those thoughts and behaviours that are attributable to them as reflections of 
their agency. The distinction between associative and propositional mental states is thus 
arguably relevant for this form of moral responsibility. By contrast, responsibility in the 
accountability sense depends on the relation of the agent to her moral community. The agent is 
accountable for her conduct if others have justifiable expectations of how she should behave. 
Scholars are divided upon the question as to whether accountability for an action necessarily 
implies attributability of that action (see Zheng, 2016: footnote 3). 
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excessive distance from black interlocutors does not tell us anything about her moral 
character. On this view, we should judge Sarah rather by her endorsed beliefs, which 
are subject to rational control.  
To sum up, I showed in this section that some proponents of the standard view 
claim that implicit attitudes are not attributable to an agent, while explicit attitudes are 
agential mental states. This is because implicit attitudes are allegedly not (sufficiently) 
responsive to reasons and can thus not contribute to the unification of a person. 
Explicit attitudes, by contrast, are reason-responsive (i.e., under the subject’s rational 
control) due to their propositional structure. The standard view’s distinction between 
implicit and explicit attitudes may thus nicely capture the distinction between those 
evaluative mental states that are not part of a person’s moral character (reason-
insensitive mental states) and those mental states that are reflective of a person’s 
moral character (reason-responsive mental states). If this is correct, the standard view 
fulfils the second desideratum of a model of attitudes (D2). That is, it is sensitive to the 
difference between aspects of an individual’s psychology that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of that person’s character and those aspects that are not part of her 
character. However, in the next chapter (see especially section 2.3), I will argue that 
so-called implicit attitudes can reflect on a person’s moral character after all. This is 
because implicit attitudes are subject to indirect rational control (and indirect intentional 
control). 
 
1.2.4 Implicit and explicit attitudes as automatic and controlled mental states 
 
In the last section, I have reviewed Levy's (2014a, 2015) view, which distinguishes 
implicit and explicit attitudes by reference to rational control. According to this, explicit 
attitudes are acquired and changed in accordance with what the agent considers to be 
good reasons, but implicit attitudes are insensitive to such reasons. However, it must 
be noted that other scholars refer to another form of control that allegedly enables us to 
distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Rydell & McConnell, 
2006; Wilson et al., 2000). This second notion of control has been inspired by 
psychological research on automatic and controlled processing (e.g., Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). In short, the idea is that controlled processes require substantial 
attentional resources (i.e., are non-efficient) and are voluntarily initiated and sustained 
(i.e., they require an intention), while automatic processes occur without the subject’s 
intention and attentional focus (i.e., they are efficient) and are difficult to suppress 
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(Gawronski & Payne, 2010).31, 32 We may refer to this as a difference in “intentional 
control”. 
A classic example of a task in which automatic and controlled processes compete 
is the so called Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1997). In a typical Stroop 
experiment participants are asked to name as quickly as possible the colour of the ink 
of a colour word, whilst there is a mismatch between the ink colour and the meaning of 
the word (e.g., the word “green” printed in red ink). It has been found that participants 
respond much more slowly in this task than in a control task in which they are asked to 
name the colours of solid squares (Stroop, 1935, experiment 2). That is, when colour 
and meaning of word are incompatible, participants find it hard not to read out the word 
instead of naming the colour. This finding is commonly taken to show that reading is an 
automatic process that interferes with the colour naming task. While the colour naming 
requires the participant’s attention, reading of the words proceeds without attention. 
Participants must selectively attend to the colour of the words in order to be able to 
successfully complete the task, whereas reading does not demand (many) attentional 
resources and proceeds without the subject’s intention to read the words (in fact, it 
proceeds despite the subject’s intention not to read the word). 
Building upon this and related research on control and automaticity in cognitive 
psychology, social psychologists began to develop and to test accounts of automatic 
and controlled attitude (and stereotype) activation (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & 
Tylor, 1986; Fazio et al., 1995).33 The key idea is that some evaluations of a social 
group (usually understood as associations) are activated automatically from memory 
(and influence behaviour in an automatic manner) whenever a member of the social 
group is present (implicit attitudes), while other evaluations, such as those implied by 
endorsed beliefs about the social group, must be intentionally retrieved by the subject 
(explicit attitudes; Wilson et al., 2000). It is widely assumed that those evaluations (or 
                                            
31
 The relation between the intentionality of a process and the attentional resources that the 
process requires is complex. On the one hand, it is arguably true that highly attention 
demanding processes require an intention to be sustained. On the other hand, It must be noted 
that processes that are initiated (and guided) by an intention do not necessarily require (many) 
attentional resources. For example, tooth brushing is clearly an intentional activity (those mental 
processes that guide my tooth brushing are intentional) but does not require (much of) my 
attention. I can focus my attention on a demanding task (e.g., adding up numbers) while I brush 
my teeth without necessarily compromising my tooth brushing performance. Thus, when 
psychologists claim that controlled processes require attentional resources and are voluntary 
initiated, this should not be taken to imply that these features necessarily go together. The claim 
seems rather to be that a prototypical controlled process combines these features. Similarly, we 
can say that a prototypical automatic process occurs without the subject’s intention and her 
attentional focus, without committing us to the claim that unintentionality of a processes and low 
attentional requirements of a process always go together. 
32
 Bargh (1994) uses the term “automatic” more broadly to denote processes that are non-
intended, outside of awareness, non-controllable, or efficient and emphasises that these 
features, although often being linked to each other, do not necessarily co-occur. 
33
 See chapter 3 for an elaboration on how stereotypes relate to attitudes. 
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stereotypes) that are activated automatically (e.g., Sarah’s association between 
BLACK PERSON and DANGER) have been learned over repeated experiences. 
Devine (1989), for example, argued that culturally prevalent negative stereotypes of 
black people become ingrained in memory due to numerous encounters with 
representations of them throughout a person’s lifetime. She showed that even people 
with explicitly non-prejudiced commitments are influenced by these automatically 
activated stereotypes when judging the hostility of an ambiguously described black 
person (Devine, 1989, study 2). As with the controlled inhibition of the automatic 
response on the Stroop task, overriding the influence of automatically activated 
evaluations with a different evaluative response is supposed to require effort and 
substantial attentional resources. Sarah, for example, may need to focus on her anti-
racist commitments in order to be able to override her unintentional habitual response 
to keep excessive spatial distance from black people. 
It can be argued that Sarah’s inclination to keep excessive spatial distance from 
black people is not reflective of her moral character because it is an unintentional 
response that she can hardly suppress. Reflective of Sarah’s moral character may 
instead be her anti-racist commitments because Sarah wants them to drive her 
responses. Insofar as these assumptions are correct, it seems that the standard view 
fulfils the second desideratum of a model of attitudes (D2): it is sensitive to the 
difference between aspects of an individual’s psychology that are not part of her 
character (her automatic mental states) and those aspect that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of her character (her controlled mental states). However, in the next 
chapter, I will argue that implicit attitudes can form part of a person’s moral character 
because agents can take indirect intentional control (and indirect rational control) of 
their implicit attitudes. 
For now though, it is important to note that there are two notions of control that can 
potentially be used to distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes. Firstly, we may ask 
whether we have or lack rational control over the acquisition and change of attitudes 
(see section 1.2.3). This comes down to the question as to whether the respective 
attitudes are reason-responsive. Implicit attitudes are assumed to be insensitive to 
what the agent’s considers to be good reasons while explicit attitudes are said to be 
reason-responsive (and thus under the subject’s rational control). Secondly, we can 
ask whether the activation of attitudes and their influence on behaviour is automatic or 
controlled (discussed in the present section). This comes down to the question as to 
whether the occurrence of the attitude and its influence on behaviour is intentional and 
requires the person’s attentional focus (we may call this “intentional control”). Implicit 
attitudes are often said to become activated and influence behaviour automatically, 
while the retrieval and operation of explicit attitudes requires both the subject’s 
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intention and attentional focus (Devine, 1989; Fazio et al., 1995). Claims about the 
automaticity-control distinction (about intentional control) can be made independently of 
claims about rational control (and vice versa). If one chooses to base the distinction 
between implicit and explicit attitudes on the automaticity-control distinction, one does 
not need to commit to any claims about reason-responsiveness (e.g., De Houwer, 
2014; Fazio, 2001; Wilson et al., 2000). Conversely, if one chooses to base the 
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes on a difference in reason-
responsiveness, one does not need to commit to any claims about the automaticity-
control distinction.34 That is, proponents of the standard view can base the distinction 
between implicit and explicit attitudes on either or both types of control.  
 
1.2.5 Implicit and explicit attitudes as unconscious and conscious mental 
states 
 
Besides differences in mental structures, rational control, and intentional control, 
differences in introspective awareness have traditionally been taken to be characteristic 
of the difference between implicit and explicit attitudes (Rydell et al., 2006; Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). My argument in this section proceeds as 
follows. I will first present the traditional view that differences in introspective 
awareness are characteristic of the implicit-explicit difference. I will then show that it is 
increasingly acknowledged, even among proponents of the standard view, that 
awareness does in fact not provide a criterion by reference to which a distinction 
between implicit and explicit attitudes could be drawn. 
Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) have been influential in forming the view that 
implicit attitudes are unconscious. They characterise implicit attitudes as follows: 
 
Implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past 
experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social 
objects. (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995: 8) 
 
Introspection is commonly defined in the philosophical and psychological literature as 
some kind of unmediated access to (or perception of) one’s own mental states 
(Borgoni, 2015). Greenwald and Banaji‘s (1995) claim that implicit attitudes are 
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience” (p. 8) 
can thus be understood to imply that people lack direct access to the contents of those 
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 Yet, to the best of my knowledge those authors who distinguish between reason-responsive 
explicit attitudes and reason-insensitive implicit attitudes do as a matter of fact also 
acknowledge that implicit attitudes operate in an automatic mode, while explicit attitudes 
operate in a controlled mode (Gendler, 2008a, 2008b; Levy, 2014a, 2015).  
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memory states that form their implicit attitudes.35 According to this claim, implicit 
attitude research is concerned with the influence of memories that are inaccessible to 
the agent on evaluative responses (favourable or unfavourable feeling, thought, or 
action). For example, the finding that people are more likely to hire white job 
candidates with ambiguous qualifications than black job candidates with the same 
qualifications has been attributed to fact that people “unconsciously harbor negative 
feelings and beliefs about blacks” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000: 315). The distinction 
between unconscious implicit attitudes (often also called “implicit biases”) and 
conscious explicit attitudes has also been taken up by a range of philosophers (e.g., 
Kelly & Roedder, 2008; Levy, 2011, 2013; Saul, 2013; Washington & Kelly, 2016). 
Some of these philosophers have suggested that people are not blameworthy for 
problematic implicit attitudes and behaviour resulting from these if they are unaware of 
having these attitudes (Saul, 2013; Levy, 2011, 2013). According to Levy (2013), for 
example, the agent’s moral responsibility for an action depends on whether the action 
is attributable to the agent. He argues that “only actions settled upon by conscious 
deliberation are deeply attributable to agents, because only such actions express the 
agent’s evaluative stance” (p. 211). According to this view, actions that are driven by 
unconscious implicit attitudes do not express the agent’s evaluative stance.36 Such a 
way of distinguishing between unconscious implicit and conscious explicit attitudes 
may be in line with desideratum D2 of a model of attitudes: it draws a line between 
aspects of an individual’s psychology that can be said to be constitutive of that person’s 
character (conscious explicit attitudes) and those aspects that are not part of her 
character (unconscious implicit attitudes). 
However, in more recent years scholars in both philosophy and psychology have 
become sceptical of the claim that so-called implicit attitudes are in fact unconscious 
(e.g., Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur 2006; Holroyd, 2015, 2016; Levy, 2014b; 
Stammers, 2016). This is because empirical evidence has accumulated to show that 
people can, at least sometimes, become aware of the content of those mental states 
that are commonly referred to as “implicit attitudes” (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 
2006; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001; Hahn et al., 2014; Scaife et al., 2016). 
Especially striking in this regard are the results by Hahn and colleagues (2014). They 
conducted several studies in which participants were asked to predict their result on a 
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 I use the term “content” here and in what follows in a colloquial sense. In particular, I do not 
want to imply that the mental state itself has propositional content. Sarah may be said to be 
aware of the content of her conceptual association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER 
when she comes to the realisation that she associates black people with danger.   
36
 Yet, as I will show below, Levy has adopted more recently the view that people can become 
aware of their implicit attitudes in the same way as they can become aware of their explicit 
attitudes (Levy, 2014b). According to this, reason-insensitivity and lack of inferential promiscuity 
(but not awareness) distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes.  
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psychological test of implicit attitudes (i.e., the implicit association test described below 
in section 1.3.1) before actually taking part in the test. For example, in one study (study 
2), participants were required to indicate on a scale the relative negativity or positivity 
of their “true attitude” towards black people (and white people) that they expected the 
test to reveal. Afterwards, they took part in the implicit association test. Strikingly, 
participants’ estimates of their “true attitudes” were largely in line with the attitudes that 
the measure of implicit attitudes revealed. This result was found across a variety of 
testing conditions. For example, it was replicated when participants had no previous 
experience with the implicit association test and received only minimal information 
about the test before making their prediction (study 4). Moreover, participant’s estimate 
of their own implicit attitude was shown to be a better predictor of their result on the 
implicit association test than their estimate of the implicit attitude of an average person 
(study 3). The researchers take this to show that participants have “unique insight into 
their own implicit responses” that extends beyond their knowledge about other people’s 
attitudes (p. 1380).  
One may of course wonder what this “unique insight” amounts to and whether it 
differs in any relevant way from how we come to know about our explicit attitudes. 
Hahn and colleagues mention two possible routes by which their participants might 
have acquired knowledge about the content of their implicit attitudes: firstly, participants 
might have considered how they have responded to the target group on past 
encounters, which might have helped them to infer the contents of their attitude 
towards the target group. We may call this indirect or inferential awareness. Secondly, 
participants may have experienced a certain negative or positive gut feeling when 
thinking about the target group, which they then reported as their implicit attitude. 
Assuming that this gut feeling is constitutive (part) of the attitude, this may qualify as 
direct (or introspective) awareness.  
One could perhaps argue that people have only inferential awareness of implicit 
attitudes (i.e., people need to rely on evidence to infer the content of their implicit 
attitudes), while they have direct introspective access to their explicit attitudes. 
However, this claim is problematic for at least three reasons. Firstly, the current 
empirical evidence concerning people’s awareness of implicit attitudes is compatible 
with the possibility that people have direct access to their implicit attitudes (Gawronski, 
Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006).37 Secondly, it is notoriously difficult to pin down what 
introspective awareness is (Holroyd, 2015). While introspection is commonly defined as 
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 In fact, Hahn and colleagues (2014) argue that participants in their studies had most likely 
direct, and not only inferential, access to the content of their implicit attitudes. However, the 
empirical support that they provide for this claim is contestable. I will therefore content myself 
with the claim that it remains an open question as to how exactly people become aware of the 
content of so-called implicit attitudes. As I will argue below, the same is true for our awareness 
of so-called explicit attitudes.   
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unmediated access to (or perception of) one’s own mental states, it has recently been 
argued that relying on evidence to infer the content of one’s mental states is in fact in 
line with the ordinary notion of introspective access (Borgoni, 2015). Given this latter 
conception of introspection, the participants in Hahn and colleagues’ (2014) studies 
had introspective access to their so called implicit attitudes even if they inferred the 
content of these attitudes from memories of their past behaviour towards the target 
group. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, even with respect to so called explicit 
attitudes it is anything but clear how we come to be aware of their contents. In fact, 
there is an ongoing dispute over whether people have direct (introspective) access to 
the content of their own propositional mental states. Carruthers (2009a), for example, 
argues that we use the same mindreading capacity that we use to infer other people’s 
mental states to learn about our own beliefs and desires. According to this view, our 
access to our own propositional mental states is never direct (or introspective) but 
always mediated by certain perceptual states. This is not the place to discuss 
Carruthers' account of mindreading. All that I want to show is that even for mental 
states that are commonly assumed to be explicit (i.e., our agential propositional 
attitudes) it is an open question whether we have direct introspective awareness of 
them. It is thus anything but clear whether awareness is a factor on which the 
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes can be based. On the contrary, 
leading proponents of the standard view (both in philosophy and psychology) have 
acknowledged that there is no relevant difference in the awareness that people have of 
so-called implicit and explicit attitudes (Levy, 2014b; Wilson et al., 2000). Levy (2014b), 
for example, relies on Carruthers’ (2009a) account of mindreading and argues that 
people can become aware of the contents of their implicit attitudes in the same way as 
they can become aware of the contents of their explicit attitudes.38  
To conclude, people can become aware of the contents of their alleged implicit 
attitudes and it is not clear whether the manner in which they become aware of their 
implicit attitudes differs in any way from how they become aware of their alleged 
explicit attitudes. This shows that if one wants to defend the distinction between implicit 
and explicit attitudes, basing this distinction on a difference in awareness does not 
seem to be promising.  
 
                                            
38
 It may of course be the case that it is more difficult to become aware of the content of some 
mental states (e.g., conceptual associations) than of the content of other mental states (e.g., 
beliefs). However, to support the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes on the basis 
of a difference in awareness one would have to argue that the content of so-called implicit 
attitudes is per se more difficult to access than the content of so-called explicit attitudes. This is 
a claim that is by far more difficult to establish. Why should we for example assume that the 
contents of propositional mental states are per se more easily to access than the contents of 
associative mental states? 
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1.2.6 Summary 
 
In the foregoing part of this chapter, I showed that proponents of the standard view 
have defended the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes with reference to a 
range of different features: mental structure, rational control, intentional control, and 
awareness. In the last section, I showed that it is increasingly acknowledged, even 
among proponents of the standard view, that awareness does not provide a criterion by 
reference to which a distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes can be drawn. 
This leaves us with the criteria of mental structure, rational control, and intentional 
control as potential difference makers. Implicit attitudes are frequently claimed to be 
associatively structured, while explicit attitudes are claimed to be propositionally 
structured. It is also usually assumed that this difference in mental structure goes 
together with a difference in reason-responsiveness (i.e., with a difference in rational 
control). According to this, implicit attitudes do not respond to what the subject regards 
to be good reasons (i.e., are not subject to rational control), while explicit attitudes are 
reason-responsive (i.e., are subject to rational control). Independently of this 
distinction, other scholars have emphasised that implicit attitudes operate in an 
automatic mode (i.e., without the subject’s intention or attentional focus), while explicit 
attitudes operate in a controlled mode (i.e., guided by the subject’s intention and reliant 
on the subject’s attentional resources). In principle, one can support the claim that 
there are distinct implicit and explicit attitudes merely by reference to the distinction 
between automatic and controlled processing without committing oneself to any 
particular assumption about mental structure or reason-responsiveness (e.g., De 
Houwer, 2014; Fazio, 2001; Wilson et al., 2000). Similarly, one could defend the 
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes by reference to mental structure (and 
the reason-responsiveness implied by this) without committing oneself to the control-
automaticity distinction. I do thus not claim that the standard view implies a conjunction 
of claims about mental structure, rational control, and intentional control. Rather I take 
the standard view to be the claim that there are distinct implicit and explicit attitudes, 
and this claim can be supported by any of the above mentioned features.  
 
1.3  Psychological measures of attitudes 
 
In the foregoing, I showed that on the standard view certain differences in mental 
structure, rational control, and/or intentional control (and on some accounts also 
awareness) characterise the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes. This 
view receives some of its support from common sense. For example, it seems 
plausible that Sarah’s inclination to keep excessive spatial distance from black 
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interlocutors is driven by an association that Sarah cannot eliminate by mere reasoning 
(e.g., her association between BLACK PERSON and DANGER) and that becomes 
activated without Sarah’s intention. At the same time, Sarah possesses certain anti-
racist beliefs that are reason-responsive and that play a role in Sarah’s intentional 
behaviour. 
Yet, it must be stressed that proponents of the standard view do not only rely on 
common sense or intuition when defending their account. Crucially, they also claim that 
psychological measurements of people’s evaluative dispositions support their view that 
there is a distinction to be made between implicit and explicit attitudes. This is a claim 
that deserves philosophical scrutiny. Our model of attitudes should certainly be 
informed by the psychological data, but we also have to keep in mind that our 
interpretation of the data relies on and deploys certain views about cognitions and their 
structure in the first place. This implies that we should not uncritically rely on common 
interpretations of measurement outcomes that suggest particular answers to the 
questions about attitude individuation, the mental states that underpin attitudes, and 
the ontology of attitudes (see questions Q1, Q2, and Q3 in the introduction to this 
thesis).  
In what follows, I will first elaborate on the difference between direct measures of 
attitudes, which supposedly measure explicit attitudes, and indirect measures, which 
supposedly measure implicit attitudes, and will provide some examples of each of 
these classes of measurement techniques (section 1.3.1). This is important because 
throughout the rest of this thesis I will take for granted that the reader is familiar with 
these different measures. Moreover, this review of measurement techniques will 
provide the reader with a clearer sense of the research that has inspired the distinction 
between implicit and explicit attitudes. In section 1.3.2, I will then argue that 
dissociations between people’s results on indirect and direct measures of attitudes do 
not prove that there is a distinction to be made between implicit and explicit attitudes, 
unless we presuppose a particular account of attitude individuation. We should 
therefore first settle the issue of attitude individuation before we interpret the 
measurement data in terms of attitudes. I will also point to the often neglected fact that 
the statistical dissociation between people’s results on different indirect measures of 
attitudes is at least as pronounced as the statistical dissociation between people’s 
results on indirect and direct measures of attitudes. This may indicate that different 
measures (including different indirect measures) tap into different mental states or 
combinations thereof – a claim that I will further elaborate on in the following chapters. 
Lastly, in section 1.3.3, I will point to evidence that indicates that the distinction 
between implicit attitudes (as measured on indirect measures of attitudes) and explicit 
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attitudes (as measured on direct measures) is not actually crucial for the prediction of 
people’s spontaneous vs. deliberate evaluative responses. 
 
1.3.1 Direct and indirect measures of attitudes 
 
Many of the claims about attitudes discussed in the previous sections have been 
informed by attitude measurement research in psychology. Broadly speaking, there are 
two classes of attitude measurement techniques: while on some measures people are 
directly prompted to express their attitudes (e.g., on semantic differentials or feeling 
thermometers as described below), other tests involve people in tasks that are 
supposed to allow for conclusions about their attitudes without directly asking them for 
their attitudes (e.g., the affective priming task and the implicit association test described 
below). I will follow De Houwer (2006) in referring to these as direct and indirect 
measures, respectively. It should be noted that in much of the literature these different 
techniques are referred to as explicit and implicit measures instead. However, this 
nomenclature is problematic because it may tacitly suggest that these measurement 
procedures assess explicit and implicit attitudes, respectively. When characterising 
measurement techniques, we should not confound the features of the measurement 
procedure itself (whether people are directly asked for their attitudes or not) with those 
properties of the constructs that they supposedly measure (De Houwer, 2006). 
Although it is commonly assumed that by directly asking participants for their attitudes 
they will express evaluations that exhibit those features of explicit attitudes that were 
reviewed in the first part of this chapter (propositional structure, reason-responsive, 
intentionally controlled), we should not make this part of the definition of the 
measurement technique. Similarly, we should refrain from defining indirect 
measurement techniques in terms of those evaluations that they are supposed to 
measure (associative, reason-insensitive, automatic evaluations). After all, it might turn 
out that they, at least sometimes, tap into constructs that differ from those that they are 
commonly supposed to measure. It may for example be the case that the Implicit 
Association Test (described below) does not necessarily measure associations (a 
possibility that I will explore in the next chapter). I will therefore use the terms “direct” 
and “indirect” for the measurement procedures and the terms “explicit” and “implicit”, as 
characterised in the first part of this chapter, for those entities that are assumed to be 
measured by these procedures.  
Giving some examples of direct and indirect assessment techniques will provide 
an insight into their differences. Questionnaires for the direct assessment of attitudes 
often include, amongst others, semantic differentials or feeling thermometers. On 
semantic differentials participants are asked to indicate how strongly they think that 
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certain attributes, such as “pleasant”, “aggressive”, and “friendly”, apply to a social 
group (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). On a feeling 
thermometer participants are simply required to indicate on a scale (e.g., ranging from 
0 to 100) how coolly or warmly they feel towards the social group in question (e.g., 
Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; Hahn et al., 2014). When asked in these direct ways 
to report on their attitude(s), people can deliberate on which response(s) they should 
give and will thus engage in and report on propositional thought processes. As a result, 
their responses are assumed to be intentional (i.e., non-automatic) and subject to 
rational control. In short, direct measures are assumed to tap into explicit attitudes as 
they have been characterised in the first part of this chapter. However, it should also be 
clear that people’s responses on these measures do not necessarily reflect their 
sincere evaluation of the group. They may adjust their responses in order to present 
themselves to the researcher in a way that they deem desirable (that is, for the most 
part, less prejudiced than they really are; Krumpal, 2013). Moreover, people may 
simply be mistaken about their attitude towards the group in question (see section 1.3.2 
for further elaboration on these possibilities). 
These possible confounds motivated researchers to develop techniques to assess 
attitudes indirectly. The underlying idea is that people’s automatic, non-deliberate, 
evaluations of a social group are expressed in their performance on tasks that require 
them to respond as quickly as possible to certain representations of that social group. 
Many indirect measures of attitudes belong to the category of priming measures. 
Examples include the affective priming task (Fazio et al., 1986), the semantic priming 
task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), and the affect misattribution procedure (Payne 
et al., 2005). These measures rely on the principle that the presentation of a stimulus 
(the prime) systematically affects participants’ subsequent reaction to another stimulus, 
which allows researchers to draw conclusions about how the prime is evaluated by the 
participants. The affective priming task (also often referred to as “evaluative priming 
task”) is one of the most popular indirect measures of attitudes (Fazio et al., 1986, 
1995). In a classic experiment, Fazio and colleagues (1995) presented participants with 
picture primes of black and white individuals on a computer screen. Each prime was 
followed by an adjective, which had to be categorized as positive or negative as quickly 
as possible by a key press. For white participants, pictures of white individuals speeded 
up responses to positive words (e.g., attractive, likable, wonderful) as compared to 
negative words (e.g., annoying, disgusting, offensive) and for black participants the 
opposite pattern of facilitation was detected. Interestingly, these facilitation effects 
occur even when the prime is presented so swiftly that participants are not able to 
consciously perceive them (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997, 2001). The results of 
affective priming studies are usually explained by an automatic activation of an 
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evaluation (i.e., the implicit attitude) when (subconsciously) perceiving the prime. It is 
assumed that the activated evaluation creates a processing advantage for evaluatively 
congruent target words, presumably due to activation spreading across associatively 
linked mental representations (Fazio, 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003; see section 1.2.1).39 
For example, if the perception of a black person elicits a negative evaluation one will be 
quicker at identifying a negative word as negative and slower at identifying a positive 
word as positive. This process is assumed to be automatic as the subject does not pay 
attention to the valence of the prime and does not intend to be influenced by the 
valence of the prime (see section 1.2.4) Moreover, one can speculate that the mental 
states that are measured on the affective priming task are beyond rational control due 
to their associative structure (see section 1.2.3).40 
Probably the most frequently used indirect measure in the context of attitude 
research is however the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). This technique is assumed to measure differential associations of two 
categories of interest (e.g., black persons and white persons) with two attribute 
dimensions (e.g., positivity and negativity). In a typical race IAT, participants have to 
categorise person stimuli as either belonging to the category of white or black people 
and words as either belonging to the class of positive or negative attributes. For 
example, participants may be instructed to respond by pressing the “a” key on a 
keyboard whenever a face of a white person (or a name that is typically linked to white 
people) appears on the computer screen in front of them and to press the “l” key 
whenever a face of a black person (or a name that is typically linked to black people) is 
displayed. Moreover, they are asked to use the same keys to categorise attribute 
words as positive or negative. For example, they may be instructed to press the “a” key 
whenever a positive attribute word is displayed and the “l” key whenever a negative 
attribute word is shown. Face stimuli and attribute words appear on the screen in 
alternating order. Half-way through the experiment the response mapping is swapped. 
That is, if participant’s were previously required to respond with “a” to white faces and 
positive attribute words and to respond with “l” to black faces and negative attribute 
words, they are now asked to respond with “a” to black faces and positive attribute 
words, and to respond with “l” to white faces and negative attribute words. Participants’ 
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 It must be noted that although the affective priming task is generally interpreted as a measure 
of implicit attitudes, Fazio does not in fact distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes 
(e.g., Fazio, 1990, 2007; Fazio et al., 1995; Fazio & Olson, 2003; see also footnote 15 above). 
According to Fazio (2007), attitudes are “associations between a given object and a given 
summary evaluation of the object” (p. 608). Responses on indirect measures, such as the 
affective priming task, are reflective of these attitudes. Responses on direct measures, by 
contrast, are just fallible reports of an attitude that are subject to many influences (e.g., the 
person’s self-presentational concerns) beyond the influence of the attitude itself. 
40
 However, it shall be noted that psychologists emphasise the feature of automaticity and rarely 
speak about lack of rational control when describing what is measured on the affective priming 
task (or on other indirect measures).  
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reaction times (i.e., the time it takes them to press the key after onset of the respective 
stimulus) are recorded during the entire experiment. In a range of studies that 
employed this paradigm, it has been shown that white participants tend to respond 
faster when the response for black people and negative attributes (and the response 
for white people and positive attributes) is paired as compared to when the response 
for black people and positive attributes (and the response for white people and 
negative attributes) is paired (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Greenwald et al., 
1998; Nosek et al., 2007).41 This is taken to show that white people tend to associate 
white people with positive attributes and black people with negative attributes. The 
underlying assumption is that when the same reaction (e.g., pressing the “l” key) is 
required in response to two classes of stimuli (e.g., black person stimuli and negative 
attribute stimuli), the reaction will be quicker if there are pre-established associations 
between these stimuli. As the IAT is presumably tapping into associative mental states, 
we can speculate in accordance with what has been said in section 1.2.3 that the IAT 
taps into mental states that are beyond the person’s rational control. Moreover, it is 
generally assumed that the IAT effect is driven by automatic processing (see section 
1.2.4). Note that the participants focus their attention on the categorisation task and 
intend to respond as accurately and fast as possible. Although they do not intend to 
reveal their evaluations of the target groups, these evaluations clearly influence their 
performance on the IAT. 
 
1.3.2 Interpreting dissociations between scores on different attitude measures 
 
The finding that the outcomes of indirect and direct attitude measurements frequently 
diverge has often been interpreted as evidence for the claim that these measures tap 
into different kinds of attitudes (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Wilson et al., 2000). The 
social psychological literature is replete with reports of studies in which participants’ 
openly expressed evaluation of a social group diverged substantially from the 
evaluation that was indirectly assessed (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; 
Greenwald et al., 1998; Rudman & Killianski, 2000). Greenwald and colleagues (1998: 
experiment 3), for example, report that while participants showed on average a 
significant bias against black people (and in favour of white people) on race IATs, a 
semantic differential measure indicated that the average participant had no racial 
preference whatsoever.42 Note that this is exactly the pattern that we would expect 
Sarah, from the example with which we started, to show if asked to take part in a race 
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 There is mixed evidence as to how black people perform on this kind of race IAT (see Morin, 
2015; Nosek et al., 2007).  
42
 A feeling thermometer measure indicated some bias against black people, but this bias was 
only half the magnitude of the average bias against black people shown on the IAT. 
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IAT and to complete the semantic differential measure. Assuming that Sarah harbours 
associations that link black people to attributes such as danger or violence, it is likely 
that she will show a bias against black people on the IAT. However, as she firmly 
believes in egalitarianism, she will most likely ascribe as many positive and negative 
attributes to black people as she ascribes to white people on the semantic differential 
measure (on which she can control her responses). Greenwald and colleagues (1998) 
report an average statistical correlation of those direct measures used in their study 
(feeling thermometer, semantic differential, modern racism scale, diversity index, and 
discrimination index) with their race IAT measures of 0.14, which is quite low given that 
a value of 0 would indicate an absence of correlation, while a value of 1 would indicate 
a perfect correlation.43 
It has to be emphasised that there are different possible reasons for why a 
person’s reported attitude towards a social group may be misaligned with the 
evaluation that an indirect measure reveals. Firstly, the person may express her 
endorsed evaluation of the social group (say, a positive evaluation), which deviates 
from evaluations that indirect measures reveal (say, a negative evaluation). The person 
may even be aware of the fact that she harbours evaluative tendencies that conflict 
with her endorsed commitments. Yet, when asked for her attitude, she expresses her 
endorsed evaluation because she sincerely believes that this is her real attitude 
towards the group. A second possibility is that a person tries to base her attitude 
assessment on the content of relevant mental states that come to her mind (including 
mental states that she would not endorse on reflection) but that she cannot (fully) 
access the content of those mental states that show up on indirect measures of 
attitudes. A third possibility is that a person is insincere. She may be aware of the 
content of those evaluative mental states that drive her performance on indirect 
measures (and endorse this as her attitude) but report a different attitude in order to 
present herself in a way that she believes other people (e.g., the researcher) will 
approve of. The phenomenon that people underreport evaluations that others are likely 
to disapprove of is an example of what social scientists and psychologist call “social 
desirability bias” (Krumpal, 2013). In this third case, the dissociation between what the 
person reports when directly asked for her attitude and the evaluation that the person 
shows on an indirect measures of attitudes can certainly not be taken as evidence for a 
dissociation between attitudes. This is because what she reports on the direct measure 
does not reflect a sincere assessment of her attitude at all. 
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 See Taylor (1990) for a comprehensible guide to the interpretation of the correlation statistic. 
According to him, correlations of 0.35 or smaller are typically said to be “low or weak”, 
correlations ranging from 0.36 to 0.67 are typically considered to be “modest or moderate”, and 
correlations ranging from 0.68 to 1.0 are generally interpreted as “high or strong” (p. 37).  
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However, it must be stressed that even if (most) people give sincere answers on 
direct measures of attitudes (such as in the first two cases described above), a 
divergence from indirectly measured evaluations is not a proof for the existence of 
distinct sets of attitudes (see Fazio, 2007, and Fazio & Olson, 2003, for related 
arguments). The lack of correlation presumably indicates that indirect and direct 
measures tap into different (sets of) mental states, but the mere fact that certain states 
are dissociated does not tell us that they constitute distinct attitudes, unless we already 
know how attitudes are individuated (see question Q1 that was introduced in the 
introduction to this thesis). To be sure, as proponents of the standard view identify 
attitudes with specific mental states, the fact that people’s evaluations on indirect and 
direct measures of attitudes are often dissociated may indicate the existence of two 
different kinds of attitudes. But it is not clear why we should identify attitudes with 
specific mental states in the first place. I have already mentioned the possibility that 
attitudes may have a different ontological status altogether (see question Q3 that was 
introduced in the introduction to this thesis). It may be that attitudes are complex traits 
of people that are based on a variety of different mental states that may vary in their 
evaluative implications (Machery, 2016). On this view, indirect and direct measures of 
attitudes would tap into different parts of the psychological basis of an attitude but not 
into different attitudes. In fact, I will defend a version of the trait view of attitudes in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. For now though, it suffices to emphasise that in order to 
interpret measurement results in terms of attitudes, we need already to have an 
account of the nature of attitudes. That is, some philosophical groundwork needs to be 
done in the first place. 
So far I have stressed that if there is indeed a substantial statistical dissociation 
between people’s scores on indirect and direct measures of attitudes, this does not 
constitute a proof for the existence of distinct implicit and explicit attitudes (and thus for 
the standard view of attitudes). However, it shall also be mentioned that it is not even 
clear in how far results on indirect and direct measures of attitudes are indeed 
dissociated. In fact, there is evidence that the size of statistical correlation between 
indirectly and directly assessed evaluations varies widely across different attitude 
objects and across different studies (Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek, 2005, 2007). 
Hofmann and colleagues (2005), who conducted a meta-analyses of 125 studies in 
which they found a mean correlation of 0.24 between IAT results and direct measures, 
conclude that directly and indirectly assessed evaluations are evidently not “completely 
dissociated and that correlations between the two are [not] purely random” (p. 1382). 
One may of course reply that at least for socially sensitive issues (e.g., gender, race, 
and sexual orientation) there is a clear dissociation between indirectly and directly 
assessed evaluations (Fazio & Olson, 2003). However, even with regard to this domain 
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the evidence is not unequivocal. There are a number of studies that found substantial 
correlations between the outcomes of indirect and direct measures of prejudice (e.g., 
Wittenbrink et al., 1997; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; McConnell & Liebold, 
2001). Wittenbrink and colleagues (1997), for example, found a substantial correlation 
of 0.41 between people’s implicit prejudice scores on a racial priming measure and 
people’s scores on a questionnaire measure of explicit racial prejudice (the modern 
racism scale).44  
Curiously enough, there is abundant evidence that the correlations between the 
outcomes of different indirect measures of attitudes are of a similar magnitude as the 
correlations between the outcomes of indirect and direct measures of attitudes (Bar-
Anan & Nosek, 2014; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Sherman et al., 2003).45 In a mass data 
analysis, Bar-Anan & Nosek (2014) found a mean correlation of 0.36 between 
participants’ results on IATs and their results on six different indirect measures of 
attitudes. The correlation of participant’s results on IATs with their results on various 
direct measures of attitudes was only somewhat lower (0.27). It must be noted that 
some of the indirect measures that Bar-Anan and Nosek (2014) included were modified 
versions of the IAT (e.g., they included a shorter version of the IAT). The correlations 
between people’s IAT results and structurally more dissimilar indirect measures were 
lower. For example, the mean correlation of participants’ scores on the race IAT and 
participants’ scores on a race affective priming task was just 0.29.46 This indicates that 
the relatively weak correlations that are (sometimes) found between the results on 
direct and indirect measures of attitudes do not have any special status. After all, 
similar dissociations are found between the results on different indirect measures of 
attitudes. It would be dubious to defend the standard view of attitudes by reference to 
the presumed dissociation between direct and indirect measures while neglecting the 
dissociations between different indirect measures of attitudes. 
The claim that results on different measures of attitudes are often dissociated is 
consistent with the claim that people harbour a multitude of evaluative mental states in 
regard to a particular social group (see section 1.2.2). Different measures (including 
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 Moreover, Hofmann and colleagues (2005) could not find an influence of the social sensitivity 
of a given topic on the correlations between IAT results and the results of direct measures in 
their meta-analysis. 
45
 By contrast, there is evidence that correlations between different direct measures of attitudes 
(e.g. between semantic differential and feeling thermometer measures of attitudes) are more 
considerable. Greenwald and colleagues (1998), for example, report an average correlation of 
0.5 between five different direct measures of attitudes (p. 1475).  
46
 Somewhat more anecdotally, Fazio and Olson (2003) mention that IAT measures and priming 
measures have repeatedly failed to correspond in their own lab, with the correlation coefficients 
being close to zero. Relatedly, Wittenbrink and colleagues (2001) found that two different 
priming tasks, involving evaluative and conceptual judgments respectively, revealed largely 
dissociated bias scores. They conclude that “these results suggest that automatic responses 
are not as invariant as it is sometimes posited” (p. 244). 
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different indirect measures) may often tap into different mental states (or combinations 
thereof), which explains why results on different measures often do not correlate well 
with each other (Machery, 2016: 116-117). This raises a range of questions about the 
notion of an attitude, which I seek to answer in the upcoming chapters. First of all, we 
may ask what kind of mental states different indirect measures of attitudes tap into. 
This relates to the question as to what kind of mental states underpin attitudes (Q2). 
Secondly, we need to take up the attitude individuation question (Q1). Are we to claim 
that different measures tap into different (implicit or explicit) attitudes or is only one of 
the various measures tapping into the person’s actual (implicit or explicit) attitude? Or, 
alternatively, is a person's attitude a complex set of representations that is tapped into 
by both direct and indirect measures? This leads us seamlessly to the question of the 
ontological status of attitudes (Q3). Are attitudes mental states or are they traits that 
are based on a variety of mental states without being identical to them? We need to 
look beyond the attitude measurement data to answer these questions. Here, the 
desiderata for a model of attitudes that I have mentioned in the introduction to this 
thesis come into play. When the attitude measurement data allows for different attitude 
conceptualisations, we should adopt the model that is most conducive to the 
explanation and prediction of people’s responses towards other people (D1), to the 
moral assessment of the attitude holder’s character (D2), and to the communication 
between philosophers, psychologists, and the wider public on attitudes (D3). In the next 
section, I will be concerned with desideratum D1, and assess in how far indirect and 
direct attitude measurement results are predictive of people’s evaluative responses. 
 
1.3.3 Predictive validity of indirect and direct measures of attitudes 
 
Assuming that attitudes, properly understood, are predictive of people’s responses 
towards other people and assuming that indirect and direct measures of attitudes 
indeed access attitudes, we should expect that results on these measures are 
reasonably good predictors of people’s responses towards other people. That is, we 
should expect in line with desideratum D1 that indirect and direct measures of attitudes 
tap into those aspects of people’s psychology that drive their responses towards other 
people. In particular, we would expect that indirect measures that supposedly tap into 
automatically operating, reason-insensitive implicit attitudes are predictive of 
unintentional responses and that direct measures that allegedly tap into intentionally 
controlled, reason-responsive explicit attitudes are predictive of deliberate responses. 
In line with these expectations, early studies suggested that that indirectly assessed 
evaluations are good predictors of spontaneous non-deliberate responses towards 
others and that directly assessed evaluations are good predictors of deliberate 
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responses (Dovidio et al., 1997; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio et al., 
1995). Dovidio and colleagues (1997) report, for example, that indirectly assessed 
attitudes of white participants towards black people were predictive of participants’ 
amount of eye contact with a black interviewer and their rate of eye-blinking in the 
interview situation (i.e., spontaneous behaviour; see experiment 3). Moreover, directly 
assessed attitudes of white people towards black people predicted their verbal 
evaluation of the black interviewer (i.e., deliberate behaviour). In particular, higher 
levels of implicit racial bias against black people (as measured on a race priming task) 
were associated with less visual contact with the black interviewer and higher rates of 
eye-blinking, while higher levels of explicit bias (as measured with questionnaires) were 
linked to more negative verbal evaluations of the black interviewer.  
However, recent meta-analyses raise doubts about the predictive validity of both 
indirect and direct measures of attitudes (Oswald et al., 2013; Forscher et al., 2016). 
Oswald and colleagues (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of 46 studies in which they 
found an overall correlation of just 0.1 between people’s scores on direct measures of 
racial attitudes and different kinds of responses towards black people (e.g., 
microbehaviour, expressed policy preferences, expressed person perception). Recall 
that a value 0 would indicate an absence of correlation while a value of 1 would 
indicate a perfect correlation. As people may not always report their attitudes sincerely 
on direct measures, one might hope to find a stronger correlation between results on 
indirect measures and the examined classes of responses. However, Oswald and 
colleagues (2013) found an overall correlation between people’s scores on race IATs 
with the examined responses that was not considerably higher than the correlation 
between direct measures and these responses (0.15 vs. 0.1). Even when particular 
categories of responses were analysed separately, there was no considerable 
difference between the predictive utility of the IAT and the predictive utility of direct 
measures detectable. Based on the above mentioned results by Dovidio and 
colleagues (1997: experiment 3), one would have expected that indirect measures are 
better predictors of microbehaviour (a category that includes nonverbal behaviour such 
as eye-blinking) than direct measures of attitudes. Instead, Oswald and colleagues 
found in their meta-analysis that neither direct measures nor the IAT were reasonable 
predictors of microbehaviour (the correlation coefficients were 0.02 and 0.07, 
respectively). Moreover, one might have expected that direct measures would 
outperform the IAT when it comes to the prediction of person perceptions (a category 
that included verbal judgments about others). However, Oswald and colleagues found 
comparable low correlations between the IAT and person perceptions and between 
direct measures and person perceptions (0.13 and 0.11, respectively). A limitation of 
Oswald and colleagues’ meta-analysis is that it includes only the IAT as indirect 
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measure. However, a recent meta-analysis by Forscher and colleagues (2016) 
suggests that low predictive validity is not just a shortcoming of the IAT but of indirect 
measures in general. They analysed 426 studies that featured a range of different 
indirect measures of stereotypes and attitudes and found a mean correlation of these 
measures with different response indices of 0.11. This is arguably in the same ballpark 
as the correlation of 0.15 between race IATs and different sorts of discriminatory 
responses towards black people found by Oswald and colleagues (2013).47  
This suggests that studies in which indirect and direct measures have been shown 
to be reasonable predictors of people’s evaluative responses towards other people, 
such as the one by Dovidio and colleagues (1997), are evidently the exception rather 
than the rule. However, as I will argue in later chapters, this does not necessarily mean 
that indirect and direct measures are of no use when it comes to the prediction of 
evaluative responses. I will argue that the relatively low predictive validity that has been 
revealed in the meta-analyses may just be due to the fact that researchers often have 
not used the appropriate measure for a given task (see section 3.3.2) and that results 
on indirect and direct measures are only predictive of highly context-specific responses 
rather than broad classes of responses (see for example section 4.5.2). 
This being said, Oswald and colleagues (2013) findings shed some doubt on the 
claim that indirect and direct measures of attitudes tap into different kinds of attitudes. If 
these measures tapped into different kinds of attitudes, we would expect them to be 
predictive of different kinds of responses. However, for none of the response 
categories that were examined in Oswald and colleagues (2013) study, there was a 
considerable difference between the predictive success of the IAT and the predictive 
success of direct measures detectable. In particular, if proponents of the standard view 
were right that indirect measures (such as the IAT) tap into automatic, reason-
insensitive mental states, while direct measures tap into controlled, reason-responsive 
mental states, we should expect that indirect measures (such as the IAT) are better 
predictors of unintentional responses and that direct measures are better predictors of 
intentional responses. This is not what Oswald and colleagues (2013) found. Results 
on the IAT did not predict spontaneous, unintentional responses (such as 
microbehaviour) any better than results on direct measures and results on direct 
measures of attitudes did not predict deliberate, controlled behaviour (such as verbal 
judgments about others) any better than results on indirect measures. This suggests 
that we may not actually need to postulate two different kinds of attitudes (as measured 
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 It shall be mentioned that while Oswald and colleagues (2013) restricted their analysis to 
discriminatory behaviour, Forscher and colleagues’ (2016) meta-analysis included a broader 
range of responses (e.g., alcohol-related behaviours, p. 11). Moreover, while Oswald and 
colleagues (2013) focussed their analysis on the predictive validity of the IAT, the main purpose 
of Forscher and colleagues’ (2016) meta-analysis was an assessment of the effectiveness of 
different bias intervention strategies.  
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by indirect and direct measures of attitudes) in order to optimally explain and predict 
people’s evaluative responses (see desideratum D1).  
 
1.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have elaborated on how attitudes are construed on what I take to be 
the predominant account of attitudes in the psychological and philosophical literature 
(the standard view), and on how these attitudes are measured. According to the 
standard view, people possess implicit and explicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes are 
usually identified with associative mental states, while explicit attitude are commonly 
identified with propositional mental states (section 1.2.1). Due to the identification of 
attitudes with individual mental states, the standard view implies that people can 
possess multiple implicit and explicit attitudes (section 1.2.2). I pointed out that this 
view is at odds with the folk psychological conception of attitudes and thus out of line 
with desideratum D3 of a model of attitudes. 
The alleged associative structure of implicit attitudes is generally understood to 
imply that implicit attitudes are reason-insensitive (section 1.2.3). According to this 
assumption, the acquisition and change of implicit attitudes is not a function of what the 
subject acknowledges to be good reasons for their acquisition and change but rather of 
mere regularities in that subject’s environment (i.e., implicit attitudes are not subject to 
rational control). By contrast, explicit attitudes are assumed to be reason-responsive 
(i.e., subject to rational control) due to their propositional structure. That is, explicit 
attitudes can be acquired and changed in accordance with what the subject deems to 
be good reasons for such an acquisition or change. Other proponents of the standard 
view base the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes on a difference between 
automaticity and control (i.e., a difference in intentional control; section 1.2.4). 
According to this, implicit attitudes can be activated and influence behaviour without the 
subject’s intent and without requiring attentional resources (i.e., automatically), 
whereas the retrieval of explicit attitudes and their influence on behaviour is intentional 
and requires the subject’s attention. Yet other scholars have referred to awareness as 
a criterion to distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes (section 1.2.5). However, 
I showed that recent empirical evidence indicates that people can become aware of 
those mental states that are usually described as implicit attitudes (i.e., those mental 
states that are accessed on indirect measures of attitudes) and that how they become 
aware of these mental states is not necessarily any different to how they become 
aware of their so-called explicit attitudes. If one wants to defend the distinction between 
implicit and explicit attitudes, awareness thus does not seem to be the right criterion. 
Tying the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes to the criteria of mental 
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structure, rational control, and/or intentional control, by contrast, seems more 
promising. 
A model of attitudes that distinguishes between explicit and implicit attitudes on the 
basis of rational and/or intentional control may seem to fulfil desideratum D2 for a 
model of attitudes (as it has been mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). It can be 
argued that mental states that are subject to rational control and/or intentional control 
are part of the agent’s moral character, while mental states that are not subject to these 
kinds of control do not form part of the agent’s moral character. Hence, the standard 
view seems to be sensitive to the difference between aspects of a person’s psychology 
that are and that are not constitutive of that person’s moral character. However, in the 
next chapter I will show that those mental states that are commonly described as 
implicit attitudes (i.e., those mental states that are measured on indirect measures of 
attitudes) are, at least to some extent, subject to indirect rational control (i.e., implicit 
attitudes are indirectly reason-responsive) and indirect intentional control (see section 
2.3). I will argue that this suffices to establish that so-called implicit attitudes can in fact 
reflect on a person’s moral character.  
In the second part of the present chapter, I elaborated on the evidence for the 
standard view that is allegedly provided by attitude measurement data. I gave some 
examples of direct and indirect measures that supposedly access explicit and implicit 
attitudes as they have been characterised in the first part of the chapter (section 1.3.1). 
Then I discussed how we should interpret dissociations between scores on different 
attitude measures (section 1.3.2). I argued that even when people give sincere 
answers on direct measures of attitudes, divergences between people’s responses on 
indirect and direct measures cannot proof that people possess distinct implicit and 
explicit attitudes, unless we already adopt a certain account of attitude individuation. 
Moreover, I stressed that the dissociation between the outcomes of different indirect 
measures of attitudes is at least as strong as the dissociation between the outcomes of 
indirect and direct measures of attitudes. This shows that the dissociations between 
indirect and direct measures of attitudes deserve no special status when we are 
theorising about the nature of attitudes. Lastly, I examined in how far results on indirect 
and direct measures of attitudes are predictive of people’s evaluative responses 
(section 1.3.3). I pointed out that the results of recent meta-analyses indicate that both 
indirect and direct measures of attitudes have a relatively low predictive validity. Most 
remarkably, the evidence suggests that there is no difference in the relative predictive 
success of indirect measures and direct measures of attitudes across different domains 
of evaluative responses (including unintentional and intentional responses). This 
suggest that the distinction between implicit attitudes (as measured on indirect 
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measures of attitudes) and explicit attitudes (as measured on direct measures) may not 
actually be crucial for the prediction of people’s evaluative responses. 
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Chapter 2: Scrutinising the standard view of 
attitudes 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I presented the standard view of attitudes, which holds that people 
possess two distinct classes of attitudes, implicit and explicit attitudes, which can be 
measured on indirect and direct measures of attitudes, respectively. Implicit attitudes 
are often claimed to have an associative structure, while explicit attitudes are supposed 
to have a propositional structure. Also, implicit attitudes are often assumed to be 
outside of the agent’s rational and intentional control, while explicit attitudes are 
assumed to be subject to these kinds of control. In this chapter, I will assume for the 
sake of the argument that indirect measures of attitudes assess implicit attitudes, and 
examine whether these mental states are indeed associative and not subject to rational 
and intentional control. 
Accordingly, when I speak of “implicit attitudes” in this chapter, I refer loosely to 
those mental states (irrespective of their structure) that are measured on indirect 
measures of attitudes and that may drive people’s spontaneous responses towards 
other people qua members of social groups. Moreover, when I speak about “implicit 
evaluative responses” in this chapter, I refer loosely to these spontaneous (cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural) responses that are assumed to be the function of implicit 
attitudes.48 Implicit evaluative responses include those responses that people typically 
exhibit on indirect measures of attitudes (e.g., responding more swiftly to negatively 
valenced words when being primed by a picture of a black person) but also 
spontaneous responses that people may show in day-to-day life (e.g., avoiding eye 
contact with black persons). My tentative use of the term “implicit attitude” 
notwithstanding, I will reach the conclusion that the standard view of attitudes, which 
distinguishes between implicit and explicit attitudes, is not the best available model of 
attitudes (see section 2.4). 
This chapter has two main parts. In the first part (section 2.2), I will examine 
whether implicit attitudes are indeed associative mental states. I will review a recent 
account by Mandelbaum (2016), according to which implicit attitudes are in fact 
propositional mental states. I will give a detailed account of the argument that 
Mandelbaum (2016) provides for his propositional account of implicit attitudes and 
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 As mentioned in an earlier footnote (footnote 11), the term “implicit bias” as it is used in the 
literature is ambiguous because it may denote implicit attitudes or implicit evaluative responses 
(Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016). 
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present some of the empirical evidence that he discusses in support of his argument 
(section 2.2.1). I will argue that Mandelbaum fails to establish that implicit attitudes are 
not associative but propositional mental states (section 2.2.2). Even if the data that 
Mandelbaum discusses provides evidence for the propositional structure of implicit 
attitudes, this does not establish that all or the majority of implicit attitudes are 
structured propositionally. More importantly, even for the effects that Mandelbaum 
reviews, there are alternative explanations available that are consistent with an 
associative account of implicit attitudes. I will emphasise that the currently available 
evidence does not allow for a definite answer to the question as to how so-called 
implicit attitudes are structured 
In the second part of this chapter (section 2.3), I will examine whether implicit 
attitudes indeed fail to be subject to rational and intentional control. I will argue that 
even on the assumption that implicit attitudes are associative mental states people can 
indirectly control their implicit attitudes. Associative mental states are, at least to some 
extent, subject to indirect rational control: people can structure their external 
environment and their internal propositional thought in order to modify their 
associations in accordance with their considered values (section 2.3.1). Moreover, 
associative mental states are, at least to some extent, subject to indirect intentional 
control: by directly controlling what they think, people can influence which associations 
become activated in a given situation (section 2.3.2). Drawing on Holroyd & Kelly 
(2016), I will argue that the fact that associations can be indirectly controlled in these 
ways suggests that it is misguided to assume, as some proponents of the standard 
view do (e.g., Levy, 2014a, 2015; Glasgow, 2016), that implicit attitudes cannot reflect 
on people’s moral characters (section 2.3.3). 
I will conclude this chapter by examining what the foregoing arguments imply for 
the notion of an attitude (section 2.4). I concede that it may be possible to distinguish 
associative, indirectly controlled, implicit attitudes from propositional, directly controlled, 
explicit attitudes. Yet, I will call into question whether this is in fact the best way to 
conceptualise attitudes. In particular, I will motivate the view (to be developed in the 
following chapters) that attitudes are better conceived of as complex traits, each 
typically based on a variety of implicit and explicit mental states.  
 
2.2  Mental structure  
 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, many proponents of the standard view hold 
that implicit attitudes are associative mental states (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Gendler, 2008a, 2008b; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Due to 
their associative structure, implicit attitudes are assumed to change in accordance with 
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changes in external contingencies (e.g., changes in cultural stereotypes) but not in 
accordance with what the subject takes to be good reasons (e.g., the subject’s belief 
that racism is wrong). By contrast, explicit attitudes are assumed to be reason-
responsive (i.e., under the subject’s rational control) because they have propositional 
structure (see section 1.2.3 in the previous chapter). In recent years, a range of 
scholars have called the assumption that implicit attitudes are associative mental states 
into question. They argue (or raise the possibility) that implicit attitudes (or “implicit 
biases” as they are sometimes called) are propositional mental states or, on some 
accounts, even fully fledged beliefs (De Houwer, 2014; Frankish, 2016; Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011; Levy, 2015; Mandelbaum, 2016; Webber, 
2016a). The arguments that these authors provide differ considerably, but they all 
agree that implicit attitudes are (at least sometimes and to some extent) responsive to 
reasons, which should not be expected if they were associative mental states but which 
is predicted on a propositional account of implicit attitudes. Nevertheless, the 
proponents of propositional accounts of implicit attitudes maintain the claim that people 
possess distinct implicit and explicit attitudes, which can be identified on indirect and 
direct measures of attitudes, respectively.49 In what follows, I will focus on 
Mandelbaum’s (2016) account of implicit attitudes because it takes centre place in 
recent discussions on the structure of implicit attitudes.  
 
2.2.1 Mandelbaum’s argument for the propositional structure of implicit 
attitudes 
 
Mandelbaum’s (2016) account of implicit attitudes can be divided into a negative and a 
positive claim. The negative claim, which he describes as his main claim, is that implicit 
attitudes are not associative. The positive claim, for which he argues more tentatively, 
is that they are structured beliefs.50 In what follows, I will elaborate on both of these 
claims in turn (sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2). Moreover, I will elaborate on the empirical 
evidence that Mandelbaum refers to in support of his argument (sections 2.2.1.3 and 
2.2.1.4). 
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 They mention different reasons for assuming that there are distinct implicit and explicit 
attitudes despite the fact that both direct and indirect measures tap into propositional mental 
states. In particular, they refer to differences in automaticity (De Houwer, 2014), consciousness 
(Mandelbaum, 2016), or the degree of rational control (Levy, 2015) to draw the implicit-explicit 
distinction. 
50
 Although Mandelbaum (2016) initially claims that the main purpose of his paper is to argue for 
the negative claim, and that he will not argue extensively for the positive claim (p. 637), a 
considerable extent of his article turns out to be devoted to the defense of the positive claim.  
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2.2.1.1  Mandelbaum’s negative claim  
 
Mandelbaum’s (2016) negative claim is based on assumptions about how associative 
mental structures can be modified: 
 
[I]f you want to break apart an associative structure your options are limited; you can 
extinguish it by presenting one of the relata without the other or you can countercondition it, 
by changing the valence of the relata. Those are the only routes to modulating an 
associative structure. In other words, if rational argumentation (or any logical or evidential 
intervention) can be used to modulate an implicit attitude, then that implicit attitude does 
not have associative structure. (p. 635) 
 
Mandelbaum’s claim that associative mental structures can only be broken apart by 
extinguishing and counterconditioning procedures (but not by rational argumentation) 
resonates with what I said in the previous chapter about associative mental states. I 
argued that associative mental states are sensitive to external contingencies and 
change only over repeated experiences. The terms “extinction” and 
“counterconditioning” are used by learning psychologists to denote the two ways that 
are available to change associations (Lieberman, 2012: chapter 2). In extinction, a 
contingency that previously held between two stimuli is removed. If the stimuli now 
occur independently of each other, the association between the mental representations 
of these stimuli will weaken over time. If someone, for example, associates women with 
motherhood (because this is a prevalent cultural stereotype), and we want to eliminate 
that association, it might help to introduce that person to women that are not mothers. 
Counterconditioning, by contrast, implies that a previous contingency is replaced with 
another contingency. For example, if someone associates women with supportive 
professional roles, and we want to break up this association, it might help to present 
that person repeatedly with counterstereotypic examples of women in leadership 
positions (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004). The important point to take from this is that both 
extinction and counterconditioning change associations incrementally over repeated 
experiences. If someone associates women with supportive roles, encountering one 
woman in a leadership position or being made aware on one occasion of the fact that 
there are women in leadership positions will not do much to change the association. 
This is why Mandelbaum assumes that a substantial modification of an implicit attitude 
by one-shot rational argumentation speaks against the assumption that the implicit 
attitude is associatively structured. Argumentation is regarded to be just not the right 
kind of intervention to modify associations in any substantial way. If the person in the 
above example ceases to associate women with supportive roles after having been 
presented with a single argument to the effect that there are women in leadership 
positions, this modification is not due to extinction or counter-conditioning, and this 
speaks according to Mandelbaum against the associative structure of that attitude.  
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Some words are in order to explain the meanings of the terms “logical intervention” 
and “evidential intervention” that appear in the above quote from Mandelbaum (2016). 
Unfortunately, Mandelbaum does not make explicit what he means by these terms. 
From the examples he gives one can infer that an evidential intervention involves the 
onetime presentation of information pertaining to an attitude object. For example, in 
one study that Mandelbaum refers to participants were presented with a statement 
informing them about whether a target person is liked or disliked by another person 
(Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005). An evidential intervention stands in direct 
contrast to counterconditioning or extinction that always require repeated presentations 
of information.51 A logical intervention involves highlighting a logical relation in which 
the attitude object stands. For example, in another study that Mandelbaum mentions, 
participants were told that a group to which they had previously developed an attitude 
is equivalent to another group (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). Thus, a logical 
intervention is also a onetime presentation of information pertaining to the attitude 
object, where the information is about a logical relation. I therefore suggest viewing 
logical interventions as a subclass of evidential interventions. Henceforth, when I speak 
of “evidential interventions”, I take this to include logical interventions. 
Mandelbaum’s argument against the associative structure of implicit attitudes can 
be reconstructed in the form of a modus ponens: 
 
(P1) If a mental structure can significantly be changed by a single argument or an 
evidential intervention, it is not an associative structure.  
(P2)  Implicit attitudes can significantly be changed by single arguments or 
evidential interventions.52 
(C)   Hence, implicit attitudes are not associative structures.  
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 One may also speculate that another difference between evidential interventions and 
counterconditiong/extinction is that these latter interventions do not involve the presentation of 
propositional information, whereas evidential interventions do. However, this does not seem to 
be right to me. Firstly, although all examples Mandelbaum provides for evidential interventions 
seem to involve the presentation of propositional information, I suspect that he does not take 
this to be a necessary feature of evidential interventions. All he needs to argue for is that the 
intervention has some impact on propositional mental states of the individual and this can be 
achieved by presenting a simple non-propositional stimulus (e.g., a picture of a person that 
contradicts a common stereotype). Moreover, it seems possible to use propositional information 
for counterconditioning/extinction. One might countercondition the association between 
MOTHERHOOD and WOMEN by repeatedly reading the propositional statement “many women 
are childless” (see also section 2.2.2.2 on how propositional thought may modify associations). 
52
 The inclusion of the word “significant” is crucial here. As mentioned above, associative 
structures change incrementally. Each individual trial in an extinction or counterconditioning 
procedure contributes to the overall change of association. Each individual trial is a onetime 
presentation of information (i.e., information on what stimuli are paired with each other) and can 
thus be seen as an evidential intervention. This leads us to the conclusion that evidential 
interventions can in principle change associations. However, the influence of each individual 
trial should barely be noticeable. Evidence that an evidential intervention changes people’s 
implicit attitudes in a statistically significant manner can thus be seen as evidence that implicit 
attitudes are not associative (see section 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.1.4 for such evidence). 
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P1 follows from what I have said above about how one can modify associations. 
Mandelbaum refers to evidence from psychological experiments to support P2. I will 
review some of this evidence in sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.1.4. Before I do that, however, 
it is worth elaborating on Mandelbaum’s positive claim. That is, the alternative view that 
implicit attitudes are propositional structures. 
 
2.2.1.2  Mandelbaum’s positive claim 
 
Mandelbaum (2016) argues that implicit attitudes are unconscious beliefs. He 
describes these mental states as “honest-to-god propositionally structured mental 
representations that we bear the belief relation to” (p. 635). He remains agnostic about 
whether these, what he calls, “structured beliefs” are necessarily unconscious or just 
usually unconscious. Recall that I have pointed out in the last chapter that so-called 
implicit attitudes are not necessarily unconscious and that it is still hotly debated in 
what sense we are conscious of our agential propositional attitudes (see section 1.2.5). 
If there is in fact no difference between implicit and explicit attitudes in terms of 
consciousness, this poses a challenge for Mandelbaum because he would need to find 
a different criterion to distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes.  
For now though, it is important to review what other properties Mandelbaum 
ascribes to structured beliefs. He insists that structured beliefs differ, due to their 
propositional structure, in important ways from associations. Most importantly, they can 
respond to reasons and take part in inferences. Consider that someone holds the 
(unconscious) belief that all blonde women are stupid. Such a belief can, at least in 
principle, be modified by an evidential intervention. One may for example point out to 
this person that his friend Sue has blonde hair and is not stupid, which may lead him to 
(unconsciously) infer that not all blonde women are stupid. That is, the evidential 
intervention provides a reason for the subject to update his belief. To use a term from 
the last chapter, beliefs are under the subject’s rational control (see section 1.2.3). That 
is, they (usually) change in accordance with what the subject accepts to be a good 
argument or good evidence. Accordingly, Mandelbaum argues that if an argument or 
an evidential intervention changes an implicit attitude, this suggests that the implicit 
attitude is a structured belief. Combined with his negative claim, Mandelbaum’s 
argument can be interpreted as follows: 
 
(P1) If a mental structure can significantly be changed by a single argument or an 
evidential intervention, it is not an associative structure but a structured belief.  
(P2)  Implicit attitudes can significantly be changed by single arguments or 
evidential interventions. 
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(C)  Hence, implicit attitudes are not associative structures but structured beliefs. 
 
This argument does of course not imply that structured beliefs always change in 
accordance with good arguments or evidential interventions. Obviously, people 
sometimes stick to their beliefs despite contrary evidence. This implies that instances in 
which implicit attitudes do not respond to arguments or evidential interventions do not 
necessarily disprove the structured belief account.  
A problem with the structured belief account of implicit attitudes is that it supposes 
a notion of belief that many scholars would reject. This is because it allows for beliefs 
that the subject would not endorse or indeed reject on reflection. Mandelbaum (2014) 
defends a Spinozan view of belief fixation (see also Gilbert, 1991). On this account, 
people automatically believe every proposition that they entertain. According to him, 
the automatic acceptance of a proposition is a subpersonal process that can, but must 
not, be followed by a reflective endorsement or rejection of the belief on person-level. 
By contrast, on the more standard Cartesian view of belief fixation, propositions can be 
entertained mentally without assenting to them (e.g., Fodor, 1983: 102). On this 
account, a belief is formed upon accepting or rejecting the respective proposition in a 
second step (in the case of rejection the negation of the proposition is believed). This 
account implies that implicit attitudes that the subject has not endorsed cannot count as 
beliefs.  
Other scholars would refute Mandelbaum’s (2014) conception of believing on 
different grounds. For example, it has been argued that propositional mental states 
only qualify as beliefs if they “feature often enough and broadly enough in the kinds of 
normatively respectable inferential transitions that characterize beliefs” and that this is 
not the case for implicit attitudes (Levy, 2015: 816). Moreover, dispositionalists, 
interpretivists, and some functionalists would deny that beliefs are ever instantiated by 
particular representational structures (Schwitzgebel, 2015). This is not the place to 
argue for a specific account of belief. In fact, Mandelbaum (2016) anticipates that many 
of his readers will not accept his account of belief and offers them to view 
propositionally structured thought rather than structured belief as the alternative to the 
associative account of implicit attitudes (p. 636).53 Accordingly, I will present 
Mandelbaum’s argument as an argument for the propositional structure of implicit 
attitudes and leave it open whether these propositional structures qualify as beliefs. 
Framed in this less radical way various proponents of propositional accounts of implicit 
attitudes, who do not endorse the claim that implicit attitudes are fully-fledged beliefs, 
will find common ground with Mandelbaum (e.g., De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, Barnes-
                                            
53
 See however Borgoni (2015), Frankish (2016), and Webber (2016a) for accounts in support 
of the view that implicit attitudes are beliefs.  
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Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011; Levy, 2015). The modified argument, which combines 
Mandlebaum’s negative and positive claims, reads as follows: 
 
(P1) If a mental structure can significantly be changed by a single argument or an 
evidential intervention, it is not an associative structure but a propositional 
structure.  
(P2)  Implicit attitudes can significantly be changed by single arguments or 
evidential interventions. 
(C)  Hence, implicit attitudes are not associative structures but propositional 
structures. 
 
In the next two sections, I will present two (sets of) studies that Mandelbaum refers to 
in order to support premise P2.54  
 
2.2.1.3  Argument strength 
 
One of the experiments that according to Mandelbaum (2016) support the view that 
implicit attitudes are propositional mental states has been conducted by Briñol and 
colleagues (2008, 2009).55 I will present the experiment as Mandelbaum presents it in 
his paper to make clear how he uses it to support his argument. However, it shall 
already be noted that Mandelbaum fails to mention a crucial aspect of the experiment, 
which leads him to interpret the data in a different way than the authors of the study 
(see section 2.2.2.2). Briñol and colleagues (2008) presented participants with either 
strong or weak arguments for hiring African-American professors and assessed 
                                            
54
 Mandelbaum reviews in total four different (sets of) studies (Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, 2009; 
Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). 
However, I believe that the two (sets of) studies that I present in what follows provide the 
strongest support for premise P2 because they are arguably about the change of already 
existent attitudes (Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, 2009; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). The other two 
(sets of) studies that Mandelbaum mentions are primarily concerned with the acquisition of 
attitudes towards previously unknown persons or fictitious tribes (Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 
2005; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; though see studies 3 and 4 in Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 
2006). This is surprising because studies about attitude acquisition do not actually support 
Mandelbaum’s argument as stated above. Early in his 2016 article, Mandelbaum makes clear 
that his argument is about attitude change and not about attitude acquisition. While he argues 
that associations can only be changed by conditioning procedures, he emphasises that 
associations are not necessarily acquired through conditioning. According to him, they can for 
example be acquired trough “one-shot learning” (p. 633). This implies that if an evidential 
intervention, which is a one-shot intervention, leads to the acquisition of an attitude, this is 
compatible with an associative account of attitudes. It is thus surprising that later in his article 
Mandelbaum tries to support his argument also with reference to evidence that certain one-shot 
interventions lead to the acquisition of attitudes. Here, I will be concerned with Mandelbaum’s 
argument as he initially presents it: as an argument about the modification of already existent 
attitudes. 
55
 The results are reported in Briñol and colleagues (2009), who reference an unpublished 
working paper by Briñol and colleagues (2008) as the original source.  
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subsequently how this manipulation affected their race IAT scores. For instance, one of 
the strong arguments consisted in the claim “that because the number and quality of 
professors would increase with this program (without any tuition increase), the number 
of students per class could be reduced by 25%” (Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, 2009: 294). 
In comparison, one of the weak arguments stated “that implementing the program 
would allow the university to take part in a national trend, and that with the new 
professors, current professors might have more free time to themselves” (ibid).  
After the manipulation, participants in the strong argument condition exhibited on 
average a more positive evaluation of black people on the IAT than participants who 
had been presented with weak arguments. This supports supposedly premise P2 of 
Mandelbaum’s argument because it shows that a single argument can affect implicit 
attitudes (assuming that the IAT taps into implicit attitudes). According to Mandelbaum, 
the observed effect is incompatible with an associative account of implicit attitudes. He 
notes that those features of the arguments that might modify valenced associations by 
way of conditioning were controlled across both conditions. For example, it was 
ensured that strong and weak arguments contained the same number of references to 
“African-American professors” and that in both conditions the hiring of African-
American professors was linked to positive attributes (e.g., “better quality” and “more 
free time”). Accordingly, if implicit attitudes were associative and thus malleable by 
conditioning procedures, we should expect the strong and weak arguments to be 
equally effective (or non-effective) in modifying participants’ attitudes. The fact that 
there was actually a difference detectable between the effect of strong and the effect of 
weak arguments supports, according to Mandelbaum, the view that implicit attitudes 
have a propositional structure. He argues that propositional structures update with 
reasoning and inference and that the strength of an argument or the weight of evidence 
contained in a persuasive message can influence reasoning and inference. In short, 
whereas the strength of an argument does not affect associative mental states, it is 
exactly the sort of thing that can affect propositional mental states (see premise P1 of 
Mandelbaum’s argument). Although Mandelbaum does not use the term, we may say 
that the participants in Briñol and colleagues (2008) experiment exerted, at least to a 
certain extent, rational control over their implicit attitudes. That is, their attitudes were 
reason-responsive.  
 
2.2.1.4  Evidential adjustment to peer attitudes 
 
Another study that Mandelbaum (2016) refers to provides evidence for the influence of 
peer opinions on implicit attitudes (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Participants in this study 
completed first a questionnaire designed to assess attitudes towards African-
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Americans (The Pro-Black Scale; Katz & Hass, 1988) and subsequently were made 
believe that their responses on the questionnaire had been compared to other 
students’ responses. The experimenters allocated the participants to either a low-
prejudice or a high-prejudice group based on their score on the questionnaire. Half of 
the participants in both the high-prejudice and the low-prejudice group were informed 
that 81% of the students of their university agreed with their judgments expressed on 
the questionnaire (high-consensus condition), whereas the other half of the participants 
was told that 19% of their student peers agreed with their judgments (low-consensus 
condition). In Mandelbaum’s terms, this feedback constitutes the evidential 
intervention. After this feedback was given, each participant was asked to wait in the 
hallway for the next part of the study to begin. There, an African American confederate 
of the experimenter was sitting on a chair at the end of a row of chairs. The dependent 
measure tracked how many chairs apart from the African American the participant 
would choose to sit. As predicted, the participants in the high-prejudice group sat 
further away from the African-American than the participants in the low-prejudice 
group. Most interestingly, however, high consensus feedback increased the extent of 
the attitude-behaviour relationship. That is, participants in the high-prejudice group who 
had received the feedback that a large majority of their peers agree with their 
prejudiced views sat even farther away from the African American, as compared with 
high-prejudiced participants who had received low-consensus feedback. Similarly, low-
prejudiced participants who learned that their beliefs are largely shared sat even closer 
to the black person in comparison to low-prejudiced participants in the low-consensus 
condition. 
According to Mandelbaum, these results indicate that evidential interventions (i.e., 
consensus feedback) changed participant’s implicit attitudes (see premise P2 of his 
argument). Mandelbaum claims that such a pronounced influence of a single evidential 
intervention on implicit attitudes is not consistent with an associative account of implicit 
attitudes (see premise P1 of his argument).56 However, this effect is according to him 
                                            
56
 Mandelbaum (2016) also claims that an associative account of implicit attitudes makes 
predictions that are opposite to the findings observed. However, his remarks on this are rather 
speculative. In particular, he argues that differences in seating distance to stigmatized 
individuals are usually explained by differences in negative affect experienced towards these 
individuals. In accordance with an associative account one can say that the seating distance is 
determined by an association between a representation of the stigmatized group and a negative 
valence. Mandelbaum claims that this account cannot explain the particular findings of Sechrist 
and Stangor’s study. Relying on dissonance theory, he argues that it should feel good for the 
highly-prejudiced person to get positive feedback in the high-consensus condition (Elliot & 
Devine, 1994). He expects this reaction to inhibit the fear response elicited by the African 
American, which in turn should counteract the tendency to keep distance to him. Similarly, the 
participant who finds out that his highly prejudiced views are not shared should experience 
more negative affect and accordingly sit farther away from the African American. This leads 
Mandelbaum to claim that an associative account makes the wrong predictions: it predicts that 
those highly-prejudiced participants in the high-consensus condition would sit closer to the 
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consistent with, and in fact predicted by, a propositional account of implicit attitudes. He 
argues that “subjects [were] adjusting the strength of their implicit attitudes in virtue of 
what they took to be germane evidence, the opinions of their peers” (p. 642). In other 
words, participants took their peers’ opinions (unconsciously) as reason to adjust their 
implicit attitudes.  
One may object that participants in the experiment did not actually update their 
implicit attitudes but that high-consensus and low-consensus feedback motivated 
participants temporarily to exhibit control over their behaviour (Madva, 2016: 2676-
2677). That is, rather than changing attitudes the experimental manipulation may have 
brought to the fore people’s motivation to control the effects of their attitudes on 
behaviour. However, it shall be noted that Sechrist and Stangor (2001) were able to 
replicate their findings in a second study, in which a more straightforward indirect 
measure of attitudes was used that rules out the influence of behavioural control. 
Participants in this experiment were first prompted to express stereotypic views about 
African-Americans. They then received high-consensus or low-consensus feedback, 
consisting in the information that 81% or 19% of their peers agree with their stereotypic 
views.57 Subsequently, they participated in a so-called lexical decision task. This 
indirect measure requires participants to decide for several strings of letters whether 
they form a meaningful word or a meaningless non-word. Some of the words denoted 
traits that are commonly perceived as stereotypic of black people (e.g., uneducated, 
violent). Importantly, the presentation of each of the letter strings was preceded by the 
presentation of a priming stimulus that was displayed subliminally (i.e., so swiftly that 
participants could not consciously perceive it). It was crucial for the experiment that on 
some trials the word “black” served as prime, while on other trials control words such 
as “chair” were presented. The researchers found that participants in the high-
consensus condition responded faster to stereotype words when they were primed with 
the word “black” than when they were primed with control words such as “chair”. By 
contrast, for participants in the low-consensus condition it made no difference whether 
they were primed with the word “black” or a control stimulus. Unlike in the case of 
seating distance, it can be ruled out that participants in this second experiment 
intentionally modulated their responses in accordance with the previously received 
feedback. This is because the participants did not consciously perceive the primes on 
the lexical decision task and the task was presented to them as visual word recognition 
study. It is thus unlikely that they saw the lexical decision task as connected to the 
                                                                                                                                
African-American than those in the low-consensus condition, although the findings were exactly 
the opposite. 
57
 One may object that Sechrist and Stangor’s (2001) second experiment reveals something 
about implicit stereotypes but not about implicit attitudes. I would like to object that stereotypes 
are central components of attitudes. I will further support this claim in the next chapter. 
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feedback that they had previously received. Hence, the results from this second study 
can be regarded as support for the view that the evidential intervention did not just 
affect people’s motivation to control responses but genuinely affected people’s implicit 
attitudes. This therefore supports premise P2 of Mandelbaum’s argument, namely, that 
evidential interventions can change implicit attitudes (see, however, section 2.2.2.3 
below for an alternative interpretation).  
 
2.2.2  Evaluation of Mandelbaum’s propositional model 
 
In what follows, I will argue that Mandelbaum fails to establish that (all) implicit attitudes 
are propositional mental states. My argument is threefold. Firstly, I will emphasise that 
even if Mandelbaum convinced us that the observed effects of arguments and 
evidential interventions on implicit evaluative responses were the function of changes 
in propositional mental states, this does not establish that in all or the majority of 
circumstances propositional mental states drive implicit evaluative responses (see 
section 2.2.2.1). My second and third argument will establish that even in the very 
cases that Mandelbaum discusses there are alternative explanations for the effects of 
arguments and evidential interventions on implicit evaluative responses that are 
compatible with an associative account of implicit attitudes. I will argue that arguments 
and evidential interventions may trigger propositional thought processes that in turn 
create or modify those associations that influence people’s implicit evaluative 
responses (section 2.2.2.2; see also Madva, 2016, for a related argument). Moreover, I 
will argue that arguments and evidential interventions may activate already existent 
alternative associations that can influence people’s implicit evaluative responses 
(section 2.2.2.3).  
 
2.2.2.1  Insufficiency of the evidence 
 
Let us for the time being assume that Mandelbaum succeeds in convincing us that 
people’s implicit evaluative responses were driven by propositional mental states in the 
cases reviewed by him. Note that this can of course not yet establish that implicit 
evaluative responses are always (or in the majority of cases) the function of 
propositional mental states. In particular, it remains a possibility that people’s implicit 
evaluative responses are frequently driven by associative mental states but that when 
people are presented with arguments or evidence of a certain kind (unconscious) 
propositional processes are activated and affect these responses (either alone, or in 
addition to the associative processes). In other words, the evidence that Mandelbaum 
provides leaves open the extent to which propositional mental states play a role in 
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implicit evaluative responses.58 Although Mandelbaum’s argument is clearly presented 
as an argument against the claim that implicit attitudes are associative, some of what 
Mandelbaum says suggests that he may be open to the possibility that associative 
mental states can at least under some circumstances contribute to implicit evaluative 
responses. He grants that propositional mental states are not the only mental states in 
the mind’s unconscious and that there is no reason to deny the existence of 
associations. However, he hesitates to add that “such associations do far less causal 
work than is often supposed, especially in the implicit bias literature” (p. 636). 
Mandelbaum’s suspicion seems to be that if associative mental states play a role in 
implicit evaluative responses, their role is negligible. 
Unfortunately, Mandelbaum does not provide any argument to support this 
suspicion. The evidence that he discusses cannot, at any rate, establish that the 
contribution of associative mental states to implicit evaluative responses is negligible. It 
remains a possibility that some of those mental states that drive implicit evaluative 
responses are associative, while others are propositional. If we identify implicit attitudes 
with those mental states that drive implicit evaluative responses, it may thus in fact be 
the case that some implicit attitudes are structured associatively, while others are 
structured propositionally. That is, implicit attitudes may be a heterogeneous class of 
mental states (see Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016, for a related argument). In this case it 
may in fact be misleading to refer to “implicit attitudes” as if we were speaking about a 
specific psychological kind. As Holroyd and colleagues (2017b) point out, we may 
come to the conclusion that implicit attitudes (or implicit biases) are not a psychological 
kind if it turned out that “there is no unified phenomenon, with any distinctive set of 
characteristics, that underpins the behavioural responses found on indirect measures” 
(p. 13). Accordingly, one may want to eliminate the notion of an implicit attitude from 
our explanations and instead refer to “implicit associations” and “implicit propositional 
mental states”. However, it shall be emphasised that the currently available evidence 
does not establish that we have to reach this conclusion.  
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 To be fair, Mandelbaum is not the only author who discusses evidence in favour of a 
propositional account of implicit attitudes. See De Houwer (2014) for further evidence. Yet still, 
the combined evidence can hardly establish that implicit evaluative responses are always (or in 
the majority of cases) driven by propositional mental states. De Houwer’s (2014) conclusion is 
relatively carefully phrased anyway. He acknowledges that he cannot provide a knock-down 
argument against the associative account of implicit attitudes but advises researchers to 
seriously consider the possibility that implicit attitudes are propositional because this may lead 
research into new fruitful directions (see also Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). 
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2.2.2.2  Modification of associations through propositional thought 
 
Above, I have assumed for the sake of the argument that Mandelbaum (2016) 
succeeds to show that in the cases described implicit evaluative responses were driven 
by propositional mental states (i.e., propositional implicit attitudes). In what follows, I 
will call this assumption into question. There is an alternative explanation for the effects 
of arguments and evidential interventions on implicit evaluative responses, and this 
alternative explanation is compatible with an associative account of implicit attitudes. In 
short, although arguments and evidential interventions may not have a significant direct 
influence on associations, they may have an indirect one that is mediated by 
propositional thought (see Madva, 2016, for a related argument). 
My argument will draw on the widely accepted hypothesis that propositional 
processes can create and modify associations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 
2011; Madva, 2016; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Mandelbaum himself acknowledges 
parenthetically that “Structured Beliefs can create associations through the mere 
continued activation of the constituents of the beliefs” (Mandelbaum, 2016: endnote 
13). One of his examples is the belief “dogs sleep on tables”. Plausibly, if a person 
frequently tokens this belief (e.g., by thinking about dogs sleeping on tables), a mental 
association between the concepts DOG and the concept TABLE will be established. 
Once this connection has been established, an activation of DOG will spread over to 
TABLE (and vice versa). Mandelbaum refers to associations that have been created in 
this way as “piggybacking associations”. Mandelbaum also stresses that evaluative 
associations can by created by propositional thought: if DOG has a positive and TABLE 
no definite valence, repeatedly thinking “dogs sleep on tables” will lead the concept 
TABLE to acquire a positive valence. This can be seen as an instance of evaluative 
conditioning. Plausibly, conditioning by propositional thought works very much like 
conditioning by virtue of co-occurrences of external stimuli. The only difference is that 
in the case of, what we may call, propositional conditioning co-occurrences of concepts 
in thought create associations rather than co-occurrences between external stimuli. 
Although this is not mentioned by Mandelbaum, propositional thought can arguably not 
only establish associations but also play a role in the modification of associations 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; Madva, 2016).59 For example, if I stop 
thinking “dogs sleep on tables”, this will gradually lead to the extinction of my 
association between DOG and TABLE if this association is not reinforced by any other 
means. Similarly, if TABLE is linked to positive valence, repeatedly thinking “Faeces 
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 It shall be mentioned that the relation between associations and propositional thought is in 
fact bidirectional on Gawronski & Bodenhausen’s (2006) influential model. Propositional thought 
can establish, modify as well as activate associations, and reversely activated associations can 
feed into propositional thought processes.  
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are on the table” may well countercondition this association due to the negative 
valence of FAECES. Curiously enough, Mandelbaum does not discuss the possibility 
that associations that have been created or modified by propositional thought may 
drive implicit evaluative responses. This is surprising because such associations may 
well have played a causal role in the very experiments that he refers to.  
To demonstrate this, it is worth having a closer look at the argument strength 
experiment by Briñol and colleagues (2008, 2009) that was presented in section 
2.2.1.3.60 When describing the experiment, Mandelbaum fails to mention a second 
factor that the researchers manipulated. Briñol and colleagues (2008) did not only vary 
the strength of the arguments for hiring African-American professors but also the extent 
to which the participants would think about the arguments. Previous research had 
indicated that people elaborate more strongly on a message the more they regard the 
message as personally relevant to them and the more they view it as their personal 
responsibility to think about the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, Harkins, & 
Williams, 1980). Based on these findings, Briñol and colleagues (2008) created a high-
elaboration and a low-elaboration condition in their study. In the high-elaboration 
condition, participants were told that the policy to hire more African-American 
professors would possibly be realised at their own university in the upcoming academic 
year (creation of personal relevance) and that only a few people would assess the 
arguments (high personal responsibility). By contrast, participants in the low-
elaboration condition were told that the policy would be realised at a remote university 
in 10 years (no personal relevance) and that a large group would assess the 
arguments (low personal responsibility). Importantly, the effect of argument strength on 
participants’ race IAT scores that Mandelbaum emphasises has only been found in the 
high-elaboration condition – namely, the condition in which the participants thought 
more about the arguments and propositions involved in them. In this condition, 
participants’ implicit evaluations of black people (as measured on the race IAT) were 
more positive when they had received strong arguments for hiring African-American 
professors than when they had read weak arguments. No such effect was present in 
the low-elaboration condition. This suggests that the extent to which participants 
thought about the arguments determined whether argument strength had an effect on 
implicit evaluation. When participants thought extensively about the arguments 
because they saw personal relevance in them and felt the responsibility to think 
thoroughly about them, argument strength had an impact on implicit evaluations, but 
when they did not give much thought to the arguments, argument strength had no 
effect.  
                                            
60
 See Madva (2016: 2678-2679) for a related discussion of Briñol and colleagues’ results. 
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Briñol and colleagues’ (2009) explanation of this effect draws on the above 
mentioned assumption that repeated thought can create associations: 
 
[W]e argue that the effect of argument quality obtained under high elaboration on automatic 
evaluations is due to the fact that the strong message led to many favorable thoughts 
associated with the integration program and Blacks, whereas the weak message led to 
many unfavorable thoughts associated with the integration program and Blacks. We 
speculate that, at least in this persuasion paradigm, the generation of each (negative) 
thought provides people with the opportunity to rehearse a favourable (unfavourable) 
evaluation of Blacks, and it is the rehearsal of the evaluation allowed by the thoughts (not 
the thoughts directly) that are responsible for the effects on the implicit measure. Thus, the 
automatic change might involve just getting the link between the attitude object and good 
(bad) rehearsed by each favorable (unfavorable) thought. (p. 295, my emphasis) 
 
Briñol and colleagues (2009) argue here that it is not “the thoughts directly” but the 
“rehearsal of the evaluation allowed by the thoughts” that resulted in the effect that was 
found in the high-elaboration condition (p. 295). What they imply is conditioning by 
propositional thought: positive thoughts about black people strengthen an association 
between black people and positive valence and negative thoughts have the opposite 
effect. The more positive (or negative) thoughts a person entertains about black people 
(i.e., the more the positive or negative evaluation is rehearsed), the stronger the 
association between black people and positive (or negative) valence may become 
(Madva, 2016: 2678-2779). This can explain why the strength of the arguments only 
had a substantial effect in the high-elaboration condition: as participants in the high-
elaboration condition thought more extensively about the strong and weak arguments 
than the participants in the low-elaboration condition, their associations changed more 
substantially as a result of that (propositional) thinking.61 Note that the thought 
processes that the participants engaged in may well have been unconscious. There is 
no reason to assume that thought processes must be conscious to create or change 
associations.  
Note also that the results found in the study by Sechrist and Stangor (2001; see 
section 2.2.1.4) can possibly be explained along the same lines. Let us consider their 
second experiment. When participants were presented with information that their peers 
largely agree with their stereotypic views about black people (high-consensus group), 
this may have boosted their confidence in these views which led to more negative 
thinking about black people. This, in turn, may have strengthened negatively valenced 
associations in regard to black people. By contrast, those participants who learned that 
their stereotypic views are not shared by their peers may have lost the confidence in 
                                            
61
 In a second experiment by Briñol and colleagues (2008), participants read either strong or a 
weak arguments in favour of including more vegetables in their diet. After having read the 
arguments, they were required to note down their thoughts in regard to the proposal. Strikingly, 
in the high-elaboration condition (but not in the low-elaboration condition), participants’ 
evaluation of vegetables on an IAT was mediated by the valence of the thoughts that they had 
listed.  
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their beliefs (low-consensus group), which may have led them to entertain positive 
thoughts (or less negative thoughts) about black people. This, in turn, may have 
strengthened positively valenced associations (or weakened negatively valenced 
associations). These effects may explain why people in the high-consensus group 
showed a bias on the lexical decision task (i.e., responding faster to stereotype words 
than to control words when primed with the word “black”), while people in the low-
consensus group showed no such bias.   
To sum up, the evidence that Mandelbaum (2016) provides is compatible with the 
assumption that implicit attitudes are associative. Argumentation and evidential 
interventions presumably trigger propositional thought processes and these may lead 
to the modification of associations that cause implicit evaluative responses. This 
explanation undermines premise P1 of Mandelbaum’s argument. That is, if a mental 
structure can significantly be changed by a single argument or an evidential 
intervention, this does not necessarily speak against the claim that this mental structure 
is associative.  
 
2.2.2.3  Activation of associations through propositional thought 
 
Although the explanation provided in the previous section is possible, it may not yet be 
the best explanation for the effects reviewed by Mandelbaum (2016). In particular, one 
may wonder whether the time between experimental manipulation and attitude 
measurement in the presented studies was long enough to actually lead to a significant 
modification of associations (even if participants thought intensely about the arguments 
and peer opinions provided). Rather the arguments and peer opinions provided may 
simply have led to the selective activation of already existing associations. This is my 
second alternative explanation for the data discussed by Mandelbaum (2016).  
Recall that I have argued in the last chapter (section 1.2.2) that if we identify 
implicit attitudes with individual associative mental states (as proponents of the 
standard view seem to do), we need to acknowledge that people likely harbour a 
multitude of implicit attitudes in regard to a social group. As an example, I have 
mentioned that Sarah’s negatively valenced association between BLACK PERSON 
and DANGER may become tokened independently of her positively valenced 
association between BLACK PERSON and MUSICALITY (and vice versa). Which of 
these associations (or we may say implicit attitudes) become tokened may depend on 
situational influences. Crucially, the fact that associations can become activated 
selectively may also explain the findings that were observed in the studies discussed 
by Mandelbaum (2016). 
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Let us again consider the study by Briñol and colleagues (2008, 2009). As 
mentioned above, they found that when participants thought extensively about the 
arguments presented to them (high-elaboration condition), argument strength 
influenced their implicit evaluations of black people on an IAT. Participants who had 
received strong arguments for hiring African-American professors showed more 
positive evaluations of black people on a race IAT than participants who had read weak 
arguments for hiring African-American professors. Note that strong arguments for hiring 
African-American professors may have triggered positive thoughts about black people, 
leading to the temporary activation of positively valenced associations, while weak 
arguments for hiring African-Americans may have triggered negative thoughts about 
black people, leading to the temporary activation of negatively valenced associations. 
The difference in the content and valence of the activated associations may have 
caused the difference in participants’ evaluative responses on the IAT that was 
conducted shortly after the experimental manipulation.  
A similar explanation can be given for the findings observed by Sechrist and 
Stangor (2001: study 2). When participants received the feedback that a majority of 
their peers agrees with their stereotypic views about African-Americans (high-
consensus group), negative thoughts about African-Americans may have been 
reinforced, which led in turn to an increased activation of negatively valenced 
associations. By contrast, when participants were informed that a majority of their 
peers disagreed with their stereotypic views (low-consensus group), this may have led 
to them to think temporarily in more positive terms about African-Americans, which in 
turn may have led to the increased activation of positive associations. The difference in 
the content and valence of the temporarily activated associations may have caused the 
difference in responding that was observed on the subsequently conducted lexical 
decision task. 
The here presented alternative explanation implies that premise P2 of 
Mandelbaum’s argument may actually be wrong. That is, the evidence does not 
establish that implicit attitudes can be significantly changed by single arguments or 
evidential interventions. This is because the evidence is also compatible with the idea 
that single arguments or evidential interventions selectively activated pre-existing 
associations (i.e., implicit attitudes) rather than “rewired” associations. On this 
alternative view, arguments or peer opinions that people are confronted with can be 
seen as situational or contextual factors that temporarily influence people’s evaluative 
responses without actually changing people’s attitudes (Madva, 2016: 2676-2677). If 
this explanation is correct, the effects of arguments and evidential interventions on 
people’s implicit evaluative responses should only be short-lived. This is an assumption 
that can be tested but that has not been examined in the studies that Mandelbaum 
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reports. In these studies, indirect attitude tests were conducted shortly after the 
experimental manipulation. Hence, the data is consistent with the assumption that the 
observed effects were just due to transient attitude activation rather than lasting 
attitude change. At this point, it shall already be noted that the situation-specificity of 
evaluative responses takes centre stage in the model of attitudes that I will propose in 
chapter 4.  
 
2.2.2.4   Preliminary conclusion 
 
Mandelbaum (2016) fails to establish that implicit attitudes, defined for the purpose of 
this chapter as those mental states that drive people’s spontaneous evaluative 
responses such as those on indirect measures of attitudes, are not associatively but 
propositionally structured. Even if we take his interpretation of the empirical data at 
face value, he cannot establish that all so-called implicit attitudes are non-associative 
(but propositional; see section 2.2.2.1). Moreover, there are alternative interpretations 
of the data available that are in fact compatible with the associative structure of so-
called implicit attitudes (section 2.2.2.2 and section 2.2.2.3; see also Madva, 2016).  
The foregoing does not provide a knock-down argument against a propositional 
account of implicit attitudes. All that I have shown is that the associative account of 
implicit attitudes remains a viable option. In fact, I grant that the currently available 
evidence can be accounted for on a propositional, an associative, or a “heterogeneous” 
model of implicit attitudes. On this latter account, what we describe as “implicit 
attitudes” (those mental states that drive people’s implicit evaluative responses) are a 
heterogeneous class of mental states that may include both associative and 
propositional mental states (see Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016, for a related argument). If 
this is the case, we may want to eliminate the notion of an “implicit attitude” (Holroyd, 
Scaife, & Stafford, 2017b). One may hope that future experiments will provide more 
decisive data that will help us to choose between these different models.62 
 
2.3  Control 
 
In the foregoing, I elaborated on the mental structure of so-called implicit attitudes. I 
concluded that although the matter is far from settled, the available data is compatible 
with the claim that implicit attitudes are associative. Now, I will turn to the question of 
what sort of control we can exert over implicit attitudes. In the last chapter, I have 
shown that it is often claimed that implicit attitudes are not subject to rational and/or not 
subject to intentional control. In what follows, I will argue that these claims are not quite 
                                            
62
 See Madva (2016: 2679) for some suggestions of experiments that may settle the issue. 
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right even if we assume that implicit attitudes are associative. In section 2.3.1, I will 
argue that the idea that propositional thought can modify associative mental states 
implies that we can take, at least to some extent, indirect rational control over our 
implicit attitudes. In section 2.3.2, I will argue that the fact that propositional thought 
can activate associations implies that we have, at least to some extent, indirect 
intentional control over our implicit attitudes. In section 2.3.3, I will show that what I 
refer to as “indirect rational control” and “indirect intentional control” can be regarded as 
subtypes of “ecological control” (Clark, 2007; Holroyd & Kelly, 2016). Based on Holroyd 
& Kelly (2016), I will argue that the fact that we have ecological control in regard to our 
implicit attitudes undermines the claim, made by some proponents of the standard view 
(e.g., Levy, 2014a, 2015; Glasgow, 2016), that implicit attitudes cannot form part of 
people’s moral characters. 
 
2.3.1  Indirect rational control 
 
As I showed in the last chapter (section 1.2.3), some authors have argued that explicit 
attitudes are acquired and changed in accordance with what the agent considers to be 
good reasons (i.e., they are under the agent’s rational control), while implicit attitudes 
are insensitive to such reasons (i.e., they are not under the agent’s rational control; 
Gendler, 2008a, 2008b; Levy, 2014a). In what follows, I will stress that this picture is 
not quite right even if we accept that implicit attitudes are associatively structured. 
Recall that I argued above that propositional thought can play a role in the 
modification of associations (section 2.2.2.2). Note that if propositional mental states 
are reason-responsive and if associations change in accordance with propositional 
mental states, associations can be said to be indirectly reason-responsive. If we 
change our patterns of propositional thought because we see good reasons for that, 
this may, at least in the long term, lead to changes in our associative mental states. A 
person who associates men more strongly with leadership abilities than women may 
deliberately think more often about the leadership abilities of women in order to modify 
this association. To be sure, the prospects of such an intervention are limited because 
a given association (e.g., the association of men rather than women with leadership) 
may be reinforced by contingencies in a person’s external environment (e.g., by the 
fact that men are actually more often to be found in leadership positions than women). 
However, it should also be noted that we can, to some extent at least, deliberately 
modify our external environment in such a way to bring about a desired change in our 
associations (Holroyd & Kelly, 2016: 121-122). One could, for example, put up photos 
of famous female leaders in one’s office to strengthen one’s association between 
women and leadership, or try to diversify one’s circle of friends in order to combat one’s 
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negative associations concerning people with backgrounds other than one’s own (e.g., 
different ethnic or socio-economic background). 
In a nutshell, if we see good reason to change our associations, we can indirectly 
achieve this by restructuring our external environment and by restructuring our internal 
thought patterns. Note that these strategies may well reinforce each other. 
Restructuring our external environment may lead to corresponding changes in our 
thought patterns (e.g., seeing photos of female leaders in our office may trigger 
thoughts about the leadership abilities of women) and changes in our thought patterns 
may motivate us to restructure our environment (e.g., thoughts about the leadership 
abilities of women may make it more likely that one will support women applying for 
leadership positions in one’s organisation).  
 
2.3.2  Indirect intentional control 
 
Let us now turn from rational control to intentional control. In the last chapter, I pointed 
out that some proponents of the standard view have argued that the distinction 
between implicit and explicit attitudes corresponds to a distinction between automatic 
and intentionally controlled mental states (Devine, 1989; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; see section 1.2.4). In particular, it is claimed that 
the activation of implicit attitudes, and their influence on behaviour, may proceed 
without the subject’s intention and attentional focus. While it is certainly right that 
associative mental states can be activated automatically, it is important to acknowledge 
that they can also be activated, and indeed be suppressed, in an indirectly controlled 
manner. This is a direct result of the fact that propositional thinking can activate 
associative mental states (mentioned in section 2.2.2.3). Sarah, for example, could 
activate stereotypic associations in regard to black people by entertaining negative 
thoughts about black people, if she wanted to. Note that Sarah may be aware of the 
fact that she harbours these associations and thus be able to activate these 
associations intentionally.63 More importantly for present purposes, Sarah may be able 
to inhibit the activation of associations that she feels alienated by. For example, by 
deliberately thinking “black people are peaceful”, she may trigger the activation of 
associations between her black people concept and positive attributes, and suppress 
the activation of negative associations (e.g., her association between BLACK PERSON 
and VIOLENCE) and her fear reaction.64, 65 
                                            
63
 See section 1.2.5 in the previous chapter for evidence that people can become aware of their 
so-called implicit attitudes. 
64
 See also Carruthers (2009b), who argues that although emotions are issued in system 1 (the 
automatic system) they can be under the subject’s intentional control (p. 124).  
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Evidence that supports the view that people can indirectly suppress the activation 
of so-called implicit attitudes comes from the literature on implementation intentions 
(e.g., Stewart & Payne, 2008; Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010; see also Holroyd 
& Kelly, 2016: 122). An implementation intention is a person’s resolution to respond in 
a specified way whenever a particular situation obtains. For example, Stewart & Payne 
(2008) instructed their participants to think the word “safe” whenever they would see a 
black face on the screen in front of them. Strikingly, these participants did not exhibit a 
bias against black people on a weapon identification task that was found amongst 
participants in a control condition, who were instructed to think stereotype irrelevant 
words (“accurate” or “quick”) in response to the presentation of black faces (see 
experiments 1 and 2).66 That is, while participants in the control condition were more 
likely to identify a briefly presented object mistakenly as gun (rather than as tool) when 
they had been primed with the picture of a black face than when they had been primed 
with the picture of a white face, participants in the “think safe” condition were equally 
likely to mistakenly identify an object as gun in the black face and the white face 
condition. Presumably, thinking “safe” in response to black people neutralised the 
influence of negative black stereotypes (such as “black people are violent”), and 
negative affect (anxiety) that is linked to these stereotypes, on people’s performance 
on the weapon identification task.67  
Note that there are two possible mechanisms that could lead to this result. Firstly, 
thinking “safe” in response to the presentation of black faces may incline people to 
overrule the output of automatic stereotyping and affective processes when deciding 
how to respond.68 Secondly, thinking “safe” in response to the presentation of black 
faces may inhibit the activation of problematic stereotypes and negative affect in the 
first place. Note that only the latter mechanism can count as indirect intentional control 
over so-called implicit attitudes themselves. Using a statistical procedure that allows 
dissociating different processes that contribute to people’s performance on the weapon 
identification task (a process dissociation analysis), Stewart & Payne (2008) found 
evidence that the latter mechanism (and not the former) drove their participants’ 
responses. This conclusion was further supported by a reaction time analysis. 
Participants in the think “safe” condition did not respond more slowly than participants 
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 See chapter 3 for an in-depth analysis of how mental stereotypes, such as the association 
between BLACK PEOPLE and VIOLENCE, relate to affective responses, such as fear (and vice 
versa). 
66
 The words “accurate” and “quick“ were chosen because participants in all groups were 
instructed to respond accurately and quickly. 
67
 See Correll and colleagues (2002, study 3) for evidence that the so-called shooter bias, which 
is similar to the weapon identification bias, is indeed the function of common black stereotypes.  
68
 Note that this would be similar to people’s intentional effort to name the colour of a colour 
word on the stroop task and not to read out the colour word (see section 1.2.4 in the previous 
chapter). 
 73 
 
in the control condition, which indicates that they did not deliberate more extensively 
about how to respond. The evidence thus suggests that implementation intentions 
allow people to suppress the activation of so-called implicit attitudes and not just to 
inhibit the influence of these mental states, once activated, on behaviour. In short, 
people have indirect intentional control over their implicit attitudes. The control is 
indirect in the sense that people can directly control what they think (e.g., the word 
“safe”) and this in turn influences which associations become activated.  
 
2.3.3  Ecological control and moral character 
 
What I have described in the above two sections as “indirect rational control” and as 
“indirect intentional control” can be seen as subtypes of what Holroyd & Kelly (2016) 
call “ecological control”, drawing on Clark (2007). Holroyd & Kelly (2016) define 
ecological control as follows:  
 
Ecological control is the structuring of one’s environment and cognitive habits such that 
autonomous processes and subsystems can effectively fulfil one’s person-level goals. (p. 
130) 
 
In the case of implicit attitudes, the relevant autonomous processes may be associative 
processes and the relevant subsystem may be an associative system. The person-
level goal could be the goal not to associate a given social group with negative 
attributes (where “associate” can be understood in a dispositional or an occurrent 
sense). In the last two sections, we have seen examples of how a person may achieve 
this goal by structuring her environment (e.g., by putting up photos of famous female 
leaders in her office) or her cognitive habits (e.g., by restructuring her propositional 
thought or by internalising implementation intentions). In short, we have seen examples 
of how people can take ecological control of their implicit attitudes. 
Importantly, Holroyd and Kelly (2016) argue that the fact that people can exert 
ecological control over their implicit attitudes (or “implicit biases” as they call them) 
suggests that implicit attitudes can be “proper targets of character-based evaluation” 
(p. 123; see also Holroyd, 2012). Since ecological control endows agents with the 
ability to modify implicit attitudes, the presence of problematic implicit attitudes that fuel 
unfair treatments of other people may reflect negatively on the agent. As Holroyd and 
Kelly (2016) put it, “there is a real sense in which whether or not [implicit attitudes] 
influence an individual’s behaviour is very much a reflection of that person’s character” 
(p. 126).   
Holroyd & Kelly (2016) admit that whether implicit attitudes are in fact appropriate 
targets of character-based evaluation may additionally depend on certain epistemic 
conditions, such as whether the agent is aware of her implicit attitudes and aware of 
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the fact that she could take ecological control of them (pp. 126-127). Yet, recall that I 
have argued in section 1.2.5 that much speaks in fact for the claim that people can 
become aware of their implicit attitudes just as they can become aware of their explicit 
attitudes. Moreover, I would like to emphasise that knowledge about ecological control 
mechanisms is actually very widespread (even though most people are of course not 
familiar with the term “ecological control”). It is common knowledge that the 
environment that we expose ourselves to and our own thought patterns can indirectly 
shape our associations, automatic processes, or feelings. In fact, Holroyd and Kelly 
(2016) emphasise that ecological control does not only play a role in regard to implicit 
attitudes but “underlies a vast swathe of human behaviour and problem-solving” (p. 
123). To name just a few examples, people may rearrange files in their office 
(structuring of environment) to increase their productivity (person-level goal; Clark, 
2007), they may form the intention to remove distracting items, such as their mobile 
phone, from their desk (structuring of environment) to better be able to sustain 
concentration (person-level goal), or they may remind themselves of positive life events 
(structuring of cognitive habit) to improve their mood (person-level goal). These 
examples show that people are familiar with, and indeed routinely employ, ecological 
control mechanisms. 
Denying that those mental states and processes that can only be ecologically 
controlled (and not be directly controlled) can be subject to character-based evaluation 
would imply that many mundane cognitive states and processes are not an appropriate 
target of such an evaluation. I agree with Holroyd & Kelly (2016) that this would be an 
untenable conclusion. A person’s productivity (or unproductivity), for example, may 
reflect on her character even if the person can only “ecologically control” those 
mechanisms that determine her productivity. Similarly, we should acknowledge that a 
person’s implicit prejudice can reflect on that person’s character even if the person can 
only “ecologically control” her implicit attitudes. This suggests that it is misguided to 
assume, as some proponents of the standard view have done (Levy, 2014a, 2015; 
Glasgow, 2016), that the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes corresponds 
to a distinction between mental states that do not reflect on a person’s moral character 
and mental states that do reflect on a person’s moral character (see desideratum D2 of 
a model of attitudes mentioned in the introduction to this thesis).  
However, this may not yet convince everyone. In particular, one may want to reply 
that if a person does not identify with a particular implicit attitude, or if that implicit 
attitude does not conform to the person’s considered values and rational judgments, 
the implicit attitude does not form part of the person’s moral character, irrespective of 
whether the person could in principle take ecological control of the implicit attitude. I will 
deal with this argument in chapter 5 of this thesis, where I will corroborate the view that 
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even response dispositions that a person does not identify with can reflect on that 
person’s moral character.  
 
2.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I scrutinised some core assumptions of the standard view of attitudes 
as I have presented it in the last chapter. Proponents of the standard view distinguish 
between implicit and explicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes are typically understood to be 
associative mental states, while explicit attitudes are regarded as propositional mental 
states. However, recently some authors have argued (or speculated) that implicit 
attitudes, too, are propositional mental states, or even fully fledged beliefs (De Houwer, 
2014; Frankish, 2016; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011; Levy, 2015; 
Mandelbaum, 2016; Webber, 2016a). I focussed in this chapter on the argument put 
forward by Mandelbaum (2016). I argued that Mandelbaum fails to establish that 
implicit attitudes (defined for the purpose of this chapter as those mental states that 
drive people’s spontaneous evaluative responses) are not associative mental states 
but propositional mental states. Even if we grant that in the studies that Mandelbaum 
describes propositional mental states drove people’s implicit evaluative responses, this 
does not establish that propositional mental states are always or in the majority of 
cases the driving force behind people’s implicit evaluative responses. Moreover, I 
showed that even for the very effects that Mandelbaum describes there are alternative 
explanations available that are consistent with an associative account of implicit 
attitudes. Accordingly, proponents of the standard view could be right about the claim 
that implicit attitudes are associative after all.  
I also scrutinised the assumptions that implicit attitudes are not subject to rational 
control and not subject to intentional control. I argued that these assumptions are not 
quite right even if we assume that implicit attitudes are associative mental states. 
People can structure their external environment and their internal propositional thought 
to modify associations (i.e., they can take indirect rational control of their associations) 
and they can suppress and activate associations by controlling their thoughts (i.e., they 
can take indirect intentional control of their associations). These indirect forms of 
control can be analysed as forms of ecological control (Clark, 2007; Holroyd & Kelly, 
2016).  
This leaves us with the possibility that implicit attitudes are associative mental 
states that can only indirectly (or ecologically) be controlled by the agent, while explicit 
attitudes are propositional mental states that can be directly controlled by the agent.69 
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 Note, however, that some authors argue that even paradigmatic examples of explicit 
attitudes, such as beliefs, are not (always) subject to direct forms of control (e.g., Hieronymi, 
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However, even if we grant that this is a plausible interpretation of the view that there 
are distinct implicit and explicit attitudes (i.e., the standard view), the question remains 
whether this is in fact the best way to conceive of attitudes. In particular, it remains 
unclear why we should assume the existence of implicit and explicit attitudes, identified 
with individual mental states, rather than just the existence of implicit and explicit 
mental states (that may ground attitudes in one way or another).  
Note that important motivations for distinguishing implicit and explicit attitudes do 
not hold up to scrutiny. Firstly, I challenged the assumption that the distinction between 
implicit and explicit attitudes, as it is usually drawn, corresponds to a distinction 
between mental states that form part of a person’s moral character and mental states 
that do not form part of a person’s moral character (see desideratum D2 of a model of 
attitudes). This is because people can exert ecological control over their implicit 
attitudes (even if these are associative mental states; see section 2.3.3). Accordingly, 
implicit attitudes may reflect on a person’s moral character. This undermines an 
important motivation to distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes. In fact, 
drawing a distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes may create confusion 
because it may wrongly suggest that people can only be evaluated for their so-called 
explicit attitudes. Secondly, I argued in the last chapter that results of attitude 
measurements on indirect and direct measures fail to motivate a distinction between 
implicit and explicit attitudes. The mere fact that results on indirect and direct measures 
of attitudes are sometimes dissociated does not establish that there are two different 
kinds of attitudes (see section 1.3.2). Thirdly, I showed in the last chapter that 
according to Oswald and colleagues (2013) results on IATs (presumably the most 
popular indirect measure of attitudes) and results on direct measures of attitudes do 
not differ in their relative success of predicting spontaneous evaluative responses 
versus deliberate evaluative responses (see section 1.3.3). This suggests that the 
postulation of two different kinds of attitudes (as measured by indirect and direct 
measures of attitudes) may not actually be necessary in order to predict and explain 
people’s evaluative responses (see desideratum D1 of a model of attitudes). 
Against the standard view speaks also that the identification of attitudes with 
individual mental states is out of line with the folk psychological understanding of 
attitudes (see section 1.2.2). When we say that someone has a racist attitude (or is a 
racist), we do not seem to highlight a particular belief or association of the agent but 
seem to refer to a general trait of the agent. Of course, psychologists and philosophers 
are not required to (and may sometimes have good reason not to) employ the same 
concepts as folk psychologists. Yet, as I have mentioned in the introduction to this 
                                                                                                                                
2008; Holroyd, 2012). If these arguments are right, this puts pressure on the claim that control 
provides a criterion that would allow us to distinguish between explicit and implicit attitudes.  
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thesis, scholars working on important issues such as racism will find it immensely 
difficult to inform public discourse with their research if their use of the term “attitude” is 
very different from how the term is used in day-to-day discourse. It is thus worth 
examining whether there is a scientifically sound model of attitudes available that better 
corresponds to the folk conception of attitudes than the standard view and that may 
also appeal to psychologists as well as philosophers (see desideratum D3 as 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). 
In chapter 4, I will propose such a model. Building upon Machery (2016), I will 
argue that attitudes are complex traits of people. On this proposed model, the implicit-
explicit distinction does not apply to attitudes, but each attitude is typically grounded in 
a variety of implicit and explicit mental states. In particular, I will argue that attitudes 
conceived as traits can be analysed as characteristic profiles of situation-specific 
evaluative response dispositions. The proposed model does justice to the fact (already 
touched upon in section 2.3.2) that evaluative responses towards a social group are 
highly context-dependent. Only a model of attitudes that acknowledges this context 
sensitivity can appropriately fulfil an explanatory/predictive function (see desideratum 
D1 for a model of attitudes). Moreover, I will argue that attitude ascriptions as 
conceived on my model provide an accurate insight into a person’s moral character 
(see desideratum D2). 
However, before I turn to my model of attitudes in chapter 4, I will elaborate in the 
next chapter on the relationship between cognitive stereotypes and affect (e.g., the 
relationship between Sarah’s conceptual association between BLACK PERSON and 
VIOLENCE and her affective reaction to be afraid of black people). This will allow me to 
draw some further conclusions about the mental states that underpin attitudes (see 
question Q2 in the introduction to this thesis) and about attitude individuation (see 
question Q1). This, in turn, will help me to further motivate my model of attitudes. It will 
become clear that conceptual mental states (i.e., stereotypes) and affective mental 
states are causally so tightly linked to each other that it does not make sense to identify 
attitudes with either conceptual or affective mental states alone. Rather we should 
acknowledge that attitudes are grounded in clusters of mental states if we want the 
notion of an attitude to optimally fulfil an explanatory/predictive function.  
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Chapter 3: The relationship between mental 
stereotypes and affect 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In the last two chapters, I have elaborated on the assumed difference between implicit 
and explicit evaluative mental states (which some scholars have described as a 
difference between implicit and explicit attitudes). In this chapter, I will turn to another 
distinction that is often made in regard to those mental states that are candidate 
(components of) attitudes. It is common in the philosophy and psychology of inter-
group relations to draw a distinction between stereotypes about a social group, on the 
one hand, and the affect that is elicited by and directed at the group, on the other hand 
(e.g., Blum, 2004, 2009; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Sie & van Voorst Vader-Bours, 
2016). Sarah, for example, may associate black people with violence (or she may 
harbour the propositional mental state with the content “black people are violent”), 
which constitutes a stereotype, and at the same time feel scared of black people, which 
is an affective response. There are different views about what kind of cognitive 
structures underpin stereotypes (see Beeghly, 2015, for a review of these), but all 
these views have in common that they understand stereotypes as mental entities that 
link representations of a social group (e.g., black people) to representations of 
particular attributes (e.g., violence, laziness, athleticism).70 The process of 
stereotyping, in a minimal sense, can be understood as the momentary activation of 
these stereotypes in a person’s mind (Beeghly, 2015).71 Affect, by contrast, includes 
basic feelings of like or dislike or fully-fledged emotions, such as anger, disgust, fear, or 
pity. Often the term “prejudice” is used in the literature to denote negative affective 
responses to an outgroup, and to contrast these with stereotypes (e.g., Blum, 2004; 
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 In line with Beeghly’s (2015) “descriptive view” of stereotypes, I will use the term “stereotype” 
in this chapter in the broad sense of a trait assignment to a social group. Other authors have 
proposed additional criteria that are required for a trait assignment to qualify as a stereotype. 
For example, it has been argued that stereotypes are morally defective, false generalisations 
about social groups that are largely resistant to counterevidence (Blum, 2004) and that 
stereotypes are “socially shared cultural constructs” (Sie & van Voorst Vader-Bours, 2016: 94). 
The argument that I make in this chapter is not contingent on any particular stereotype 
definition. Beeghly (2015) notes that the term “stereotype” is ambiguous in so far as it may refer 
to a cluster of traits assigned to a social group (“the entire informational structure”, p. 680) as 
well as to individual traits assigned to a social group (“parts of that structure”, ibid). In this 
chapter, I will be concerned with individual trait assignments, if not mentioned differently. 
71
 Beeghly (2015) distinguishes four different views about the nature of stereotyping that one 
may also interpret as stages in the process of stereotyping: stereotyping as momentary 
stereotype activation; stereotyping as stereotype use; primary influence of stereotypes on 
thoughts, emotions, and action as stereotyping; and stereotyping as stereotype communication. 
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Judd, Blair, & Chapleau, 2004; Sie & van Voorst Vader-Bours, 2016).72, 73 The 
distinction between stereotypes and affect in regard to social groups (i.e., prejudice) 
can be seen as an instance of the general distinction between cognition and affect 
(Amodio, 2008). 
Many scholars assume that the distinction between stereotypes about social 
groups and affect towards people qua members of social groups (henceforth referred 
to as “affect towards social groups” or simply “social affect”) is not only a conceptual 
distinction but that these concepts in fact correspond to distinct mental kinds (e.g., 
Amodio, 2008; Judd, Blair, & Chapleau, 2004; Valian, 2005). I will follow Madva and 
Brownstein (2016) in calling this the “two-type model”. On this view, Sarah’s 
association between BLACK PERSON and VIOLENCE can in principle be separated 
(both conceptually and in terms of the kinds of mental states involved) from her fear 
response towards black people (and indeed any affective response towards black 
people). Accordingly, it would, at least in principle, be possible for her to have the 
stereotype activated without being in an affective state of fear (or without being in any 
affective state), and conversely, to be in an affective state of fear towards a black 
person without having any stereotype activated. Consequently, it is sometimes claimed 
that stereotypes are “cold” cognitive mental states, while prejudices are “hot” affective-
motivational mental states (Valian, 2005).74 Note that how we conceive of the relation 
between stereotypes and social affect has a bearing on the question about attitude 
individuation (see Q1 in the introduction to this thesis). If the “two-type model” is right, 
we may ask whether stereotypes, or social affect (i.e., prejudice), or both of these 
components constitute people’s attitudes. 
However, some scholars have argued that the distinction between “cold” 
stereotypes and “hot” social affect does not hold up (Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016; 
Madva & Brownstein, 2016). They have argued that stereotypes inherently possess an 
affective valence and that social affect inherently possesses stereotypic conceptual 
content.75 That is, for both what is commonly referred to as “stereotype” and for what is 
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 I use the term “outgroup” here as it is commonly used in social psychology to denote a social 
group that the person who we are referring to does not consider herself to be member of. For 
example, Muslims are a religious outgroup to a person who considers herself to be Christian. 
Conversely, Christians are that person‘s religious “ingroup”.  
73
 Blum (2004) notes that “stereotyping is not the same as prejudice, and neither requires the 
other“ (footnote 4). Yet it shall also be mentioned that Blum (2009), by contrast, describes 
stereotypes as one component (alongside affect) of prejudice. 
74
 Another author who adopts the “hot vs. cold-metaphor” is Anderson (2010). She claims that 
stereotypes “are more a matter of ‘cold’ cognitive processing than ‘hot’ emotion” (p. 45, my 
emphasis). This may suggest a gradual difference between “cold” stereotyping and “hot” 
emotion. Accordingly, I do not regard her, as Madva and Brownstein (2016) do, as a (clear) 
proponent of a two-type view. 
75
 Wittenbrink and colleagues (1997) seem to defend at least the first of these two claims when 
they posit that implicit stereotypes “are colored by their valences, so that stereotyping and 
prejudice on the implicit level are conceptually intertwined” (p. 271). 
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commonly referred to as “prejudice” there are both affect and conceptual content 
involved.76 Let us call this, again following Madva and Brownstein (2016), the “one-type 
model”. If this view is right, it is not sensible to ask whether stereotypes or social affect 
constitute our attitudes because these components cannot be separated.  
In this chapter, I will argue that one-type theorists are right in so far as stereotypes 
about social groups and affects towards social groups form tight clusters. They are 
parts of a mental kind that I will call in accordance with Madva and Brownstein (2016) 
“evaluative stereotype”. This being said, I will also point out, contra to Madva and 
Brownstein (2016), that these clusters are not a unified mental state but are composed 
of different kinds of mental states (e.g., conceptual mental states and affective mental 
states) that are causally interconnected. Due to the tight causal connections between 
these mental states it is appropriate to say that stereotypes have an affective quality 
and that affect towards social groups has a conceptual or stereotypic quality. I will 
conclude that we need to acknowledge that attitudes are jointly constituted by 
conceptual (stereotypic) and affective mental states (plus maybe yet other kinds of 
mental states) if we want the notion of an attitude to optimally fulfil an explanatory and 
predictive role (see desideratum D1 of a model of attitudes).  
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I will present the empirical 
evidence that Amodio and his colleagues have provided in support of the two-type 
model (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio & Hamilton, 2012). In section 3.3, I will argue 
that there is an alternative explanation for Amodio and colleagues findings. Their 
findings can be explained by the operation of specific “evaluative stereotypes” (a term 
that I borrow from Madva and Brownstein, 2016) rather than the separate operation of 
evaluations (i.e., social affect) and stereotypes (section 3.3.1). I will show that it 
improves our predictions of discriminatory behaviour when we focus on the interaction 
between stereotypes and affective responses rather than emphasising their 
separateness (section 3.3.2). Moreover, I will argue that differential effects of induced 
emotions on IAT results are best explained on the assumption that there are evaluative 
stereotypes (see section 3.3.3). This leaves open the question of whether evaluative 
stereotypes are in fact unified mental states that blend conceptual and affective 
content, or whether they are constituted by distinct, but causally tightly linked, 
conceptual and affective mental states. I will address this question in section 3.4. In 
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 It is important to note that it is logically possible that “stereotype” and “prejudice” are different 
concepts although they refer to the same entity. This case would be analogous to Frege’s 
(1948) famous example of the words “morning star” and “evening star”, which he takes to have 
different senses while having the same referent, i.e. the planet Venus. The word “morning star” 
is roughly used in the sense “bright star that can be observed in the morning”, while “evening 
star” is used in the sense “bright star that can be observed in the evening”, and as it happens 
theses senses pick out the same object. Just as astronomical observations were needed to find 
out that the morning star and the evening star are the same planet, psychological experiments 
might inform us that stereotypes and prejudices are the same psychological kind after all. 
 81 
 
section 3.4.1, I will discuss and reject Madva and Brownstein’s (2016) one-type view 
according to which evaluative stereotypes “are best conceived in terms of mutually co-
activating semantic-affective-behavioral ‘clusters’ or ‘bundles’” that cannot be broken 
apart into more primitive mental states (p. 1). I will reply that Madva and Brownstein’s 
“bundles” can better be understood as separate, but interacting, conceptual and 
affective mental states. In section 3.4.2, I will argue that due to the tight causal 
connections between these conceptual and affective mental states, one-type theorists 
are nonetheless right about the claim that stereotypes about social groups have an 
affective quality and that affect towards social groups has a conceptual (or stereotypic) 
quality. In section 3.5, I will then summarise my nuanced position on the relation 
between stereotypes and affect, and conclude that attitudes should be conceived of as 
being jointly constituted by conceptual and affective mental states (plus perhaps other 
kinds of mental states). 
Before I start, one cautionary note is in order. In this chapter, I will mainly be 
concerned with mental states that scholars commonly describe as “implicit” (roughly, 
those mental states that drive spontaneous evaluative responses such as those that 
are expressed on indirect measures of attitudes) and not with mental states generally 
described as “explicit”. I am confident that the conclusions that I reach in this chapter 
on the relation between implicit stereotypes and prejudices can be extended to mental 
states more commonly described as explicit.77 Yet regardless of this possible 
extension, my argument as presented in this chapter lends support to the view that 
attitudes should not be identified with individual mental states but are better conceived 
of as grounded in clusters of mental states.   
 
3.2  Empirical support for the two-type model 
 
The empirical case for the distinctness of so-called implicit stereotypes and prejudices 
has most forcefully been made by Amodio and his colleagues (Amodio, 2008, 2014; 
Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio & Hamilton, 2012; Amodio & Ratner, 2011). It must be 
noted that they use the term “implicit evaluation” instead of “implicit prejudice” for 
affective responses towards social groups in order to “avoid invoking unintended 
connotations associated with the complicated construct of prejudice, such as 
consciously endorsed racist attitudes and beliefs.” (Amodio & Devine, 2006: footnote 
1). In what follows, I will adopt this terminology, which is also useful because “implicit 
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 Note also that it is not even clear whether there is something like explicit affect. Affective 
mental states do not exhibit those features that are usually seen as characteristic of explicit 
mental states: they are presumably not propositionally structured and neither subject to direct 
rational nor direct intentional control. 
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evaluation” may refer to both positive and negative affect, whereas the term “implicit 
prejudice” is typically connoted with negative affect. 
A significant part of Amodio and colleagues’ argument is based on neuroscientific 
evidence that supposedly shows that there are distinct neural systems for what they 
call semantic (i.e., conceptual) and affective processing (Amodio, 2008, 2014; Amodio 
& Ratner, 2011).78 It is argued that this neural distinction supports a corresponding 
psychological distinction between conceptual stereotypes and affective evaluations. 
However, it is highly contentious whether such an inference from the distinction 
between neural systems to the existence of two distinct psychological constructs is 
valid.79 In what follows, I will therefore not elaborate on the evidence for distinct neural 
underpinnings of stereotypes and prejudices but rather describe the direct 
psychological evidence for the claim that stereotypes and prejudices are distinct mental 
kinds. That is, I focus on what I take to be the strongest case for the two-type model. 
This is also in line with my general interest in the mental states (and not neural states) 
underpinning attitudes (see question Q2 in the introduction of this thesis). 
Amodio and colleagues discuss a range of psychological experiments that 
allegedly support the view that implicit stereotypes and implicit evaluations are distinct 
mental kinds (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio & Hamilton, 2012). The alleged 
evidence for what for what I call in accordance with Madva & Brownstein (2016) “the 
two-type model” is threefold. Firstly, Amodio and Devine (2006) claim that people’s 
results on IATs that are designed to assess implicit stereotypes do not correlate with 
people’s results on IATs that are designed to assess implicit evaluations. Secondly, 
they assume that implicit evaluations and implicit stereotypes as measured with these 
different IATs are predictive of different kinds of behaviours. Thirdly, Amodio and 
Hamilton (2012) provide evidence that social anxiety induced by the prospect of an 
upcoming interaction with a black person affects scores on a racial evaluative IAT but 
not those on a racial stereotype IAT. In the following paragraphs, I will describe these 
pieces of evidence in turn. In the next section, I will then scrutinise the evidence and 
show that there is an alternative explanation for these findings that is compatible with a 
one-type view. 
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 In what follows I will use the term “conceptual” for what Amodio and colleagues call 
“semantic”. The term “semantic” is ambiguous and what they actually seem to refer to is 
conceptual processing. 
79
 Many contemporary philosophers of mind (and cognitive scientists) defend some form of non-
reductive materialism according to which psychological states supervene on neural states but 
are not identical with them (Baker, 2009). For them, a difference between psychological kinds 
always implies a difference in the underlying neural states, whereas the reverse inference from 
a difference in neural states to a difference in psychological kinds is not valid. By contrast, 
identity theorists would challenge the very distinction between the psychological and the neural 
level because they believe that psychological states are identical to brain states (Lewis, 1994). 
See also section 6.2.8 in Madva and Brownstein (2016) for a discussion of the relation between 
psychological-level and neural-level distinctions.  
 83 
 
Amodio and Devine (2006) created two different IATs to assess implicit evaluations 
and implicit stereotypes separately and to prove the independence of these 
psychological constructs (see study 1). The evaluative IAT (henceforth “Eval-IAT”) was 
designed to measure how readily the white participants in the study associate white 
and black faces with pleasant and unpleasant words.80 The pleasant words included 
“honor, lucky, diamond, loyal, freedom, rainbow, love, honest, peace, and heaven” and 
the unpleasant words included “evil, cancer, sickness, disaster, poverty, vomit, bomb, 
rotten, abuse, and murder” (p. 654). As predicted, the results indicated a significant 
evaluative bias against black people, presumably showing that participants more 
readily linked black people to unpleasantness than to pleasantness, and white people 
more readily to pleasantness than to unpleasantness.81 The stereotype IAT (henceforth 
“Stereo-IAT”) was designed to measure how strongly the same participants associate 
white and black faces with “mental” or “physical words”. The “mental words” included 
“math, brainy, aptitude, educated, scientist, smart, college, genius, book, and read” and 
the “physical words” included “athletic, boxing, basketball, run, agile, dance, jump, 
rhythmic, track, and football” (p. 654). As predicted, the results were consistent with the 
assumption that white people are more strongly associated with mental attributes than 
with physical attributes and that black people are more strongly linked to physical 
attributes than to mental attributes.82 Yet, although on both the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-
IAT a significant bias was detected, participants’ scores on these measures were 
uncorrelated. That means that participants who showed an evaluative bias against 
black people on the Eval-IAT did not reliably show stereotypic responses on the Stereo-
IAT, and vice versa. Amodio and Devine argue that if evaluation and stereotyping were 
a unified mental kind, a correlation between the results on the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-
IAT should be detectable. However, as no such correlation was found, evaluation and 
stereotypes must be seen as distinct mental kinds. Stereotypes can exert their 
influence on behaviour without affect-involving evaluative responses playing a role and, 
conversely, social affect can influence responses without stereotyping. 
In two further studies, Amodio and Devine (2006) tested their hypothesis that 
implicit stereotypes and implicit evaluations are uniquely predictive of different kinds of 
behaviours (see studies 2 and 3). Based on previous research on explicit stereotypes 
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 Note that some authors call this kind of IAT “attitude IAT” (e.g., Oswald et al., 2013; Rudman 
& Ashmore, 2007). 
81
  Amodio and Devine (2006) only report a composite Eval-IAT score. That is, in fact we do not 
know whether the effect found on the Eval-IAT is due to participants linking black people more 
readily to unpleasantness than to pleasantness, linking white people more readily to 
pleasantness than to unpleasantness, or due to a combination of both these factors. 
82
 Again, Amodio and Devine (2006) only report a composite score. That is, in fact we do not 
know whether the effect found on the Stereo-IAT is due to a stronger association of white 
people with mental attributes than with physical attributes, a stronger association of black 
people with physical attributes than with mental attributes, or due to a combination of both these 
factors. 
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and explicit evaluation (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1996; Dovidio et al., 2003), they expected 
that implicit stereotypes would predict judgment formation about a social group (what 
they call “instrumental behaviour”), whereas implicit evaluations would predict basic 
approach or avoidance responses (what they refer to as “consummatory behaviours”). 
One of these studies (study 3) consisted of two sessions, in the first of which the Eval-
IAT and Stereo-IAT were administered and in the second of which the measures of 
instrumental and consummatory behaviours were taken. The results showed that Eval-
IAT scores were uniquely predictive of participant’s seating distance to the belongings 
of an African American interaction partner (consummatory behaviour), whereas the 
Stereo-IAT scores were uniquely predictive of participants’ assumptions about the 
interaction partner’s performance on various academic and non-academic tasks 
(instrumental behaviour). The higher participants’ evaluative bias against black people 
on the Eval-IAT, the further they sat away from the belongings of the African American, 
while the same pattern in the evaluative IAT results did not correlate with judgments 
about the black interaction partner’s task performance. By contrast, the higher 
participants’ stereotype bias (i.e., associating black people more strongly with physical 
than with mental words), the worse they assumed the interaction partner would perform 
on academic tasks, while this variation in stereotype IAT results did not correlate with 
seating distance.83 These findings allegedly lend support to the view that stereotypes 
and evaluations (i.e., affect towards social groups) have different functional roles and 
thus are different mental kinds. 
If stereotypes and evaluations have different functional profiles, we should also 
expect that they respond differently to situational input. This has been examined by 
Amodio and Hamilton (2012). They led half of their white participants to believe that 
they were about to interact with a black person (black partner condition), while the 
other half was led to believe that their interaction partner would be a white person 
(white partner condition). Those participants in the black partner condition showed 
subsequently more bias against black people on an Eval-IAT than those participants in 
the white partner condition. However, the two groups exhibited no difference in their 
biases on the Stereo-IAT. Crucially, self-reported feelings of anxiety were stronger for 
participants in the black partner condition than for participants in the white partner 
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 In the other study (Amodio & Devine, 2006: study 2), participants read a short writing sample 
of either a black or a white writer and were asked to form an impression of the writer. 
Afterwards, instrumental behaviour was assessed by asking participants to indicate which 
attributes they would use to describe the author and consummatory behaviour was measured 
by asking whether they would like to befriend the author as well as by asking them to rate on a 
feeling thermometer how warm they feel towards the author. Subsequently, the same 
participants completed a Stereo-IAT and an Eval-IAT. As predicted, a statistical procedure 
(hierarchical linear regression) revealed that the Stereo-IAT results were linked to participant’s 
instrumental behaviour (whether they would describe the author in stereotype-conforming 
terms) but not to their consummatory behaviours, whereas the Eval-IAT results were predictive 
of the consummatory behaviours but not of the instrumental behaviours. 
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condition. Moreover, in the black partner condition, participants’ level of anxiety was 
correlated with their Eval-IAT scores but not with their Stereo-IAT scores. For 
participants in the white partner condition, no such correlation could be found. Amodio 
and Hamilton conclude that social anxiety affects social evaluation (which involves 
affect) but not stereotyping. If evaluation and stereotyping were one psychological kind, 
we should expect that both are affected by the same factors. Amodio and Hamilton’s 
experiment seemingly shows that there is at least one factor (i.e., anxiety) that affects 
evaluation selectively. Thus it seems that stereotyping and evaluation are functionally 
different. 
To summarise, there are different pieces of evidence that have been taken to 
bolster the two-type model: results on measures of implicit stereotypes have been 
shown to be independent of results on measures of implicit evaluations. Moreover, 
stereotypes and evaluations seem to have different functional profiles: they contribute 
to different forms of behaviour and are not affected in the same ways by the same 
input.  
 
3.3  Assessing the evidence for the two-type view 
 
The argument that Amodio and colleagues (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio &  
Hamilton, 2012) provide can be interpreted as an argument to the best explanation. 
They argue that the hypothesis that stereotypes and evaluations are distinct entities is 
the best explanation for (1) the low correlation between people’s results on the Stereo-
IAT and the Eval-IAT, (2) the fact that Stereo-IAT and Eval-IAT results predict different 
kinds of behaviours, and (3) the fact that results on Stereo-IAT and Eval-IAT are 
influenced differently by feelings of anxiety. In the following, I will argue that the 
reported findings can equally well be explained on a model that emphasises that there 
are tight links between stereotypes and evaluations, and that is compatible with a one-
type view. That is, I will argue that the findings can be explained by the operation of 
particular “evaluative stereotypes” (a term that I borrow from Madva & Brownstein, 
2016) rather than the separate operation of evaluations and stereotypes. I will make 
this case for each of Amodio and colleagues’ pieces of evidence separately, starting 
with the evidence from the lack of correlation between Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT results 
(section 3.3.1), followed by the evidence from behavioural prediction (section 3.3.2), 
and the evidence from the influence of social anxiety on social evaluation (section 
3.3.3). At the same time, I will argue that a model that is based on the notion of 
evaluative stereotypes may lead research into more fruitful directions (section 3.3.2) 
and that it can explain at least one finding, from a different study (Dasgupta et al. 
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2009), that cannot be explained on a model that holds that evaluations and stereotypes 
are largely unrelated constructs (section 3.3.3).  
 
3.3.1  Lack of correlation between Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT results 
 
There are two concerns that have been raised about Amodio and Devine’s (2006) 
interpretation of the absence of correlation between Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT results. 
Firstly, both IATs seem to utilise words that have at the same time conceptual and 
affective qualities and thus it is unclear how these IATs can track the distinction 
between conceptual stereotyping and affective evaluation (Holroyd & Sweetman, 
2016). Secondly, the different IATs may not track the distinction between stereotyping 
and evaluation because the combination of face stimuli with word items on the two IATs 
may have triggered complex interactions between stereotypes and social affect (Madva 
& Brownstein, 2016). In section 3.3.1.1, I will address the first concern and argue that it 
can be dismissed once we properly understand the rationale behind Amodio and 
Devine’s (2006) experiment. In section 3.3.1.2, I will elaborate on the second concern 
and insist that this indeed poses a challenge to Amodio and Devine’s (2006) 
interpretation of their results. 
 
3.3.1.1  Words with conceptual as well as affective content 
 
Amodio and Devine (2006) take the non-correlation between Stereo-IAT results and 
Eval-IAT results to show that stereotypes and evaluations are functionally independent. 
People can stereotype social groups without having an affective response towards 
them and they can have an affective response towards other social groups without 
stereotyping them. However, it has been pointed out that both the words used for the 
Stereo-IAT and the words for the Eval-IAT possess conceptual content as well as an 
affective valence, and thus cannot track a difference between (affect-free) stereotyping 
and evaluation (Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016). Obviously, all the words on the Eval-IAT, 
such as the pleasant words “diamond” and “lucky” or the unpleasant words “evil” and 
“cancer”, have a meaning that is not reducible to the valence of the word. They signify 
particular objects, such as diamonds, or states, such as being lucky. Similarly, all the 
words on the Stereo-IAT, such as the “mental words” “math” and “brainy” or the 
“physical words” “athletic” and “boxing”, have both a particular meaning and a valence 
attached to them. Note, for example, that the positive valence of “athletic” can be seen 
if we compare it with other physical terms like “sluggish” or “weak”. Importantly, the 
same is true for the category labels “physical” and “mental”. Arguably, both these words 
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bring positive associations to mind (at least when considered in isolation).84 Thus, 
Amodio and Devine’s (2006) claim that these category labels are “relatively neutral” 
seems misplaced (p. 654). 
Yet, properly understood, Amodio and Devine’s claim is not that the lack of 
correlation between the scores on the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-IAT is due to the items 
on the Eval-IAT being purely affective and the items on the Stereo-IAT being purely 
conceptual.85 Rather their claim seems to be that there is no correlation detectable 
because the effect on the Eval-IAT is driven by the affective aspects of the items used 
(and not by the conceptual aspects), whereas the effect on the Stereo-IAT is due to the 
conceptual aspects of the items used (and not due to their affective aspects). In short, 
on the Eval-IAT, affect is supposedly the “difference maker”, whereas on the Stereo-
IAT, conceptual content is supposedly the “difference maker”. The rationale behind this 
claim is as follows. The effect found on the Stereo-IAT cannot be due to differences in 
affective responses because the physical and mental word lists used were of similar 
average valence (recall that physical words included for example “athletic” and “agile”, 
while mental words included for example “brainy” and “educated”). By contrast, the 
Eval-IAT effect was due to different affective responses because the difference 
between the pleasant and unpleasant words was a difference in affective valence and 
not a difference in stereotypic conceptual content relating to black people (recall that 
pleasant words included for example “lucky” and “diamond”, while unpleasant words 
included for example “cancer” and “disaster”).86 A pre-test, in which another group of 
participants rated the words in the word lists for their favourability, backed these claims 
about their average valences. Both the mental and physical words turned out to be 
positively valenced on average and, not very surprisingly, the pleasant words were 
rated much more positively than the words in the unpleasant word list.87 Hence, 
according to Amodio & Devine (2006), the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-IAT may reveal a 
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 See next section (section 3.3.1.2) for an argument that “physical” can take on a negative 
valence when ascribed to black people. 
85
 Madva and Brownstein (2016) seem to acknowledge this point (see endnote 10 in their 
paper). However, their discussion in the main text remains perplexingly out of line with this 
admission. In the main text, they continue to criticise that the category labels and words used on 
the Stereo-IAT are evaluatively-laden (p. 7). 
86
 It should be noted, however, that some of the unpleasant words used (most notably “poverty”, 
“abuse”, and “murder”) are presumably linked to common black stereotypes. This is an 
unfortunate oversight in Amodio and Devine’s study design. I will grant for the sake of the 
argument that this oversight did not affect the results of their experiment and show below that 
even if this is granted, there is an alternative explanation for Amodio & Devine’s results. 
87
 Actually, things were a bit more complicated. Although both mental words and physical words 
were rated positively on average in the pre-test, the mental words were rated somewhat more 
favourably than physical words. Yet, the difference in favourability between the pleasant and 
unpleasant words of the Eval-IAT was much bigger than the difference in favourability between 
the mental words and the physical words of the Stereo-IAT. Moreover, Amodio and Devine 
(2006) used a statistical procedure (covariate analysis) to ensure that the effect on the Stereo-
IAT was not driven by the difference in valence that was revealed on the pre-test. See footnote 
3 in their paper on this. 
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difference between evaluation and stereotyping, even though the words used on these 
tests have both affective as well as conceptual qualities. Whereas the Stero-IAT effect 
is presumably due to a difference in stereotypic content (physical vs. mental) because 
the affective valence is held constant, the Eval-IAT effect is presumably due to a 
difference in affective valence (pleasantness vs. unpleasantness) because the words 
used presumably did not differ in stereotypic content relating to black people. As 
people’s results on the two IATs are dissociated, Amodio and Devine (2006) conclude 
that stereotypes about black people and affect towards black people can operate 
independently of each other and are thus distinct mental kinds. Now that we have a 
better understanding of Amodio & Devine’s argument, we can further assess its validity. 
 
3.3.1.2  Results on both IATs are the result of “evaluative stereotypes” 
 
In the last section, I pointed out that the fact that both the words used on the Stereo-IAT 
and the Eval-IAT have both affective and conceptual qualities does not undermine 
Amodio and Devine’s (2006) claim that these tests tap into separate mental constructs: 
conceptual stereotypes and affective evaluations. However, this should not be taken to 
imply that dissociations between results on Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT are in fact best 
accounted for by the separate operation of affective evaluations and conceptual 
stereotypes. In what follows, I will argue that on both the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-IAT, a 
combination of stereotypic conceptual content and affect may well have driven the 
observed effects. The combination of face and word stimuli on the two IATs presumably 
allows for complex interactions between the activation of stereotypes and affect, and 
different combinations of stereotypes and affect may have resulted in the dissociation 
between Stereo-IAT and Eval-IAT results. In other words, Amodio and Devine (2006) 
fail to establish that stereotypic content is the sole “difference maker” on the Stereo-IAT 
and that affect is the sole “difference maker” on the Eval-IAT. Consequently, they fail to 
establish that stereotypes about social groups and affect towards social groups can 
operate independently of each other.  
Drawing on research by Degner and Wentura (2011), Madva and Brownstein 
(2016) point out that the valence that a given trait has for a person often depends on 
whom the trait is assigned to: “a trait like intelligence or being ‘good at’ some activity 
has a positive valence when it is attributed to oneself or one’s ingroup, but a negative 
valence when attributed to an outgroup” (p. 7). Consequently, one can speculate that 
the mental attributes used on the Stereo-IAT might have taken on different valences 
when combined with black than when combined with white person stimuli. Amodio and 
Devine found that the valence of the mental attributes is positive on average when they 
tested them in isolation, but dependent on whom the trait is assigned to, the valence of 
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these traits may vary significantly. When the white participants were asked to respond 
with the same key on the keyboard to black person stimuli and to mental stimuli, this 
might have led to negative affect. By contrast, when participants were required to 
respond in the same way to white person stimuli and to mental stimuli, this might have 
led to positive affect. These evaluative responses might have contributed to the 
observed Stereo-IAT effect.  
Similarly, the physical attributes might have taken on different valences for the two 
target groups on the Stereo-IAT. Blum (2004) rightly notes that the “[h]istorical and 
social context introduces an important level of complexity to the overall assessment of 
the content of a stereotype” (p. 278). As an example, he mentions that black people are 
often described as good dancers. On the face of it, this might seem to be a positive 
stereotype. However, seen in the historical context, this attribution suggests a negative 
evaluation. Drawing on work by Pickering (2001), Blum (2004) explains that this 
stereotype dates back to the slave era, where black people were seen as joyously 
entertaining subordinates, who are irrational, irresponsible, and lazy. Accordingly, the 
stereotype of black people as good dancers tends to invoke the deeply negative 
conception of black people as good at particular physical activities while being mentally 
weak. Even if people are ignorant about the origin of the stereotype, they may well be 
aware of its derogatory character (which is unbeknown to them historically rooted). By 
contrast, saying of a white person that she is a good dancer, or good at physical 
activities in general, does not carry this historical burden and can thus indeed be linked 
to a positive evaluation of the person (especially, if the evaluating person is white 
herself). Thus, it seems plausible that on Amodio and Devine’s (2006) Stereo-IAT the 
pairing of white person stimuli with physical attributes evoked positive affect, whereas 
the pairing of black person stimuli with physical words was linked to negative 
evaluation of black people. 
Taken together, these complexities that arise when mental and physical attributes 
are linked to black and white people shed doubts on the claim that differences in 
affective valence did not contribute to the Stereo-IAT effect in Amodio and Devine’s 
(2006) study. Amodio and Devine take the Stereo-IAT to reveal “a pattern of stereotypic 
trait associations with Black and White faces” (p. 655). That is, participants presumably 
linked black faces more readily to physical attributes than to mental attributes and white 
faces more readily to mental attributes than to physical attributes.88 Amodio and Devine 
seem to assume that these associations do not differ in affective valence because the 
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 Although, as already mentioned in footnote 82, it is not clear from the Stereo-IAT score 
reported by Amodio and Devine (2006) whether the effect is in fact due to people linking black 
people more readily with physical attributes than with mental attributes, linking white people 
more readily with mental attributes than with physical attributes, or due to a combination of both 
these factors.  
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attributes “physical” and “mental” are equally positively charged.89 However, as I have 
argued above, this inference is misguided. Whereas an association between white 
people and mental attributes is likely linked to positive affect (at least in white people), 
an association between black people and physical attributes may well be linked to 
negative affect (at least in white people). All in all, the Stereo-IAT effect may reflect the 
affectively charged conception of black people as less intelligent than white people 
(and as more physical in a dehumanizing sense). Note that even the association of 
black people with physical attributes can be seen as expression of the demeaning 
conception that black people are mentally inferior. Results by Amodio and Hamilton 
(2012) support the suspicion that the Stereo-IAT is primarily driven by the conception of 
black people as unintelligent. They found a higher rate of attribute categorisation 
mistakes for the black-mental pairing than for any other pairing (black-physical, white-
mental, and white-physical) on a Stereo-IAT, indicating that of all the pairings 
participants found it most difficult to link black people to mental attributes (see also 
Madva & Brownstein, 2016: 10). This is compatible with the interpretation that the 
Stereo-IAT effect is primarily driven by the negatively charged stereotype that black 
people are unintelligent. 
So far I have argued that evaluations (i.e., affective responses) may well have 
contributed to the effect found on Amodio and Devine’s (2006) Stereo-IAT. Conversely, 
one may now wonder whether stereotyping may have influenced the Eval-IAT effect. In 
fact, the structure of the Eval-IAT does not rule out the possibility of stereotype content 
influencing the result. To be sure, most of the positive and negative word items used on 
the Eval-IAT (e.g., “diamond”, “peace”, “disaster”, and “vomit”) did not convey 
stereotype content.90 However, it may well be that these words in conjunction with 
pictures of black and white persons activated stereotypes from memory, which 
matched the valences of the words. For example, when faces of white people were 
paired with positive words, this may have led to the activation of positive white person 
stereotypes. Likewise, when white faces were paired with negative attributes, this might 
have led to the activation of negative white person stereotypes. However, we can 
assume that people associate their own group more strongly with positive stereotypes 
than with negative stereotypes. Consequently, for participants in Amodio and Devine’s 
experiment, all of who were white, the pairing of positive words with white faces may 
have been more effective in triggering correspondingly valenced stereotypes than the 
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 It should be noted that although I speak here in accordance with Amodio & Devine (2006) 
loosely of associations, this is not meant to preclude the possibility that (some of) the relevant 
implicit mental states that link representations of people (e.g., black people) to representations 
of particular traits (e.g., physical attributes) may be propositionally rather than associatively 
structured (see last chapter). Whether a given mental state is associatively or propositionally 
structured does not make any difference to the argument presented here.   
90
 Though see footnote 86 above.  
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pairing of white faces with negatively valenced words. Similarly, negative black 
stereotypes may have readily been activated in the white participants when they had to 
pair black faces with negatively valenced words. By contrast, the pairing of black faces 
with positive words may have been less effective in triggering the activation of positive 
black stereotypes. The Eval-IAT results may thus reflect that white people associate 
white people more strongly with positively valenced stereotypes than with negatively 
valenced stereotypes and black people more strongly with negatively valenced 
stereotypes than with positively valenced stereotypes. It is of course difficult to say 
which specific stereotypes may have been invoked on the test. However, a good guess 
would be that those stereotypes were triggered that were most accessible in 
participants’ memory (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). These considerations show that 
there is a possible alternative explanation of the Eval-IAT effect that hints at the mutual 
contribution of evaluation and stereotyping. 
In sum, both the claim that the Stereo-IAT effect is exclusively driven by differences 
in stereotyping (and not in evaluation) as well as the claim that the Eval-IAT effect is 
exclusively driven by differences in evaluation (and not in stereotyping) can be called 
into question. Different evaluations of white and black people may well have been 
elicited on the Stereo-IAT depending on the association of these two groups with 
mental and physical attributes, respectively. Moreover, the pairings of positive and 
negative words with faces of white and black individuals on the Eval-IAT may well have 
triggered stereotypes that matched the valences of the words. The reason for the 
absence of correlation between Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT is therefore not necessarily 
that the former test is exclusively influenced by evaluations (i.e., affect), whereas the 
latter test is purely influenced by stereotypes (i.e., conceptual content). A plausible 
alternative explanation is that the absence of correlation is a result of different, what I 
call following Madva & Brownstein (2016), evaluative stereotypes that the two tests 
evoke.91 As already mentioned, the Stereo-IAT effect seems to be primarily driven by 
the negatively valenced stereotype that black people are less mentally capable than 
white people. Due to its different structure, the Eval-IAT is less likely to trigger a 
particular evaluative stereotype across participants. Rather the Eval-IAT can be 
assumed to evoke whatever stereotypes are strongest for each individual participant. 
Plausibly, participants whose performance on the Stero-IAT was driven by the negative 
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 On a more general note, my elaborations in this section point once again to the need to be 
cautious about the interpretation of psychological measurement results. I showed that a test that 
has been taken to reveal implicit stereotypes (the Stereo-IAT) may as well tap into implicit 
evaluations, while a test that has been taken to reveal implicit evaluations (the Eval-IAT) may as 
well tap into implicit stereotyping. Similar considerations may plausibly apply to other test like 
the affective priming task, which is commonly interpreted to reveal evaluations (Fazio et al., 
1995) or the shooter task, which has been interpreted to reveal cultural stereotypes (Correll et 
al., 2002). 
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“black people are unintelligent” stereotype were not necessarily influenced by negative 
black stereotypes on the Eval-IAT and, conversely, those participants who were 
influenced by predominantly negative black stereotypes on the Eval-IAT were not 
necessarily influenced by the “black people are unintelligent” stereotype on the Stereo-
IAT. The absence of correlation between Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT is thus compatible 
with a view according to which stereotyping and evaluation are strongly intertwined 
(Madva & Brownstein, 2016: 10-11). It must be emphasised, however, that this 
alternative explanation leaves open the question of whether stereotypes and 
evaluations are distinct kinds of mental states that always or at least normally co-occur 
(which would arguably still be compatible with a two-type model), or whether evaluative 
stereotypes are, as proposed by Madva & Brownstein (2016), unified mental states that 
blend conceptual and affective content (which would speak for a one-type model). In 
section 3.4, I will tackle this question.  
Before I do this, however, I will show that the presented account of evaluative 
stereotypes can also explain why Stero-IAT and Eval-IAT results predict different kinds 
of behaviours, and that the postulation of the construct of evaluative stereotypes has 
the potential to direct attitude research into more fruitful directions (section 3.3.2). 
Moreover, I will show that the evaluative stereotype account can explain why anxiety 
affects Eval-IAT results but not Stereo-IAT results, and that this account in fact provides 
the best explanation for selective effects of different emotions on different kinds of IATs 
(section 3.3.3).  
 
3.3.2  Behavioural prediction from Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT scores 
 
As noted before, Amodio and Devine (2006) also suggest that the Stereo-IAT and the 
Eval-IAT are uniquely predictive of instrumental and consummatory behaviour, 
respectively. According to them, this finding points to differential functional roles of 
stereotypes and evaluations (i.e., social affect), supposedly confirming that stereotypes 
and evaluations are distinct psychological kinds. In the last section, I presented an 
alternative explanation for the absence of correlation between Stereo-IAT and Eval-IAT 
that does not depend on stereotypes and evaluations being independent. I have 
argued that different evaluative stereotypes (combinations of affective and conceptual 
mental content) may have been evoked when people participated in these tests. The 
behavioural prediction results can similarly be explained by the operation of different 
evaluative stereotypes. That is, they may be accounted for by differences in the content 
of particular evaluative stereotypes evoked on the Stereo-IAT and the Eval-IAT rather 
than by a difference between stereotyping and evaluation (Madva & Brownstein, 2016: 
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8-10).92 I argued that the Stereo-IAT effect may be driven by the negatively valenced 
stereotype that black people are less mentally capable than white people, whereas the 
Eval-IAT effect may be influenced by a broader range of evaluative stereotypes 
(essentially, whatever stereotypes come readily to the mind of the participants). Against 
this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the Stereo-IAT was a good predictor of judgments 
about a black interaction partner’s academic task performance (Amodio & Devine, 
2006: study 3). By contrast, the Eval-IAT scores may have failed to predict these 
judgments because participants’ Eval-IAT performance was presumably driven by a 
variety of evaluative stereotypes, only a few of which were about the purported mental 
inferiority of black people. It is also of no surprise that the negative conception of black 
people as mentally weak that may have driven the Stereo-IAT effect would not predict 
the seating distance to a black person. Increased social distance to stigmatised 
individuals can be due to anxiety (Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008), yet there is no reason to 
assume that mentally weak individuals are perceived as a threat. Accordingly, it can be 
supposed that the Eval-IAT excelled in the prediction of seating distance because 
participant’s performance on the Eval-IAT may have been a reflection of threat-related 
stereotyping rather than (or more than) intelligence-related stereotyping. There is thus 
a feasible alternative explanation for why Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT results were 
uniquely predictive of different kinds of behaviours. These behaviours may not have 
been the function of different kinds of mental states (evaluations and stereotypes) as 
proposed by Amodio and Devine (2006) but the function of evaluative stereotypes with 
different contents.  
This indicates that we may not actually need to separate the contributions of 
stereotypes and evaluations to make accurate predictions about people’s responses 
towards others. In fact, Madva and Brownstein (2016) convincingly argue that 
discriminatory responses are best predicted by specific evaluative stereotypes (pp. 15-
17). They review a range of studies that employed IATs that presumably tapped into 
specific evaluative stereotypes and show that results on these IATs excelled as 
predictors of discriminatory behaviours (Agerström & Rooth, 2011; Rooth, 2010; 
Rudman & Ashmore, 2007; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Rudman & Lee, 2002). For 
illustration, let us have a closer look at one of these studies. Rudman and Ashmore 
(2007) compared two different IATs for their ability to predict overtly discriminatory 
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 Madva and Brownstein (2016) point to the fact that we usually explain behavioural differences 
by differences in the content of mental states rather than by differences in the kinds of mental 
states involved (pp. 8-10). For example, two people may act differently because of differences 
in the content of their desires. Person A may belief that Bonnie is a drug dealer and desire to 
buy drugs, while person B may belief that Bonnie is a drug dealer and desire drug dealers to be 
punished (Madva & Brownstein, 2016: 9). The fact that person A buys drugs from Bonnie and 
that person B calls the police does not point to the fact that person A’s and person B’s 
behaviour is the function of different kinds of mental states but just to the fact that their desires 
differ in content. 
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intergroup behaviour. The first IAT included positively and negatively valenced words 
without stereotype content (positive: sunshine, smile, etc.; negative: filth, death, etc.) 
and thus closely resembled the Eval-IAT used by Amodio and Devine (2006).93 The 
second IAT included positively and negatively valenced words with stereotype content 
(negative: lazy, shiftless, dangerous, etc.; positive: ambitious, industrious, ethical, etc.). 
This latter IAT can be described as evaluative stereotype IAT (henceforth, “Eval-Stereo-
IAT”).94 In contrast to Amodio and Devine’s (2006) Stereo-IAT, which was putatively 
designed to measure the influence of the conceptual content of stereotypes on 
behaviour, the Eval-Stereo-IAT was explicitly designed to assess the behavioural 
impact of affectively valenced stereotype content. In Rudman and Ashmore’s (2007) 
first study, participants were asked to indicate how frequently they had performed 
certain discriminatory actions towards black people in their life after they had 
completed the two IATs. The behaviours were clustered into three groups. They 
included verbal behaviours, such as making ethnically offensive comments, defensive 
behaviours, such as avoiding certain groups, and offensive behaviours, such as 
physically hurting targets. In a second study, participants were asked to indicate to 
which student groups they would apply a necessary funding cut before taking part in 
the two IATs. Crucially, among the student groups listed were groups representing 
minority groups (Jews, Japanese, black people) that were subsequently also included 
in the IATs. For all these various behaviours in study 1 and 2, a statistical procedure 
(hierarchical regression analysis) revealed the Eval-Stereo-IAT to be the more effective 
predictor than the generic Eval-IAT. In both studies, Eval-Stereo-IAT scores predicted 
the reported and actual discriminatory behaviour even after controlling for the influence 
of explicit prejudice, whereas the Eval-IAT did not account for unique variance in the 
behavioural data. Strikingly, at least some of the behaviours examined in this study, 
namely the offensive and defensive behaviours, are behaviours that presumably fall 
under what Amodio and Devine (2006) describe as consummatory behaviours 
(involving approach and avoidance responses). On Amodio and Devine’s account, 
consummatory behaviours are the function of affective responses and should thus be 
predictable by people’s scores on the Eval-IAT. Yet in Rudman and Ashmore’s study, 
the Eval-Stereo-IAT fared by far better in predicting these responses than the Eval-IAT.  
Madva and Brownstein (2016) rightly stress that “[t]he Eval-IAT may be too coarse-
grained to capture, let alone differentiate among, the many affect-laden responses 
most relevant to social behavior” (p. 14). It should come as no surprise that prejudice is 
not just a matter of generic negative affect (that the Eval-IAT is supposedly tracking) 
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 Rudman & Ashmore (2007) call this “the attitude IAT”.  
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 One should not get distracted by the fact that Rudman and Ashmore (2007) refer to this latter 
IAT mostly as “stereotype IAT”. They explicitly note that this IAT assesses both “cognitive and 
evaluative associations” (p. 361). 
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but often involves specific emotions, such as anger, disgust, fear, or pity (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Inbar et al., 2009; Tapias et al., 2007). Note that I have mentioned 
above that differences in seating-distance to the African-American in Amodio and 
Devine’s (2006) experiment may have resulted from differences in people’s anxiety-
related stereotyping. If this is the case, and we want to predict how far a white person 
will sit apart from a black person, we may be better advised to rely on a measure that is 
specifically designed to measure people’s anxiety-related stereotyping in regard to 
black people rather than a measure like the Eval-IAT that may tap into whatever 
stereotypes about black people come readily to people’s minds (or the Stereo-IAT that 
seeks to balance the involved valences of the stereotypes).95 Note that different 
predictors will likely excel in different domains. While anxiety-related stereotyping is 
likely to be the best predictor of aversive or defensive behaviours (e.g., avoiding 
physical contact), anger-related stereotyping is likely to be a better predictor of 
offensive behaviours (e.g., physically harming others; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; 
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Madva & Brownstein, 2016: 21). This suggests that in 
order to yield optimal predictions of inter-group behaviour, researchers should adjust 
their measures in accordance with the task at hand. This has long been recognized as 
“the principle of compatibility” (Ajzen 1988: 96-98), but unfortunately this principle is 
often neglected in practice. 96 
Accordingly, measures like the IAT, if properly designed, might have some 
predictive value after all. Recall that recent meta-analyses of the IAT, and other indirect 
measures, revealed disappointingly low average correlations between people’s scores 
on indirect measures and different forms of discriminatory behaviours (Oswald et al., 
2013; Forscher et al., 2016; see section 1.3.3 in chapter 1). According to Madva and 
Brownstein (2016) these findings do not show that the IAT has low predictive validity 
per se but rather “that researchers too often use the wrong measures for a given task” 
(p. 16).97 Most researchers rely on generic Eval-IATs or Stereo-IATs that seek to 
balance the affective valence of the stimuli. However, the research reviewed by Madva 
and Brownstein (2016) suggests that measures that tap into specific stereotypes with 
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 We may for example develop an Eval-Stereo-IAT that includes on the one hand stereotypic 
traits that are likely linked to anxiety (e.g., threat, assault, violence) and on the other hand words 
that are safety-related (e.g., safety, support, peace). Similarly, one could develop an affective 
priming task that requires participants to categorise stimuli as frightening or non-frightening, 
when they are primed by the previous presentation of black or white faces. 
96
 Note that this principle is not only often neglected in indirect but also in direct attitude 
assessments. Note, for example, that feeling thermometers (a popular direct measure of 
attitudes) assess affect only very coarsely in terms of negative or positive valence. Accordingly, 
we should not expect people’s responses on feeling thermometers to be predictive of their 
responses in specific situations, in which specific stereotypes and specific emotions are likely to 
become activated.  
97
 See also Brownstein’s and Madva’s contributions (amongst others) to the roundtable 
discussion on the value of the IAT on The Brains Blog (accessed on 24/01/17): http://philosophy 
ofbrains.com/2017/01/17/how-can-we-measure-implicit-bias-a-brains-blog-roundtable.aspx 
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specific affective implications show the greatest predictive success (Agerström & 
Rooth, 2011; Rooth, 2010; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; 
Rudman & Lee, 2000).  
To conclude, there is abundant evidence that IATs that are designed to tap into 
both the conceptual content and specific affective implications of stereotypes (Eval-
Stereo-IATs) have more predictive power than IATs that are designed to tap into 
generic evaluations (Eval-IATs) or the conceptual content of stereotypes (Stereo-IATs). 
To be sure, the results by Amodio and Devine (2006) suggest that Eval-IAT and 
Stereo-IAT results may, at least sometimes, lead to accurate predictions (studies 2 and 
3). This may be due to the fact that these measures happen to tap into evaluative 
stereotypes after all (see section 3.3.1.2). Yet still, Eval-IATs and Stereo-IATs that 
merely incidentally tap into evaluative stereotypes will have less predictive success 
than Eval-Stereo-IATs that are specifically designed to tap into particular evaluative 
stereotypes relevant to the behavioural domain at hand. This shows that the emphasis 
that some psychologists have put on the purported independence of stereotypes about 
social groups and affect towards social groups may have led research in the wrong 
direction. Note that using the notion of evaluative stereotypes in our explanations for 
discriminatory behaviours may have pragmatic value in as far as it may nudge 
researchers to examine the interaction between affective and conceptual aspects of 
intergroup bias rather than examining the independent contributions of affective 
evaluations and cognitive stereotypes. This will ultimately lead us to a better 
understanding of those factors that actually drive people’s responses towards social 
groups and to better predictions of intergroup behaviour. 
Note that I have stressed in the introduction to this thesis that the notion of an 
attitude plays a crucial role in explanations and predictions of people’s evaluative 
responses (see function F1 mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). I argued that to 
optimally fulfil this explanatory and predictive function, our notion of an attitude towards 
a group X should pick out exactly those features of an individual’s psychology that drive 
that person’s evaluative responses towards that group X (see desideratum D1). As I 
have suggested in this section, stereotypes about social groups and affect towards 
social groups jointly drive people’s responses towards social groups. Accordingly, we 
should want a model of attitudes that incorporates both affect and stereotypes 
regarding social groups (i.e., a model that incorporates evaluative stereotypes). 
Excluding any of these components would diminish the explanatory and predictive 
power of our model. Yet, it shall be emphasised again that it remains an open question 
whether stereotypes about social groups and social affect are distinct mental states 
that always (or at least normally) causally interact (which is arguably still compatible 
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with a two-type view) or whether they form unified mental states that blend conceptual 
and affective content (a question that I will tackle in section 3.4).  
 
3.3.3  Effect of emotion on Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT scores 
 
So far I have presented alternative explanations for Amodio and Devine’s (2006) 
finding that there is a low correlation between people’s Stereo-IAT and Eval-IAT results 
(section 3.3.1) and their finding that Stereo-IAT and Eval-IAT results predict different 
kinds of behaviours (section 3.3.2). Now I turn to the final finding presented in section 
3.2: the finding that social anxiety affects Eval-IAT scores but not Stereo-IAT scores 
(Amodio & Hamilton, 2012). According to Amodio and Hamilton (2012), this finding 
highlights that evaluations and stereotypes are distinct mental kinds that exhibit distinct 
functional profiles.98 By now, it should come as no surprise that I insist that there is an 
alternative explanation for this finding that does not require evaluations and 
stereotypes to be functionally independent. Plausibly, the anxiety that was induced by 
the anticipation to interact with a black person may have affected the particular 
evaluative stereotypes that contributed to the Eval-IAT effect but not the particular 
evaluative stereotypes that contributed to the Stereo-IAT effect (Madva & Brownstein, 
2016: 8). Amodio and Hamilton (2012) employed a very similar Eval-IAT and Stereo-
IAT as Amodio and Devine (2006). We saw that the Stereo-IAT effect found in Amodio 
and Devine (2006) was plausibly driven by the negatively charged stereotype that black 
people are mentally inferior to white people. We may speculate that anxiety does not 
affect the extent to which this particular stereotype becomes activated but that it may 
affect the activation of other stereotypes, which played a role on the Eval-IAT (but not 
on the Stereo-IAT). For example, it seems plausible that anxiety would boost the 
activation of black-violence or black-dangerous stereotypes. Moreover, we can 
speculate that a different kind of emotion manipulation would in fact affect people’s 
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 It should be noted that while Amodio and Devine (2006) have purportedly found a 
manipulation that affects evaluations (as assessed on the Eval-IAT) but not stereotyping (as 
assessed on the Stereo-IAT), they do not conversely report on a manipulation that affects 
stereotyping but not evaluations. In fact, Madva and Brownstein (2016) argue that a change in 
stereotyping without a corresponding change in evaluation would be “more diagnostic” for a 
two-type view than a change in evaluation without a corresponding change in stereotyping (p. 
11). They support this statement with reference to a model by Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
(2006), which they take to be an example of a one-type view. They claim that on Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen’s model occurrent affect towards a social group is determined by the activated 
stereotypes about that group, but not vice versa (i.e., occurrent affect does not influence 
stereotype activation). It is surprising that Madva and Brownstein base their argument here on a 
model according to which the relation between stereotyping and evaluation is one-directional 
because their own model seems to imply that the relation between stereotyping and evaluation 
is in fact bi-directional. They claim, for example, that “all putative implicit stereotypes are affect-
laden and all putative implicit prejudices are ‘semantic,’” (p. 1). On this view, we should neither 
expect that a manipulation that affects stereotyping fails to affect evaluations, nor should we 
expect that a manipulation that affects evaluations fails to affect stereotyping.  
 98 
 
Stereo-IAT scores. For example, inducing feelings of superiority may boost the 
conception that black people are mentally inferior and thereby increase the observed 
bias on the Stereo-IAT. 
Further experiments are certainly needed to assess whether these particular 
assumptions are right. However, there is already some evidence that specific emotions 
indeed selectively affect specific IATs (Dasgupta et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2009; Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012). Crucially, an evaluative stereotype model provides arguably 
the best explanation for these findings. Dasgupta and colleagues (2009), for example, 
showed in a series of experiments that induced disgust, but not induced anger, affects 
evaluations of homosexuals on an Eval-IAT, whereas induced anger, but not induced 
disgust, has an effect on the evaluation of Arabs on an Eval-IAT.99 They conclude that 
“emotions may focus attention on semantically applicable features of outgroups” (p. 
589) and that “negative emotions will only exacerbate implicit bias if they are applicable 
to the stereotypes and threats attached to the group” (ibid). Common Arab stereotypes 
such as “Arabs are terrorists” are arguably linked to the emotion of anger and so it 
comes as no surprise that anger increases bias against Arabs on Eval-IATs. Similarly, 
the increase in bias against homosexuals (as measured on an Eval-IAT) after disgust 
induction is exactly what we should expect given that common homosexual stereotypes 
such as “homosexuals engage in lewd conduct” are arguably linked to the emotion of 
disgust. 
The finding that different emotions exhibit different effects on Arab and homosexual 
Eval-IATs is crucial because it provides us with an instance where the evaluative 
stereotype explanation is in fact the better and not just an equally plausible 
explanation. Note that the selective effects of disgust and anger on homosexual and 
Arab Eval-IATs are difficult to reconcile with the assumption that Eval-IATs measure 
generic likes or dislikes that are detachable from stereotypes. Disgust and anger are 
arguably both negative emotions and should increase biases on both Arab and 
homosexual Eval-IATs if these measured just basic positive and negative evaluations. 
By contrast, the selective effects of anger and disgust on the Eval-IATs is exactly what 
we should expect if these measures tapped into different stereotypes that are linked to 
anger and disgust, respectively. This further supports the claim, already touched on in 
the last section, that we need to go beyond the simple distinction between positive and 
negative affect if we want to understand the nature of people’s attitudes. Different 
emotions, such as anger, disgust, fear, and pity, play a role in our responses to people 
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 See Tapias and colleagues (2007) for a related study (study 2). They found that a 
predisposition to feel anger (and not a predisposition to feel disgusted) predicted people’s 
reports of their attitudes towards African-Americans, while a predisposition to feel disgust (and 
not a predisposition to feel anger) predicted people’s reports of their attitudes towards 
homosexuals. 
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qua members of social groups, and these emotional responses are tightly linked to 
those stereotypes that we associate with these groups (Madva & Brownstein, 2016: 13-
14).  
 
3.3.4  Summary 
 
To sum up, there are two competing explanations for the findings that (1) Eval-IAT and 
Stereo-IAT scores do not correlate well with each other, (2) that scores on these 
measures predict different kinds of behaviours, and (3) that scores on these measures 
are affected differently by anxiety. According to Amodio and colleagues (2006, 2012), 
these findings can be explained by the fact that the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-IAT tap 
into different mental kinds: the Eval-IAT measures affect towards black and white 
people and the Stereo-IAT measures stereotypes about black and white people. I 
presented an alternative explanation, inspired by Madva and Brownstein (2016), 
according to which both the Eval-IAT and the Stereo-IAT tap into interactions of 
conceptual stereotypes and affective evaluations. On this view, Eval-IAT and Stereo-
IAT may tap into different evaluative stereotypes. 
I also argued that there are reasons to prefer this alternative explanation. Firstly, I 
argued that using the notion of evaluative stereotypes in our explanations for biased 
social behaviour will likely have pragmatic benefits (see section 3.3.2). By using this 
notion, we nudge researchers to focus their investigation on the interactions between 
the conceptual and affective aspects of intergroup bias. Examining these interactions is 
arguably a more fruitful research programme than examining alleged differences 
between stereotyping and evaluation. One indicator of this is that measures that are 
explicitly designed to measure specific evaluative stereotypes (Eval-Stereo-IATs) 
possess more predictive validity than measures that are designed to measure 
exclusively evaluations (Eval-IATs) or stereotypes (Stereo-IATs). Secondly, an 
evaluative stereotype model provides the better explanation for the finding that different 
negative emotions (e.g., anger and disgust) affect Eval-IATs about different outgroups 
(e.g., Arabs and homosexuals) differently (see section 3.3.3). This effect is well 
explained by the fact that different Eval-IATs tap into different stereotypes that are 
linked to specific emotions but is difficult to reconcile with the idea that Eval-IATs tap 
into generic positive or negative affective responses that are detached from 
stereotypes. Overall, we are thus well advised to refer in our explanations of 
discriminatory conduct to the interactions between stereotypes and affect (i.e., 
evaluative stereotypes) rather than emphasising the individual contributions of either 
stereotypes or affect.  
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At this point, one may wonder how evaluative stereotypes relate to attitudes – the 
main theme of this thesis. If the notion of an attitude towards a group X is to denote 
those features of an individual’s psychology that drive that person’s evaluative 
responses towards people of group X (see desideratum D1 in the introduction to this 
thesis), we should acknowledge that evaluative stereotypes are (at least partly) 
constitutive of attitudes.100 After all, evaluative stereotypes seem to be an important 
factor that drives people’s responses towards people qua members of social groups. 
However, this still leaves open the question whether stereotypes and evaluations are 
distinct mental states that always (or normally) interact (and thus are still, in a sense, 
distinct components of attitudes) or whether evaluative stereotypes are unified mental 
states that blend conceptual and affective content. I will address this question in the 
next section. 
 
3.4  A model of evaluative stereotypes 
 
In what follows, I will first consider the possibility that evaluative stereotypes are a 
unified mental state (section 3.4.1). Such a one-type view has been proposed by 
Madva and Brownstein (2016), who draw on Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b) notion of “alief”. 
They argue that evaluative stereotypes are “mutually co-activating semantic-affective-
behavioral ‘clusters’ or ‘bundles’” (p. 1). I will reply that their position is misguided 
because the components of these supposed clusters are better construed as distinct 
mental states rather than as parts of a unified mental state (Currie & Ichino, 2012; 
Dogget, 2012; Holroyd, 2016; Nagel, 2012). In the subsequent section (section 3.4.2), I 
will then argue that although evaluative stereotypes are composed of different mental 
states (including conceptual/stereotypic and affective mental states), the distinction 
between “cold” cognitive stereotypes and “hot” affective prejudice as suggested by 
proponents of the two-type view is misguided (e.g., Valian, 2005). Due to the tight 
causal connection between stereotypes about social groups and affect towards social 
groups, there is in fact a sense in which stereotypes are affective and in which social 
affect is conceptual or stereotypic.  
 
3.4.1  Evaluative stereotypes as unified mental states? 
 
Madva and Brownstein (2016) argue that evaluative stereotypes “are best conceived in 
terms of mutually co-activating semantic-affective-behavioral ‘clusters’ or ‘bundles’” (p. 
19). They claim that these bundles of semantic, affective, and behavioural content are 
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 I added “at least partly” in brackets because there may still be additional mental kinds that 
are constitutive of attitudes (e.g., endorsed beliefs). In the next chapter, I will elaborate more 
extensively on this.  
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sui generis mental states that cannot be broken apart into more primitive mental states. 
That is, they defend one-type model. Madva and Brownstein (2016) relate their model 
to Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b, 2012) model of “alief” (see also Brownstein & Madva 
2012a, 2012b). Gendler develops the notion of alief to account for behaviour that is 
neither fully intentional (i.e., based on beliefs and desires) nor fully reflexive (i.e., 
involving no or only minimal representational content that mediates between stimulus 
and behaviour; see in particular Gendler, 2012, on this contrast). Gendler defines a 
paradigmatic alief as an associative mental state that links representational (R), 
affective (A) and behavioural (B) content. She illustrates alief driven behaviour, 
amongst others, with the example of tourists walking on a glass walkway high above 
the floor of the Grand Canyon (Gendler, 2008a). Although the tourists typically believe 
that the platform is safe and evidently desire to step on the platform, they may 
experience feelings of anxiety or uneasiness and may only cautiously move forward. 
That is, they may alieve something different. According to Gendler (2008a), “[t]he alief 
has roughly the following content: ‘Really high up, long long way down. Not a safe 
place to be! Get off!!’” (p. 635).101 According to Gendler, the person in this example 
does not have separate representational, affective, and motoric mental states activated 
but is in a unified state of alief. We can say that the person aliefs R-A-B.102 Gendler 
(2008b) herself describes implicit attitudes as a form of alief (pp. 574-576), and Madva 
and Brownstein (2016) build upon this idea to illustrate the nature of evaluative 
stereotypes (pp. 19-22). To give an example, a racist alief may consist of associations 
of BLACK PERSON with concepts such as DANGER and WEAPON 
(representational/conceptual stereotype content), which is associated with the feeling 
of fear (affect/evaluation) and the reading of a motor routine for flight (behaviour).103 
Similar to the person walking on the glass platform, who feels anxiety and moves only 
cautiously forward despite her belief that the platform is safe, the person with the racist 
alief (say Sarah) feels afraid of black people and is inclined to keep distance to them 
despite her anti-racist beliefs.  
I would like to reply that it remains unclear why Gendler (2008a, 2008b) and 
Madva and Brownstein (2016) insist on the view that their supposed clusters of 
representational/conceptual, affective, and behavioural content constitute unified 
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 Other examples of alief driven responses that Gendler (2008a) mentions are, amongst 
others, being reluctant to drink from a glass of juice in which a sterilised dead cockroach has 
been stirred, being disgusted by eating fudge that has the form of dog faeces, or being less 
accurate in throwing darts at faces of beloved people than at faces of unknown people. 
102
 Gendler (2008b) notes that “[t]hough this usage is approximate – and in that sense, 
misleading – it helps to emphasize the ways in which thinking in terms of alief differs from 
thinking in terms of the traditional cognitive and conative attitudes” (p. 559). 
103
 Madva and Brownstein (2016) rightly note that Gendler’s model of implicit attitudes can be 
seen as an adaption of the classical tripartite model of explicit attitudes (p. 19; Rosenland & 
Hovland, 1960).  
 102 
 
mental states. Several commentators of Gendler’s model have raised the worry that 
what she describes as instances of alief are in fact conglomerates of various interacting 
mental states (Currie & Ichino, 2012; Dogget, 2012; Holroyd, 2016, Nagel, 2012).104 
The challenge comes down to this: why should we prefer the alief account of unified 
representational, affective, and behavioural content over an account that holds that 
certain representational mental states (e.g., conceptual associations) closely interact 
with affective mental states (e.g., emotions) and motoric mental states? 
Replying to her critics, Gendler (2012) claims that the representational, affective, 
and behavioural components of an alief are not “fully combinatoric”, which according to 
her shows that they are not distinct mental states (p. 806). According to Gendler beliefs 
and desires are fully combinatoric. That means that, in principle, each belief can co-
occur with any desire (and vice versa). For example, Aisha’s belief that there is cake in 
the fridge may usually co-occur with her desire to eat cake but could, in principle, occur 
with any other desire (e.g., her desire to empty the fridge or her desire to eat ice 
cream). Gendler (2012) rightly notes that this is why it is misguided to speak of any 
belief-desire pair as a unified mental state. 
Yet, it remains unclear why Gendler (2012) thinks that the components of so-called 
aliefs are not fully combinatoric. Let us consider that when Sarah encounters black 
people in a deprived neighbourhood, her weapon concept becomes activated, she is 
afraid, and inclined to run away. Contrary to what Gendler (2012) claims, these 
representational, affective, and behavioural components are arguably fully 
combinatoric. For example, the same fear response that co-occurs with an activation of 
the association between BLACK PERSON and WEAPON may under other 
circumstances co-occur with an activation of an association between BLACK PERSON 
and RAPE. Furthermore, fear conditioning may allow us to establish a link between 
literally any mental representation and Sarah’s fear response (Davey, 1992; Rachman, 
1991). Conversely, even when the association between BLACK PERSON and 
WEAPON is strongly linked to fear, conditioning procedures may allow us to establish a 
link between the association of BLACK PERSON and WEAPON to a different emotion, 
say anger or pity. Note that the fact that it may be very difficult to break apart the 
components of alleged aliefs does not imply that these components are not in principle 
fully combinatoric. The same is arguably true for many of our belief-desire pairs (Currie 
& Ichino, 2012: 790). Aisha’s desire to eat cake may in fact always co-occur with her 
belief that cake is high in calories, but that does not imply that her desire to eat cake 
                                            
104
 Madva and Brownstein (2016) mention this objection (p. 19) and admit that they “do not offer 
any knockdown argument” against it (endnote 35). What they offer is “a list of features of implicit 
mental states that ought to constrain theorizing about the nature of these states” (p. 19). Yet, 
each of the features on their list is compatible with both their “unified mental state model” and 
the “distinct but closely interacting mental state model” that I defend in the following.  
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could not in principle co-occur with any other belief (or no belief at all). As the 
representational, affective, and behavioural components of alleged aliefs can combine 
in multiple ways and are arguably not (relevantly) less combinatoric than paradigmatic 
examples of mental states such as beliefs and desires, we have reason to assume that 
these components of aliefs are in fact distinct mental states.105 This undermines the 
very notion of alief. When an association of BLACK PERSON and WEAPON is reliably 
linked to fear and the readying of the motor routine for flight, this is better 
conceptualised as an instance of causally closely connected mental states rather than 
a single mental state of alief. 
This is congruent with Holroyd’s (2016) proposed “minimal model” of implicit bias, 
which “sees implicit biases as simply causally related, or co-activated representational 
contents, or affective and behavioural responses“ (p. 175). Holroyd (2016) emphasises 
that a benefit of this model is that it alerts us to the heterogeneity of mental states (e.g., 
representational and affective mental states) that may play a role in implicit cognition 
(see also Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016). Being aware of this heterogeneity is important 
when one is exploring bias intervention strategies. Note that an intervention that 
successfully tackles one kind of mental state (e.g., a conceptual association) may not 
necessarily affect another kind of mental state (e.g., an affective disposition), although 
these stand in close causal relations. 
I will leave it open just how many different kinds of mental states are involved in 
what Gendler calls alief. It may seem natural to assume that each of the supposed 
components of aliefs corresponds to one kind of mental state. This would leave us in 
fact with a three-type model according to which representational mental states (i.e., 
stereotypes), affective mental states, and motoric mental states closely interact in the 
production of implicitly biased responses. However, it should be noted that on many 
accounts of affect, it includes a motoric component (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Ekman, 2003). 
For example, fear may (partly) be constituted by a motor programme for flight. On such 
a view, evaluative stereotypes may be constituted by two different kinds of mental 
states: representational mental states (i.e., stereotypes) and affective mental states 
(which include motor programmes).106 It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to 
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 Note also that it is unclear how much less combinatoric than paradigmatic mental states the 
components of so-called aliefs would need to be in order to justify the claim that these 
components constitute a unified mental state.  
106
 If one would want to stick to the notion of an implicit attitude and to the idea that these can 
be identified with individual mental states, one would thus have to identify them with 
representational mental states (e.g., conceptual associations) and with affective mental states. 
Note that our answer to the question of whether so-called implicit attitudes are associative 
structures (see last chapter) may accordingly depend on how we flesh out the nature of affect. 
The crucial question would be whether affect can be understood, in any relevant sense, as an 
associative structure. In the implicit attitude literature, affect is often understood as a 
representation of a positive or negative valence that is associatively linked to other 
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argue for a particular account of affect, so I will remain non-committal on how exactly 
we need to divide those mental states that constitute evaluative stereotypes. The point 
I want to stress is just that evaluative stereotypes are not a unified mental state 
because at least some of its components (i.e., stereotypes and affect) can combine in 
multiple ways. 
To conclude, what I refer to as “evaluative stereotype” can be understood as a 
cluster of causally tightly connected representational (i.e., stereotypic) and affective 
(and potentially motoric) mental states. Sarah, for example, may possess an evaluative 
stereotype with a content that we may broadly describe as “black people are 
dangerous”. This evaluative stereotype may consist of various associations of the 
concept BLACK PERSON with concepts like VIOLENCE, WEAPON or RAPE (and/or 
corresponding propositional mental states); the emotion of fear, and various motor 
programmes (e.g., the motor programme for flight). 
 
3.4.2 The affective quality of stereotypes and the conceptual quality of 
intergroup affect 
 
The fact that evaluative stereotypes are composed of different kinds of mental states 
(including conceptual/stereotypic and affective mental states) should, however, not be 
taken to suggest that there is a divide, of the kind suggested by proponents of the two-
type view, between “cold” cognitive stereotypes and “hot” social affect (Valian, 2005). In 
fact, my proposed account of evaluative stereotypes is compatible with the view that 
stereotypes are affective and that social affect is conceptual/stereotypic (Madva & 
Brownstein, 2016).  
Let us first consider why one might think that stereotypes are non-affective. The 
stereotype “women are nurturing” may serve as an example. Valian (2005) emphasises 
that this stereotype (what she calls “a schema”) can be recruited by different belief 
systems (p. 200).107 She mentions that it could be recruited to rationalise a sexist belief 
system that dictates that parenting should be the primary role of women or contribute to 
an egalitarian belief system that advocates that more men should develop nurturing 
characteristics. Depending on the kind of belief system the stereotype is recruited by, it 
may be linked to negative affect (sexist belief system) or positive affect (egalitarian 
                                                                                                                                
representations (see section 1.2.1). Yet, it is unclear whether, and if so in what sense, complex 
emotions such as fear or disgust can be understood as associative structures. 
107
 Valian (1999) explains that “schemas are similar to stereotypes but the term ‘schema’ is 
more inclusive and more neutral.” (p. 1044). By this, she seems to refer to the fact that 
stereotypes are often characterised as morally problematic attributions of traits to social groups 
(see also footnote 70 above). She prefers the term schema because she believes that 
assertions such as “women are nurturing” are not inherently morally objectionable. See Blum 
(2004) for the opposing view that such schemas (or “stereotypes” as he calls them) are 
inherently morally objectionable. 
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belief system). Valian (2005) takes this to show that “cognitions [such as schemas] do 
not automatically carry a set of emotions and motivations with them” (p. 200). 
I grant that in different people the stereotype “women are nurturing” is linked to 
different kinds of affective responses. However, I would like to object that this does not 
establish that this stereotype is affectively “cold” as suggested by Valian (2005). Note 
that in both the sexist and the feminist the stereotype is tightly linked to an affective 
response, even though the nature of the affective responses differs. It is by virtue of 
this link to affect that it is legitimate to say that the stereotype is affective. In the sexist, 
the stereotype “women are nurturing” is affective in the sense that it is disposed to elicit 
negative feelings such as contempt towards women (and in the sense that feelings of 
contempt may elicit the stereotype), and in the feminist, the stereotype “women are 
nurturing” is affective in the sense that it is disposed to elicit positive feelings such as 
admiration (and in the sense that feelings of admiration may elicit this stereotype). In 
fact, it can be assumed that the stereotype “women are nurturing” is linked in most, if 
not all, people who harbour this stereotype to one affective reaction or another. That is, 
this stereotype, like other stereotypes, has affective significance to the person who 
harbours the stereotype. Saying that the stereotype “women are nurturing” is affectively 
“cold” is thus misleading.108 
Note also that, conversely, a given affective response may be linked to different 
(sets of) stereotypes in different people. In one person, feelings of contempt towards 
women may trigger the activation of stereotypes such as “women are nurturing”, while 
in another person the same feeling may trigger stereotypes such as “women are 
irrational”. In both persons, the affective response has conceptual implications by virtue 
of its causal connection to stereotypes. The same will be true of emotions such as 
anger, disgust, or pity in regard to particular social groups. These emotions elicit 
specific (sets of) stereotypes by virtue of which they can be said to have conceptual 
significance for the individual. 
To conclude, there is a sense in which stereotypes are affective and in which social 
affect is conceptual. Stereotypes about social groups are affective in the sense that 
they are disposed to trigger affective responses towards social groups (and also in the 
sense that they can be activated by affective responses towards social groups). 
Conversely, affective responses towards social groups are conceptual (or we may say 
stereotypical) in the sense that they are disposed to activate particular stereotypes 
about social groups (and also in the sense that they can be evoked by particular 
stereotypes about social groups).  
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 This being said, Valian (2005) may well be right that the fact that the stereotype can be 
recruited by different belief systems establishes that the stereotype is not inherently sexist.  
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3.5  Conclusion 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, I have presented two contrasting views on the 
relationship between stereotypes about social groups and affect towards people qua 
members of social groups (what I refer to as “affect towards social groups” or “social 
affect”). In short, while proponents of two-type models have emphasised that 
stereotypes about social groups and affect towards social groups are separable mental 
states (corresponding to “cold” cognition and “hot” affect), one-type theorists have 
stressed that stereotypes and social affect form inseparable clusters. Now it is time to 
evaluate how these views fare in the light of the conclusions that I have reached in this 
chapter, and to examine how this may inform our understanding of attitudes. 
Recall that two-type theorists, like Amodio and colleagues (Amodio & Devine, 
2006; Amodio & Hamilton, 2012), have emphasised that cognitive stereotypes about 
social groups and affect towards social groups are only weakly correlated, predict 
different kinds of behaviours, and are affected differently by emotion manipulations 
(see section 3.2). I have argued that the given evidence does not warrant these claims 
(section 3.3). Low correlations between results on Stereo-IATs that supposedly 
measure stereotypes and results on Eval-IATs that allegedly tap into affective 
responses can equally well be explained by the fact that these measures tap into 
different clusters of stereotypes and social affect (i.e., by postulating the existence of 
evaluative stereotypes; see section 3.3.1). Furthermore, the fact that the Eval-IAT and 
the Stereo-IAT tap into different evaluative stereotypes may also explain why results on 
these measures predict different kinds of behaviours (see section 3.3.2) and why these 
measures are differently affected by the induction of anxiety (see section 3.3.3). The 
evidence discussed by two-type theorists thus fails to establish that stereotypes and 
social affect can operate independently of each other. Quite to the contrary, much 
speaks in fact for the claim that stereotypes and social affect form clusters (i.e., 
evaluative stereotypes). The evidence suggests that we can yield better predictions of 
discriminatory behaviour when we focus on the interactions between stereotypes and 
affect rather than focusing exclusively on either stereotypes or affect (see section 
3.3.2). Moreover, differential effects of different emotions on IATs involving different 
social groups can best be explained by the fact that particular stereotypes typically 
interact with particular affective mental states (see section 3.3.3). 
However, this does not imply that evaluative stereotypes are unified mental states 
of the kind of Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b) aliefs or Madva and Brownstein’s (2016) 
semantic-affective-behavioural clusters. In particular, I argued against the idea that an 
evaluative stereotype can be construed as a sui generis mental state that joins 
stereotypic and affective content (see section 3.4.1). Against this view speaks that 
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stereotypes (e.g., the conceptual association between BLACK PEOPLE and 
WEAPON) and affective responses (e.g., fear towards black people) are, at least in 
principle, fully combinatoric. That is, a given stereotype can co-occur with different 
kinds of affective responses and a given affective response towards a social group can 
co-occur with different stereotypes. This speaks for the view that evaluative stereotypes 
are composed of different mental states (e.g., representational/stereotypic and affective 
mental states) that have tight causal connections to each other (see also Holroyd, 
2016). 
Given these tight causal links between stereotyping and social affect, Madva and 
Brownstein (2016) are arguably right about the claim that “all putative implicit 
stereotypes are affect-laden and all putative implicit prejudices are ‘semantic,’” (p. 1). 
On my account, affect towards social groups (what Madva and Brownstein call 
“prejudices”) are conceptual (what Madva and Brownstein call “semantic”) in the sense 
that they are disposed to activate stereotypes about social groups (and also in the 
sense that they can be triggered by particular stereotypes about social groups). 
Conversely, stereotypes about social groups are affective in the sense that they are 
disposed to trigger affective responses towards social groups (and also in the sense 
that they can be activated by affective responses towards social groups; see section 
3.4.2).  
To conclude, I have argued for a nuanced view that does not readily fall into the 
one-type/two-type classification as it has been outlined at the start of this chapter. On 
my view, one-type theorists are right in so far as stereotypes about social groups and 
affects towards social groups form tight clusters (what Madva & Brownstein, 2016, call 
“evaluative stereotypes”). However, these clusters are not a unified mental state, as 
Madva and Brownstein (2016) assume, but are composed of different kinds of mental 
states (e.g., conceptual mental states and affective mental states) that are causally 
interconnected. Due to the tight causal links between these mental states, it is 
appropriate to say that stereotypes have an affective quality and that affect towards 
social groups has a conceptual or stereotypic quality. Although I showed that it is 
misguided to draw a line between “cold” cognitive stereotypes and “hot” affective 
prejudice, my view allows to identify mental states that are primarily conceptual 
(Sarah’s association between BLACK PERSON and VIOLENCE) and only by virtue of 
their causal connection to other mental states affective, and mental states that are 
primarily affective (Sarah’s fear response to black people) and only by virtue of their 
causal connection to other mental states conceptual. This may appeal to some authors 
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who seem to sympathise with a two-type view without (fully) endorsing the claim that 
stereotypes are non-affective (e.g., Anderson, 2010).109 
What does the foregoing imply for the notion of an attitude? In the introduction to 
this thesis, I argued that a key function of the attitude notion is the explanation and 
prediction of people’s evaluative responses in regard to other people (see function F1 
in the introduction to this thesis). Furthermore, I argued that in order to fulfil this 
explanatory and predictive function, our notion of a person’s attitude towards a group X 
should pick out exactly those features of that person’s psychology that drive that 
person’s evaluative responses towards that group X (see desideratum D1 in the 
introduction to this thesis). In this chapter, I argued that stereotypes about social 
groups and affective mental states interact tightly in the production of evaluative 
responses towards social groups. In fact, models that highlight the interactions 
between stereotypes and social affect produce better predictions than models that 
focus on one of these components alone (see section 3.3.2). If we would identify 
attitudes merely with affective mental states or merely with stereotypes, we would miss 
a crucial aspect of what is predictive of people’s inter-group responses. Accordingly, we 
should acknowledge that both stereotypes (which may have associative or 
propositional structure) and social affect are part of people’s attitudes. This raises the 
question as to what kind of ontological status attitudes have if they are jointly 
constituted by mental states of different kinds (see question Q3 in the introduction to 
this thesis). This leads us straight to the issues to be addressed in the next chapter, in 
which I will evaluate and defend one account of the ontological status of attitudes: the 
view that attitudes are traits, which are based on various distinct mental states.   
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 Anderson (2010) claims that stereotypes “are more a matter of ‘cold’ cognitive processing 
than ‘hot’ emotion” (p. 45, my emphasis). She thus falls short of endorsing the claim that 
stereotypes are (always) non-affective. 
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Chapter 4: A trait view of attitudes 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that conceptual/stereotypic and affective mental states 
interact so tightly in the production of evaluative responses towards other people that it 
would not make sense to identify attitudes with either conceptual/stereotypic or 
affective mental states alone. In order for the notion of an attitude to optimally fulfil an 
explanatory/predictive function, we need to acknowledge that attitudes have both 
conceptual and affective components (see desideratum D1 of a model of attitudes 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). However, it shall be noted that conceptual 
and affective mental states as described in the last chapter can hardly be the only 
components of attitudes. Note that Sarah, for example, does not only harbour 
evaluative stereotypes, such as her “black people are dangerous” evaluative 
stereotype (her associations of the concept BLACK PERSON with concepts such as 
VIOLENCE, WEAPON, or RAPE, the emotion of fear, etc.), but also certain moral 
beliefs (e.g., her belief that it is morally reprehensible to treat people differently 
because of their skin colour) and desires (e.g., the desire not to discriminate against 
black people). These beliefs and desires also influence (at least sometimes) the nature 
of her evaluative responses towards black people (see also Besser-Jones, 2008).110 
Accordingly, we need a model of attitudes that takes all of the above mentioned 
mental states into account if we want to optimally explain and predict Sarah’s 
evaluative responses towards black people in the various situations in which she 
encounters them (see desideratum D1). Note that dependent on the situation that 
Sarah finds herself in, different mental states may become activated and drive her 
responses towards black people. When Sarah walks through a deprived 
neighbourhood, she may be stressed and her reactions towards black people may 
primarily be driven by her “black people are dangerous” evaluative stereotype. 
However, when she walks through her own affluent neighbourhood, she may feel at 
ease and have more cognitive resources available to reflect on her egalitarian 
commitments and to keep the activation of negative evaluative stereotypes at bay 
when she encounters black people. Our model of attitudes should account for this 
situation-specificity of her evaluative responses. Moreover, we should want a model 
that is consistent with the character evaluative function of attitudes (see desideratum 
                                            
110
 Besser-Jones (2008) argues that a person’s moral character consists not only of that 
person’s behavioural dispositions but also of that person‘s moral commitments (beliefs, desires, 
and intentions) and the extent to which that person’s behavioural dispositions are influenced by 
these moral commitments.  
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D2) and that could potentially appeal to all parties that use the attitude concept 
(philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary people; see desideratum D3).  
In this chapter, I develop a model that I take to be consistent with these desiderata. 
In short, I will argue that attitudes are complex traits. Each of these traits is grounded in 
a variety of mental states (conceptual associations, affects, beliefs, desires, etc.) and 
can be analysed as a profile of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions. On 
this view, Sarah can be said to exhibit the profile of an aversive racist (or to possess 
the trait of aversive racism): she is disposed to show favourable responses towards 
black people in situations in which she has sufficient time and cognitive resources to 
reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments; and she is 
disposed to show negative responses towards black people in situations in which she 
does not have sufficient time (e.g., when she has to judge quickly whether she is in 
danger) or cognitive resources (e.g., when she is occupied with the detection of 
potential threats or when she is deeply engaged in a conversation with her patients) to 
reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. 
I will develop my account of attitudes in response to Machery’s (2016) trait view of 
attitudes, which I find appealing but which is not without its own flaws. The view that 
attitudes are traits is attractive because we ascribe attitudes to people for much the 
same reasons that we attribute traits such as courage to people: we want to 
explain/predict people’s responses and convey information about people’s characters 
(see functions F1 and F2 of the attitude concept mentioned in the introduction to this 
thesis). Machery (2016) argues that attitudes, just like traits such as courage, are 
broad-track dispositions, each of which is grounded in a variety of mental states 
(conceptual associations, emotions, moral beliefs, etc.). Machery further implies that 
attitudes can be characterised in terms of an aggregate strength and positive or 
negative valence. If, for example, the clear majority of a person’s cognition, affect, and 
behaviour towards black people is reflective of a negative evaluation of black people, 
that person can be said to possess a strong negative attitude towards black people. If, 
however, only a small majority of a person’s cognition, affect, and behaviour towards 
black people is reflective of a negative evaluation, while the rest of that person’s 
responses reflect positivity towards black people, we can according to this view say 
that that the person has a weak negative attitude towards black people. I will argue that 
characterising attitudes in terms of aggregate strength and generic positive or negative 
valence obscures relevant evaluative complexities of attitudes: it conceals those 
evaluative conflicts that many people, such as Sarah, are experiencing and neglects 
that specific emotions, and not just generic positive or negative affect, are 
characteristic of attitudes. My own preferred model of attitudes – the view that attitudes 
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are profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions – does justice to these 
complexities, while still allowing us to conceptualise attitudes as traits.  
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I will give a detailed account of 
Machery’s (2016) trait view of attitudes. In section 4.3, I will discuss Machery’s 
argument to the best explanation in favour of his trait view. I grant that Machery’s 
model provides an explanation for a range of perplexing findings from the attitude 
literature, but I also point out that that there are other ways to conceptualise attitudes 
(including the view that attitudes are mental states) that have the same explanatory 
power. In section 4.4, I will highlight that the failure of Machery’s argument to the best 
explanation notwithstanding, there are good reasons to adopt a trait model of attitudes. 
In particular, there are striking similarities in the explanatory, predictive, and character 
evaluative roles of trait and attitude ascriptions, and the trait view of attitudes aligns 
well with the folk psychological understanding of attitudes. In section 4.5, I will present 
an objection that any view that holds that attitudes are traits (including my own) must 
address. According to this objection, people possess no traits because their responses 
are largely determined by aspects of situations that they encounter and not by inner 
response dispositions of the kind that traits are usually identified with. I will give 
substance to this claim by presenting Doris’ (2002) influential situationist argument 
against the existence of character traits (section 4.5.1) and will show that this 
argument, in slightly modified form, can also be applied to attitudes construed as traits 
(section 4.5.2). In section 4.5.3, I will then present a reply that is open to Machery 
(2016). According to this reply, the situationist argument does not establish that there 
are no attitudes construed as traits but rather that people’s attitudes are oftentimes 
relatively weak. This reply rests on the idea that attitudes are characterisable in terms 
of an aggregate strength and valence. In section 4.6, I will argue that the 
characterisation of attitudes in these “aggregationist” terms misses the point because it 
obscures the complex structure of attitudes. In particular, it does not do justice to 
relevant differences in the affective content of attitudes and masks those evaluative 
conflicts that people are often experiencing in regard to social groups, such as when 
people feel alienated by their own racist dispositions or exhibit both benevolent and 
hostile sexist tendencies. In section 4.7, I will describe my own trait model of attitudes, 
which I argue neutralises the situationist challenge (described in section 4.5) without 
obscuring the evaluative complexities of attitudes (described in section 4.6). This is the 
view that attitudes are profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions. 
The framework for my account is provided by Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) influential 
cognitive-affective personality system model (section 4.7.1). On this model, some traits 
at least can be analysed as “distinctive and stable patterns of behavior variability 
across situations” (p. 246). Analogously, I propose that we can understand attitudes, 
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construed as traits, as stable patterns of evaluative response variation across 
situations (section 4.7.2). I will highlight that there are different legitimate ways to 
individuate attitudes on this account, which depend on the interests and purposes of 
attitude ascribers (section 4.7.3). Moreover, I will stress that attitudes as construed on 
my model have a psychological basis that is typically composed of a variety of implicit 
and explicit mental states (section 4.7.4) and point out what this implies for attitude 
measurement (section 4.7.5). Lastly, to further locate my account of attitudes in the 
literature, I will compare my account of attitudes to Schwitzgebel’s (2013) dispositional 
model of attitudes (section 4.7.6). 
 
4.2  Machery’s trait view 
 
Machery (2016) develops his trait view of attitudes as an alternative to what I described 
as the standard view of attitudes: the view that attitudes are mental states, which are 
either implicit or explicit.111 He refers to this dominant view of attitudes in psychology 
and philosophy as “the Freudian picture of attitudes” (p. 105). Machery explains that on 
the Freudian view implicit attitudes are characterised as non-introspectable and 
automatic mental states, while explicit attitudes are described as mental states that are 
introspectable and whose impact on cognition and behaviour can intentionally be 
controlled.112 He argues that understanding attitudes as traits, which are neither 
properly described as implicit nor explicit and which are based on a variety of different 
mental states, provides the better explanation for a range of findings from the attitude 
literature than the Freudian view (pp. 115-120). These findings include the low 
correlation between people’s results on different indirect measures of attitudes (see 
section 1.3.2 in this thesis), the susceptibility of indirect attitude measures to contextual 
influences (see, for example, section 1.2.2, section 2.2.2.3, and section 3.3.3) and the 
low predictive power of people’s results on indirect measures (see section 1.3.3). 
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 It shall be noted that Machery is certainly not the first author to link attitudes to traits. Ajzen 
(1988), for example, has pointed out that both the trait notion and the attitude notion are used in 
“dispositional explanations of behaviour” (p. 1). According to him, personality psychologists use 
the trait concept in dispositional explanations, while social psychologists use the attitude 
concept in dispositional explanations. 
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 Machery’s characterisation of the “Freudian view” includes two of those criteria that are 
according to my review in chapter 1 often relied on to justify the distinction between implicit and 
explicit attitudes. These are the criteria of awareness (introspectability) and intentional control. 
In contrast to my characterisation of the standard view in chapter 1, Machery does not mention 
mental structure (i.e., associative vs. propositional mental structure) and rational control as 
further criteria. Note also that I showed in chapter 1 that even proponents of the standard view 
increasingly acknowledge that awareness does not provide a criterion by reference to which a 
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes can be drawn. These differences between 
Machery’s and my characterisation of the standard view (or the Freudian view) do not have any 
bearing on the arguments to come in this chapter.  
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Yet, before we can evaluate Machery’s (2016) argument to the best explanation 
(see next section), we need to examine more closely what his claim that attitudes are 
traits comes down to. He characterises traits as follows: 
 
A trait is a disposition to perceive, attend, cognize, and behave in a particular way in a 
range of social and non-social situations. Within a species, there are individual differences 
with respect to a particular trait; some organisms have more of it, others less. This variation 
can be measured, and it is predictive of their behavior and cognition. (Machery, 2016: 111) 
 
Machery uses, amongst others, the example of courage to give some context to this 
characterisation of a trait. Knowing that a person is courageous helps to predict the 
person’s behaviour and cognition in a wide range of situations. Note that we have 
certain expectations of how a courageous person would behave in the face of a fire 
alarm, fierce criticism by a superior, a dangerous animal, etc. We can also fairly well 
predict some general cognitive and affective tendencies of a courageous person. For 
example, we would expect that the courageous person is not unduly swayed by fear 
and able to countenance due risk. Courage is thus at the same time a behavioural, 
affective, and cognitive disposition. Because traits such as courage manifest 
themselves in these different ways (and not just in a single way), Machery 
characterises them as broad-track dispositions rather than as narrow-track disposition 
(p. 111).113 
He emphasises that courage, like any other trait, is not a mental state, and 
crucially, that it is not reducible to any of the occurrent mental states that it may 
manifest in. Rather courage is based on a range of mental states and processes, which 
compose the “psychological basis” of the trait and which jointly determine the degree to 
which the trait is possessed (i.e., determine the strength of the trait): 
 
A person’s degree of courage depends on her moral beliefs (e.g. whether fear is shameful), 
on the nature of her fear reactions, on the strength of her pride, on her capacity for self-
control, and so on. (Machery, 2016: 112) 
 
By this he does not mean to imply that there is only one particular set of mental states 
that is sufficient for possessing a trait to certain extent. Rather different compositions of 
mental states can realise a specific trait to a particular degree.  
Building upon this characterisation of a trait, he goes on to define attitudes as 
follows:  
 
[Attitudes] are broad-track dispositions to behave and cognize (have thoughts, attend, 
emote, and so on) toward an object (its formal object) in a way that reflects some 
preference. To have a positive attitude toward liberals is to be disposed to interact with 
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 Machery uses the terms “multitrack disposition” and “broad-track disposition” 
interchangeably. 
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liberals in a way that reflects a positive evaluation and to have positive thoughts and 
emotions about them. (Machery, 2016: 112) 
 
Accordingly, we can say that a person who has a negative attitude towards black 
people is disposed to behave, think, and feel in a way that reflects a negative 
evaluation of black people. This implies that knowing that a person has a negative 
attitude towards black people provides us with a good basis for predicting her 
behaviour as well as her thoughts and feelings towards black people. Just as any other 
trait of a person, attitudes according to Machery have a psychological basis, which is 
composed of a range of different mental states and processes. He provides the 
following example for this: 
 
A negative racial attitude toward blacks may depend on moral beliefs (e.g. for most of us 
the belief that racism is wrong or, for some racists, the belief that racism is 
right), on non-propositional associations between concepts (e.g. an association between 
the concept of a black man and the concept of danger), on emotions (e.g. fear when 
confronted with black men), and on weak self-control. This psychological basis is as 
heterogeneous as the psychological basis of courage. Some of the components may be 
conscious (perhaps some moral beliefs), while others (including associations between 
concepts) are likely to be inaccessible to introspection. (Machery, 2016: 112) 
 
Machery argues that while the mental states and processes that form the psychological 
basis of the attitude (moral beliefs, conceptual associations, emotions, self-control 
processes) may correctly be described as implicit or explicit, this distinction does not 
apply to attitudes themselves. On this view, it makes no sense to ask whether a 
disposition to behave and cognise is introspectable or whether it operates in a 
controlled manner. Instead, this question can only reasonably be asked for the 
components of the psychological basis of the attitude (such as beliefs, associations, 
and emotions). Consequently, there are no such things as implicit or explicit 
attitudes.114 
It is striking that Machery claims in the above quote that a negative attitude 
towards black people may partly be the function of the belief that racism is wrong. This 
may seem surprising because such a belief does not seem to imply a negative 
evaluation of black people. Quite to the contrary, such a belief can be expected to 
counteract negative cognitive and behavioural dispositions towards black people. What 
Machery seems to imply is that a person may possess a negative racial attitude to a 
certain degree if most components of the attitude imply a negative evaluation. Recall 
that Machery emphasises that traits such as courage can be possessed to different 
degrees and that the degree to which a trait is possessed (“the strength of a trait”; p. 
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 Accordingly, speech acts like “I like black people” do not express an explicit attitude 
according to Machery (2016: 114). He argues that they may express one’s assessment of one’s 
attitude, a command directed to oneself, a conscious emotional reaction, or a commitment to a 
moral norm. 
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112) is determined by the mental states and processes that form the psychological 
basis of the trait. Analogously, he assumes that the strength of an attitude (i.e., the 
degree to which an attitude is possessed) is the function of the mental states and 
processes that compose the psychological basis of the attitude. A person who believes 
that racism is wrong but who also harbours numerous mental states which imply a 
negative evaluation of black people (e.g., negative stereotypes and negative emotions) 
may mostly, albeit perhaps not always, exhibit negative cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural responses in regard to black people. Accordingly, the person can be said 
to possess a relatively strong negative attitude towards black people. As I will show in 
section 4.5.3, the idea that attitudes can vary in strength is a crucial component of 
Machery’s attitude model because it helps warding off what I call the “situationist 
challenge” to the idea that attitudes are traits. Before I turn to this challenge, however, I 
will consider why we should adopt the view that attitudes are traits in the first place.  
 
4.3  Assessing Machery’s argument to the best explanation 
 
Machery (2016) supports the trait view of attitudes with an argument to the best 
explanation (pp. 115-120). He argues that the trait picture provides a superior and 
unifying explanation for a range of perplexing results that have emerged in attitude 
psychology. These include: (1) the finding that scores on different indirect measures 
often do not correlate well with each other,115 (2) the finding that scores on indirect 
measures are affected by various context effects, and (3) the finding that scores on 
indirect measures are poor predictors of evaluative responses. In what follows, I will 
discuss these findings in turn and show that any account of attitudes that is compatible 
with the idea that different indirect measures tap into different (sets of) mental states 
can explain them (see sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3). That is, Machery’s trait model is 
certainly not the only model of attitudes that can account for (and would predict) these 
findings. This being said, I will stress that there are other reasons to prefer a trait view 
of attitudes over alternative attitude models in section 4.4: there is a striking similarity in 
the explanatory, predictive, and character evaluative roles of trait and attitude 
ascriptions, and a trait view of attitudes corresponds nicely with the folk psychological 
understanding of attitudes. 
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 I do not discuss separately a further finding that Machery (2016) mentions – “that the size of 
the correlation between two indirect measures can be manipulated” (p.117) – because it is 
closely related to this finding. See footnote 117 below. 
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4.3.1 Dissociation between results on different indirect measures of attitudes  
 
Let us start with the finding that scores on different indirect measures of attitudes often 
show a relatively weak correlation (see section 1.3.2 in chapter 1 for a discussion of 
this finding). For example, people who show a bias against black people on an Eval-IAT 
do not necessarily show a bias against black people on an affective priming task (and 
vice versa; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Machery (2016) argues that this finding can be 
explained by the fact that different indirect measures tap into different components that 
constitute the psychological basis of an attitude.116 To illustrate, recall that I argued in 
the last chapter that different kinds of IATs may plausibly tap into different evaluative 
stereotypes (i.e., clusters of conceptual content and affect) and that this may explain 
why results on these different measures are dissociated. If for example one IAT 
(primarily) taps into the “black people are dangerous” evaluative stereotype, while 
another IAT (primarily) taps into the “black people are musical” evaluative stereotype, 
we should expect a low correlation between people’s scores on these measures. The 
claim that attitudes are traits that are based on various different mental states 
(including various evaluative stereotypes) that are accessed by different indirect 
measures accounts for the low correlations between these measures.117 
However, note that all that is really needed to explain the comparatively low 
correlation between people’s results on different indirect measures is the assumption 
that these measures tap into different (sets of) mental states. Machery’s trait view 
implies this assumption, but other ways to individuate attitudes are certainly consistent 
with this assumption too. Note, for example, that we could identify attitudes with 
individual mental states (or specific clusters of mental states such as evaluative 
stereotypes) and say that different indirect measures tap into different attitudes. This 
would provide an equally good explanation for the finding that results on different 
indirect measures are often dissociated as the claim that these measures tap into 
different components of the psychological basis of a trait. 
Machery’s main point is that the trait model allegedly provides a better explanation 
for this finding than what he calls the Freudian view. He suggests that according to the 
Freudian view an agent harbours only one implicit attitude (construed as a mental 
state) in regard to a target, which is accessed by different indirect measures.118 
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 See also Huebner (2016: 67), who draws on Machery’s argument.  
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 Note also that the more two indirect measurement procedures resemble each other, the 
higher the correlations between results on these measures can be expected to be. This helps to 
explain a related finding that Machery (2016) discusses: “that the size of the correlation 
between two indirect measures can be manipulated.” (p.117)  
118
 Machery is most explicit about how he construes the Freudian view in an endnote, in which 
he clarifies that the target of his paper is the view “that there is a single mental state that is 
people’s implicit attitude.” (endnote 5) 
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Accordingly, we should expect a substantial correlation between people’s results on 
these measures (even if we allow for some measurement error). I would like to object 
that what Machery describes here is a caricature of the model of attitudes that is 
predominant in the attitude literature. In chapter 1 (section 1.2.2), I have argued that 
according to the most charitable interpretation of the standard view of attitudes, people 
can possess multiple implicit attitudes (identified with associative mental states) and 
multiple explicit attitudes (identified with propositional mental states) in regard to a 
social group. Arguably, such a view has sufficient resources to explain the fact that 
different indirect measures do not correlate well with each other. One could simply 
claim that different indirect measures tap into different implicit attitudes (i.e., different 
associative mental states).119 Yet, note that even though the standard view is 
compatible with the low correlations between indirect measures, there are different 
reasons to think that the standard view does not provide us with an ideal model of 
attitudes (see previous chapters).  
 
4.3.2  Contextual influences on indirect measures of attitudes 
 
Machery (2016) further claims that the trait view of attitudes is better able to explain 
and predict contextual influences on indirect attitude measurement outcomes than the 
Freudian view. Let us first review some relevant findings. Some context effects are 
already familiar from last chapter. Recall that Amodio and Hamilton (2012) found that 
when their participants were made believe that they were soon to interact with a black 
person, they showed a stronger bias against black people on an Eval-IAT than when 
expecting to interact with a white person. That is, participants’ Eval-IAT score was 
sensitive to the immediate situation in which they found themselves. Recall also that 
Dasgupta and colleagues (2009) showed that induced disgust increased participants’ 
bias against homosexuals on an IAT, while induced anger increased their bias against 
Arabs on an IAT. This is again a case in which contextual factors (factors that induced 
disgust and anger) had an impact on indirect attitude measurement results. Machery 
(2016) argues that the trait view is well equipped to predict such contextual influences: 
 
[T]he trait picture hypothesizes that attitudes depend on psychological bases that 
encompass good old-fashioned mental states and processes, such as emotions, self-
control, and so on, and that indirect measures tap into some of these components. 
Because we know a lot about these mental states – there is after all a lot of research on 
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 Machery anticpates this reply and objects that “[i]t is […] bad scientific practice to postulate a 
theoretical entity for every measure” (p. 117). Yet, it seems that Machery himself postulates a 
theoretical entity for every measure when he claims that these measures tap into different 
mental states. Note also that the assumption that people may possess multiple implicit attitudes 
can possibly be supported by independent considerations (e.g., the fact that people likely 
harbour multiple associative mental states that imply an evaluation of a social group; see 
section 1.2.2 in chapter 1). 
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emotions and on what influences them – the trait picture leads us to predict which factors 
should modulate the measurement of attitudes by means of indirect measures. (p. 119) 
 
Machery argues in this passage that the trait perspective helps us predict how 
particular contextual factors will affect particular measurement outcomes because it 
highlights that these measures tap into mental states of which we already know a great 
deal. If we know for example that a measure is particularly sensitive to negative 
emotions, we can predict that the prospect of interacting with a black person, which 
likely heightens feelings of anxiety in white people prone to negative evaluations of 
black people, will influence the measurement outcome.  
Machery claims that the Freudian view does not allow for such specific predictions 
because on this view different indirect measures are assumed to tap into the same 
mental state (i.e., the same implicit attitude). According to him, this view has limited 
resources to explain why one indirect measure is influenced by a particular contextual 
factor, while another indirect measure is not affected by the same factor. Above, I have 
argued that, on a more charitable reading, the standard view of attitudes grants that 
people may harbour multiple implicit attitudes. Yet still, one may argue that Machery’s 
trait view has more resources to explain and predict context effects because it holds 
that different indirect measures may tap into different kinds of mental states (e.g., 
emotions, associations, beliefs, etc.), whereas the standard view only holds that 
different indirect measures may tap into different mental states of the same kind (i.e., 
different associations). 
However, this does still not establish that only Machery’s trait view provides the 
resources to explain and predict these effects. In fact, all we need to explain and 
predict the differential context effects on different indirect measures of attitudes is the 
acknowledgement that these measures tap into different kinds of mental states (e.g., 
conceptual associations, propositional mental states, emotions) or different 
combinations thereof. This assumption is compatible with Machery’s trait view but also 
with views that identify attitudes with individual mental states or specific clusters of 
mental states. 
 
4.3.3  Low predictive validity of indirect measures of attitudes 
 
Lastly, Machery (2016) argues that the trait view of attitudes provides the best 
explanation for the relatively low predictive validity of indirect measures of attitudes that 
has been revealed in recent meta-analyses (Greenwald et al., 2009; Oswald et al., 
2013; see also section 1.3.3 of this thesis).120 In chapter 3 (section 3.3.2), I have 
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 Note that a more recent meta-analysis, the one by Forscher and colleagues (2016), confirms 
the finding of low predictive validity.   
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argued that results on an indirect measure can predict clearly circumscribed responses 
if the measure has been customised for the specific task at hand. Machery would 
possibly agree with this assessment because he seems to base his argument merely 
on the claim that indirect measures are not reasonably good predictors of spontaneous 
evaluative responses across the board. He argues that on the trait view predictions that 
are based on people’s scores on individual indirect measures are expected to be poor 
because any indirect measure only taps into a subset of the components that an 
attitude is composed of. As there are many components that influence people’s 
responses towards a particular social group, a measure that only measures one of 
these components cannot predict responses towards the social group across the board 
(rather than just responses in circumscribed circumstances). On the Freudian view, by 
contrast, we should expect a greater predictive success of individual indirect 
measurement outcomes because, as Machery presents this view, it holds that different 
indirect measures tap into a single mental state (i.e., the implicit attitude), which 
influences a broad range of responses. 
My reply should be familiar by now. What Machery presents here as the Freudian 
view is a non-charitable interpretation of the view that is predominant in the attitude 
literature. On a more charitable reading, the standard view of attitudes allows that 
people may harbour multiple implicit attitudes (i.e., multiple associative mental states in 
regard to a social group). So even the standard view allows for multiple determinants of 
people’s responses towards a social group and could thus explain the low predictive 
validity of individual indirect measures.  
 
4.3.4  Preliminary conclusion 
 
To conclude, Machery (2016) fails to establish the superiority of the trait view with his 
argument to the best explanation. He argues that his trait view of attitudes provides the 
best explanation for (1) the fact that scores on different indirect measures often do not 
correlate well with each other, (2) the fact that scores on indirect measures are affected 
by various contextual factors, and (3) the fact that scores on indirect measures are 
poor predictors of evaluative responses. Yet, all we need to postulate to explain these 
findings is that different attitude measures tap into different (sets of) mental states. This 
is certainly compatible with the view that attitudes are traits that are based on a range 
of different mental states (e.g., associative mental states, propositional mental states, 
affective mental states, etc.) but also with models according to which attitudes can be 
identified with individual mental states (e.g., associative mental states, propositional 
mental states, affective mental states, etc.) or particular clusters of these.  
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4.4  Why conceptualise attitudes as traits? 
 
The failure of Machery’s (2016) argument to the best explanation notwithstanding, 
there are good reasons for adopting a trait view of attitudes. In the introduction to this 
thesis, I mentioned that the notion of an attitude plays a role in explanations/predictions 
of people’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses towards other people (see 
function F1 of a model of attitudes as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis) and 
in the assessment of a person’s moral character (see function F2). It is widely 
acknowledged that trait ascriptions fulfil exactly these roles (Goldie, 2004: 3-6). If we 
are told that a person, say Frank, is arrogant, we may predict that he is likely to 
discount other people’s opinions, is likely to show off, etc. We may also explain some of 
Frank’s responses retrospectively by reference to the trait of arrogance. We may for 
example come to the conclusion that Frank boasted about his high salary to his 
colleagues because he is arrogant. Traits are usually understood to be the basic 
building blocks of a person’s character. Knowing that Frank is arrogant does not only 
help us to explain and predict his responses but also to assess his character. As 
arrogance is commonly perceived to be a negative trait, we will likely come to the 
conclusion that Frank has a bad character (if all we know about him is that he is 
arrogant). Attitude ascriptions are strikingly similar in all these regards. They, too, help 
us to predict people’s responses. If we are told that Frank has a negative attitude 
towards black people, we may predict that he will feel uncomfortable in the presence of 
black people, that he will likely discount the opinions of black co-workers, etc. 
Moreover, we can explain Frank’s responses towards black people retrospectively by 
reference to his negative attitude towards black people. We may conclude that Frank 
keeps interrupting black co-workers in group discussions, while hearing out his white 
co-workers, because he has a negative attitude towards black people. Finally, the fact 
that Frank has a negative attitude towards black people may lead us to the conclusion 
that he has a bad character (given that this is all we know about Frank). Due to these 
striking similarities in the explanatory, predictive, and character evaluative roles of trait 
and attitude ascriptions, it is intuitive to assume that attitudes have in fact the 
ontological status of traits.  
Note that the assumption that attitudes are traits evidently drives our day-to-day 
folk psychological judgments about people’s attitudes. If someone tells us that Frank 
has a negative attitude towards black people, we intuitively infer that Frank is generally 
disposed to respond (cognitively, affectively, and behaviourally) in a negative manner 
towards black people. That is, we attribute a general trait to him rather than a particular 
mental state. As the trait conception of attitudes is clearly the prevalent conception of 
attitudes among folk psychologists, academic psychologists and philosophers may also 
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want to adopt a trait notion of attitudes (if they do not already do so) because this 
would facilitate exchange between academia and the wider public (see desideratum D3 
of a model of attitudes as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). Scholars will find 
it difficult to inform public discourse on such important issues such as racism or sexism 
if their notion of an attitude is very different to the attitude notion that ordinary people 
employ. 
To be sure, scholars may sometimes have good reasons not to use the same 
notions as folk psychologists. Folk psychology can be mistaken, in which case 
scholarship may actually aim to revise folk psychological notions rather than taking 
these notions for granted (P. M. Churchland, 1981; P. S. Churchland, 1986; Stich, 
1983). Accordingly, if it turned out that folk psychologists are confused about the idea 
that attitudes are traits, philosophers and psychologists may try to replace the folk 
psychological notion of attitudes with a more accurate understanding of attitudes. As I 
will show in the following section, some scholars have in fact argued that folk 
psychologists are mistaken about the very idea that people possess traits (including 
attitudes conceived as traits). I will reply that this argument is misguided and that we 
can make sense of the notion that attitudes are traits after all. Philosophers and 
psychologists should consider adopting a trait notion of attitudes (if they do not already 
adopt such a notion) – not only because such a notion is useful for 
explanatory/predictive and a character evaluative purposes but also because this 
would make attitude research more accessible to the wider public. 
 
4.5  The situationist challenge 
 
There has been a long-standing debate in psychology as well as in philosophy about 
the question whether personality and character traits are real (e.g., Bowers, 1973; 
Hartshorne & May, 1928; Kamtekar, 2004; Merritt, 2000). Some scholars have argued 
that people’s behaviour is largely determined by situational factors and that this speaks 
against the existence of traits as they are commonly understood, i.e., as psychological 
dispositions to behave (and cognise) in a consistent manner across different relevant 
situations (Doris, 2002; Harman, 1999; Hartshorne & May, 1928; Mischel, 1968; 
Peterson, 1968). According to this line of argument (henceforth, “the situationist 
challenge”), people are simply mistaken when they ascribe traits to themselves or 
others. A similar argument has been used to argue against the existence of attitudes 
understood as general evaluative dispositions (i.e., traits) of people (Schwarz, 2007; 
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001, Smith & Conrey, 2007; Wicker, 1969). If these authors are 
right, we cannot explain or predict people’s responses towards people qua members of 
social groups by reference to attitudes understood as traits and neither can we invoke 
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such attitudes when assessing a person’s moral character. All that we can refer to are 
situational influences on people’s responses or perhaps the influence of situation-
specific mental states.  
In what follows, I will discuss the situationist challenge in some detail. In section 
4.5.1, I will review Doris' (2002) argument against the existence of character traits and 
in section 4.5.2, I will describe how this argument can be applied to the case of 
attitudes. In section 4.5.3, I will then present a possible rejoinder to the situationist 
challenge that is open to Machery. It will become clear that on Machery’s account the 
idea that attitudes can be characterised in terms of an aggregate strength and valence 
is crucial for fending off the situationist challenge. However, as I will show in section 
4.6, describing attitudes in these aggregationist terms is problematic because it 
obscures relevant evaluative complexities of attitudes. This will lead me to develop an 
alternative trait model of attitudes in section 4.7. The proposed model can both ward off 
the situationist challenge (described in the present section) and do justice to the 
complexity of attitudes described in section 4.6.  
 
4.5.1  A situationist argument against the existence of traits 
 
Doris defends the view that character and personality traits as they are usually 
understood do not exist (Doris, 1998: 2002).121 He argues that the notion of traits that is 
common in the philosophical as well as psychological literature and the common folk 
psychological notion of traits suppose that traits centrally involve dispositions to 
behaviour (Doris, 2002: chapter 2, chapter 5).122 When we say that someone is 
compassionate we assume that the person is disposed to behave in a compassionate 
manner. Doris (2002) describes this common understanding of character traits by 
reference to what he calls the principle of consistency: 
 
Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behaviour across a 
diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their conduciveness to 
the manifestation of the trait in question. (p. 22) 
 
According to this, a person only possesses a trait if the behaviour that is expressive of 
the trait (i.e., the trait-relevant behaviour) is shown reliably across diverse situations in 
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 It shall be mentioned that Harman (1999) is another prominent defender of this view in 
philosophy. 
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 This being said, Doris acknowledges that character traits and virtues are not only expressed 
in overt behaviour but also in internal psychological processes. Yet, he regards these 
psychological processes as secondary for an account of traits in so far as they subserve 
behaviour (Doris, 2002: 17). Doris’ focus on behavioural dispositions has been widely criticised 
(Besser-Jones, 2008; Kamtekar, 2004; Webber, 2006; Webber, 2013). Machery (2016), by 
contrast, does not seem to prioritise behavioural over psychological dispositions in his 
characterisation of traits. This implies that the situationist objection must be slightly adjusted to 
be applied to Machery’s account of attitudes (see next section). 
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which the behaviour is appropriate.123, 124 An example will help to point out what Doris 
means by “trait-relevant behaviour”, “trait-relevant eliciting conditions”, and by 
“conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait” (p. 22). Let us consider the trait of 
compassion, which Doris also uses as his central test case. Compassionate 
behaviours, such as helping or comforting other people, are the trait-relevant 
behaviours in this case. In general we would expect the compassionate person to 
behave compassionately in situations in which she is confronted with the suffering of 
other beings. The distress of others is thus a trait-relevant eliciting condition. Yet, 
situations in which one is confronted with other’s distress may differ in how conducive 
they are to compassionate behaviour. For example, it is more difficult to act 
compassionately when one is generally in a bad mood or under time pressure than 
when one feels elevated and has plenty of spare time. According to Doris, we should 
expect of a compassionate person that she acts compassionately even when it is 
relatively difficult to do so. Thus, compassion-relevant situations that are not especially 
conducive to compassionate behaviour are especially diagnostic when it comes to 
ascribing the trait of compassion to a person (Doris, 2002: 19). Doris is quite aware that 
it is a delicate matter to decide how consistently a person must behave 
compassionately across situations in which compassionate behaviour is appropriate in 
order to justify the ascription of the corresponding trait (Doris, 2002: 18-20). Yet, he is 
convinced that people’s failure to act compassionately across different compassion-
relevant situations is in fact so severe that there remains no doubt that people do not 
possess a trait of compassion as it is usually understood. 
To prove his point, he draws on a vast number of psychological experiments that 
indicate that seemingly irrelevant situational variables determine whether people act 
compassionately (Doris, 2002: chapter 3). For example, there is evidence that people 
are much more likely to help another person who is apparently in distress when they 
recently had good luck (Isen & Levin, 1972) and less likely to do so when they are in a 
hurry (Darley & Batson, 1973) or when there is another person present who could help 
but who remains passive (Latané & Darley, 1970). Moreover, the famous Milgram 
experiments have revealed that most people can be persuaded to apply severe electric 
shocks to another person if the instructions are given by an authority figure who insists 
that the electric shocks are necessary for the success of the experiment (Milgram, 
1974). Doris takes these findings to show that aspects of the situations in which people 
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 Doris mentions two further principles: The principle of stability, which is implied in the 
principle of consistency (if trait-relevant behaviour is consistent across different trait-relevant 
situations, it can also be expected to be stable across repeated occurrences of the same trait-
relevant situation), and the principle of evaluative integration, which concerns the relation 
between different traits that constitute a person’s character. 
124
 Very similar characterisations of trait possession can be found in Goldie (2004: 50) and 
Merritt (2000: 365). 
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find themselves determine whether they behave compassionately or not. Accordingly, it 
would be wrong to assume that some people possess a robust trait that disposes them 
to behave compassionately across different trait-relevant situations.  
Yet, Doris acknowledges that people may possess “highly contextualised 
dispositions or ‘local’ traits” (Doris, 2002: 64). For example, someone may consistently 
help people in distress when being in a good mood and when not being under time 
pressure. Accordingly, we may say that that person possesses “good mood and spare 
time compassion”, while lacking any form of “bad mood” or “in a hurry compassion”. 
Doris stresses that this “localised” way of speaking about traits is at odds with the usual 
model of traits as general behavioural dispositions. 
 
4.5.2  A situationist argument against the existence of attitudes conceived as 
traits 
 
In section 4.3.2, we saw that Machery (2016) claims that his trait view may help to 
predict how particular contextual factors affect the measurement of attitudes. Yet, one 
may object that contextual influences of this sort undermine the very notion of attitudes 
conceived as traits in the first place. In analogy to Doris argument against the existence 
of personality traits, one can construct the following argument against the existence of 
attitudes conceived as traits:  
 
P1) If attitudes are traits of a person, a person’s evaluative responses towards 
members of a particular social group (i.e., the attitude-relevant responses) 
should be consistent across various situations in which members of the group 
are present (i.e., across attitude-relevant eliciting conditions).  
P2) Yet, a person’s evaluative responses towards members of a particular social 
group (i.e., the attitude-relevant responses) are not consistent across various 
situations in which members of the group are present (i.e., across attitude-
relevant eliciting conditions).  
C)  Hence, people do not possess attitudes understood as traits. 
 
This argument is implicit in the work of a range of authors who call into question the 
notion of attitudes as broad response dispositions (Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 
2001; Smith & Conrey, 2007; Wicker, 1969). I deliberately refer to “attitude-relevant-
responses” instead of “attitude-relevant behaviours” in the above argument because 
cognitive and affective responses are commonly understood to be as indicative of 
attitudes as behavioural responses. Recall, for example, that on Machery’s (2016) 
model, attitudes are “broad-track dispositions to behave and cognize (have thoughts, 
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attend, emote, and so on) toward an object […] in a way that reflects some preference” 
(p. 112). Thus, according to premise 1 of the above argument, if a person possesses a 
negative (or positive) attitude towards black people, we should expect that that person 
consistently shows negative (or positive) behavioural, cognitive, and emotional 
responses towards black people across different situations. According to premise 2, 
this is not what we actually find. In the remainder of this section, I will review some 
evidence that supports premise 2 and elaborate on the conclusion that follows from this 
if we also accept premise 1. In the next section (section 4.5.3), I will then show that 
Machery’s account provides us with resources to reject premise 1. Yet, this reply 
comes at a price as I will show in section 4.6. 
There is plenty of evidence of situational influences on people’s evaluative 
responses towards social groups (for reviews see Blair, 2002; Dasgupta, 2013; Smith & 
Semin, 2004, 2007). In fact, I have already mentioned various examples of the 
situation-specificity of evaluative responses in previous parts of this thesis (see, for 
example, section 1.2.2; section 2.2.2.3; section 3.3.3; and section 4.3.2). In section 
4.3.2, I mentioned for example the finding that induced disgust promotes people’s bias 
against homosexuals on an IAT, while induced anger fosters bias against Arabs on an 
IAT (Dasgupta et al., 2009). Note that the emotions, induced by thinking about 
disgusting or anger-eliciting autobiographical events, can be seen as aspects of the 
situation that the participants found themselves in, and which influenced their 
evaluative responses.125 Recall also that Amodio and Hamilton (2012) found that when 
their participants were made to believe that they were soon to interact with a black 
person, they showed a stronger bias against black people on an Eval-IAT than when 
they expected to interact with a white person. This shows again that aspects of the 
immediate situation that people find themselves in (i.e., whether they expect to interact 
with a black or white person) affect their evaluative responses. Richeson and Ambady 
(2001) conducted a similar experiment with gender as target category. They found that 
male participants who expected to interact with a woman in a superior role relative to 
them showed a bias against women on a gender Eval-IAT, whereas male participants 
who expected to interact with an equal-status or subordinate-status female partner 
showed a bias in favour of women on the Eval-IAT. One may want to object that 
participants in this experiment did not exhibit different evaluative responses towards 
women in different situations but different responses towards different kinds of women 
(female superior vs. female non-superior). Yet, it must be stressed that if we are 
interested in a person’s attitude towards women in general, characteristics of a 
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 Note also that the evidence that Mandelbaum (2016) provides in support of his view that 
implicit attitudes are not associative can similarly be interpreted as evidence for the situation-
specificity of evaluative responses (see section 2.2.2.3 in chapter 2).   
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particular woman that a person is confronted with (or expects to be confronted with) 
can count as situational factor on a broad reading of “situation”.126 It is also worth 
noting that, on a broad reading of “situation”, the common finding that people report 
positive attitudes towards black people when directly asked for their attitude but exhibit 
biases against black people on indirect measures of attitudes can be construed as the 
result of situational influences (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; see also 
section 1.3.2). That is, we can construe the different ways that attitudes are accessed 
(by asking the participant directly or by engaging the participant in a categorisation task 
such as the IAT) as different situations that trigger different responses. One situation 
(when participants are directly asked for their attitude) allows the participant to 
deliberate on her response (thus allowing for a controlled response), whereas the other 
situation (when participants need to react as quickly as possible on a categorisation 
task) prevents such deliberation. Analogously, we can interpret the low correlations 
between people’s results on different indirect measures of attitudes (see section 4.3.1 
of this chapter and section 1.3.2 of chapter 1) as the result of situational influences. 
Different measures, such as the affective priming task and the Eval-IAT, involve 
different procedures, which can be construed as situational factors that influence the 
measurement outcomes. As a consequence, we should expect people’s results on 
these measures to be dissociated. Also, if responses on indirect measures are highly 
sensitive to situational factors (such as the details of the measurement procedure), it 
should come as no surprise that outcomes on these measures are relatively weak 
predictors of discriminatory responses in real-world contexts (see section 4.3.3 of this 
chapter and section 1.3.3 of chapter 1). 
To sum up, there is plenty of reason to believe that premise 2 of the above 
argument is true: people’s evaluative responses towards members of a particular social 
group are not consistent across various situations in which members of the group are 
present (i.e., across attitude-relevant eliciting conditions). Accordingly, one may claim in 
the spirit of the situationist argument that people do not possess attitudes understood 
as general dispositions to show evaluative responses of a certain valence (i.e., 
attitudes understood as traits). Instead we may say that people possess “local 
attitudes” (Doris, 2002: 87). People may for example exhibit the “being confronted with 
a subordinate women attitude” and the “being confronted with a superior women 
attitude” or the “having been asked to report an attitude towards black people attitude”. 
Such a “local” situation-specific conception of attitudes has indeed many proponents in 
psychology (Conrey & Smith, 2007; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Schwarz, 2007; 
                                            
126
 As I will point out in section 4.7.3, depending on our interests and purposes, we may want to 
individuate situations in different ways.  
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Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Smith & Conrey, 2007).127 These scholars identify attitudes 
with highly situation-specific occurrent evaluative responses, sometimes also called 
“constructed” attitudes (Schwarz, 2007). However, it does not seem accurate to say 
that our attitudes towards a social group cease to exist when we do not currently 
undergo a response to that group (see Schwitzgebel, 2010: 543, for a similar 
argument). I therefore prefer to conceptualise local attitudes as dispositions. They can 
be construed as highly situation-specific dispositions to exhibit evaluative responses of 
a certain kind. On this view, people can possess multiple attitudes towards a social 
group at the same time, all of which are tied to particular situations. Yet, we may not 
even need to bother about the accurate conceptualisation of attitudes from a localist 
perspective if we can make sense of the notion of attitudes as “global” traits after all. In 
the next section, I will show how this may work. I will argue that the notion that attitudes 
have an aggregate strength and valence provides us with a reply to the situationist 
challenge. However, as I will show in section 4.6, this reply comes at a price: describing 
attitudes in these aggregationist terms is problematic because it obscures relevant 
evaluative complexities of attitudes.128  
 
4.5.3 A rejoinder to the situationist argument against the existence of attitudes 
conceived as traits 
 
Although Machery (2016) does not directly discuss the situationist argument as I have 
presented it above, his characterisation of attitudes suggests that he would likely reject 
premise 1.129 That is, his model allows rejecting the claim that we can only ascribe an 
attitude conceived as a trait to a person if that person shows consistent evaluative 
responses across different attitude-relevant situations. Recall that attitudes, conceived 
as traits, can vary in strength according to Machery. Accordingly, Machery can insist 
that we would only expect total consistency in a person’s evaluative responses towards 
a social group if that person has an extremely strong attitude towards that group. 
Consider a case in which all of a person’s mental states and processes in regard to 
black people reflect negativity. Here, we would in fact expect that irrespective of the 
situation in which the person encounters a black person, the person will show 
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 The situationist perspective on attitudes is in fact as old as attitude psychology. Already 
Allport (1935), reviews (and rejects) in his seminal article on attitudes what he calls “The Case 
for Specificity“ (p. 820). 
128
 The issue of local attitudes will be taken up again in section 4.7.3.3, in which I will describe 
what status local attitudes have on my proposed trait model of attitudes.   
129
 Machery (2016) presents the situationist argument in very general terms and his response is 
somewhat sketchy: he claims that the outcome of the person-situation debate has been that 
“[p]roperties of the person and situational features both influence behavior” (p. 121). Moreover, 
he emphasises the role of aggregation over various responses of a person in determining a 
person’s attitude (see main text below for explanation).  
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cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses that reflect negativity. By contrast, if 
someone possesses a weak negative attitude towards black people, we would actually 
expect that that person’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses towards black 
people are somewhat inconsistent across situations. In particular, the person who has 
a weak negative attitude towards black people may show negative cognitive, affective, 
and behavioural responses towards black people in most but not in all situations in 
which she encounters black people. The reason may be that she harbours some 
mental states in regard to black people that do not imply a negative evaluation, such as 
the belief that racism is wrong. In some situations this belief may become sufficiently 
activated to counteract the influence of negative evaluative responses.130 
On Machery’s model, we can determine whether a person possesses a positive or 
negative attitude towards a social group by aggregating over a person’s evaluative 
responses on various occasions. If a person shows negative responses towards black 
people across all (or nearly all) observed situations, we can be reasonably confident 
that that person has a strong negative attitude towards black people.131 If a person 
shows negative evaluative responses towards black people in most but clearly not all 
instances, we may say that the person has a weak negative attitude towards black 
people. Finally, we can infer that a person lacks an attitude towards black people if 
there are as many instances in which the person shows positive evaluative responses 
towards black people as there are instances in which the person shows negative 
evaluative responses towards black people. That is, a person does not possess an 
attitude if aggregated over various occasions the person exhibits no preference for the 
group. This latter thought is expressed in the following quote, in which Machery (2016) 
argues against the possibility of ambivalent attitudes:  
 
[T]he trait picture denies (except perhaps in pathological cases) that people have 
ambivalent attitudes. If the hypothesized coreferential, differently valenced mental states do 
not lead to a broad-track disposition to behave and cognize in a way that expresses either 
a positive or a negative preference, then people simply do not have an attitude toward the 
relevant object. They will act and cognize in a way that expresses a positive preference in 
some contexts and a negative preference in other contexts, and their aggregate behavior 
cannot be predicted (even imperfectly) by postulating a trait. (p. 124) 
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 The point that strong attitudes lead to consistent responses, while weak attitudes are 
associated with rather inconsistent responses, is also emphasised by Webber (2013, 2016b).  
131
 Note that this can only be an estimate because the number of observations will always be 
limited. We are restricted to observations of evaluative responses because we cannot directly 
observe the entirety of mental states that a person harbours in regard to a social group and that 
may issue in evaluative responses towards that group. Note also that it remains unclear how we 
would determine the valence and strength of a person’s attitude if we had access to this set of 
mental states. In particular, would each mental state figure in the same manner in the 
calculation or would we give more weight to those mental states that get activated more 
frequently?  
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A situationist about attitudes may see this as grist to her mills and argue that people 
never exhibit an aggregate preference towards any social group because their 
responses are solely the function of situational influences. However, such a claim is at 
odds with the empirical evidence as Machery rightly points out (p. 121). Decades of 
research in attitude psychology have shown that attitude measures that aggregate 
across various evaluative responses of a subject on various occasions (e.g., various 
responses of the subject to questionnaire items) do oftentimes reveal aggregate 
preferences of the subject that have (some) predictive validity (Ajzen, 1988: chapter 3; 
Epstein, 1983). That is, for many social groups individuals exhibit at least a minor 
aggregate cross-situational preference, which allows ascribing at least a weak attitude 
to them (i.e., a weak positive attitude or a weak negative attitude). 
To conclude, there is a possible reply to the situationist argument against the 
existence of attitudes construed as traits. According to this reply, situationists set the 
bar too high when they claim that in order to possess an attitude towards a social 
group, one’s evaluative responses towards members of that social group must be 
consistent across various situations in which members of the group are present.132 
According to Machery, attitudes can vary in strength (i.e., degree of possession), and 
thus we should only expect very strong attitudes to lead to perfectly consistent 
evaluative responses across different situations. Weak attitudes, by contrast, are 
characterised by imperfect cross-situational consistency in evaluative responses. 
Empirically, we can estimate the strength and valence of a person’s attitude towards a 
social group by aggregating over various observed cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
responses of that person towards members of that social group.  
The foregoing suggests that aggregation carries much weight in Machery’s model 
of attitudes because without this aspect, Machery’s trait view would fall victim to the 
situationist challenge. In the next section, I will point out that presenting attitudes in 
these aggregationist terms problematically obscures many of those complexities that 
are characteristic of attitudes. In section 4.7, I will then present an alternative view of 
attitudes as traits that wards off the situationist challenge without obscuring the 
evaluative complexities of attitudes. This is the view that attitudes can be identified with 
stable profiles of evaluative response variation across situations. 
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 It must be noted that even though this response to the situationist challenge may be 
successful in the case of attitudes (though see next section), it may not work for all kinds of 
traits. Doris (2002) acknowledges that different traits have different attributive standards (p. 18-
20). He further notes that the attribution of virtues such as loyalty or compassion requires more 
than just broad behavioural trends over multiple situations (pp. 73-75). According to him, 
individual situations carry significant weight when it comes to the ascription of these virtues. 
One single instance of unfaithfulness in the face of sexual temptation may suffice to conclude 
that a person is not loyal (to any degree). Similarly, we may not want to ascribe the trait of 
compassion (to any degree) to a person who exhibits a broad cross-situational tendency to help 
people in distress but who administers severe electric shocks to a person when instructed to do 
so by an authority figure (Milgram, 1974). 
 130 
 
4.6  The complexity of attitudes 
 
We have seen that Machery (2016) characterises attitudes in aggregationist terms. By 
aggregating across a person’s positively and negatively valenced cognitive, affective, 
and behavioural attitude-relevant responses in various situations, we can estimate how 
strongly positive or negative the attitude is overall. The fact that attitudes can vary in 
strength provides us with a plausible response to the siutationist argument against the 
existence of attitudes conceived as traits. However, as I will argue in this section, 
Machery’s characterisation of attitudes is problematic because it does not do justice to 
the complex structure of people’s attitudes. 
Before I turn to this argument, it is worth pointing out that estimating the aggregate 
strength and valence of an attitude is beset with various difficulties. Note, for example, 
that there is often no simple fact of the matter as to whether a given response 
expresses a negative or positive evaluation. Suppose that someone pities black 
people. We may regard this affective response to be expressive of a positive evaluation 
if it results from that person’s acknowledgement that black people are structurally 
disadvantaged in society. Yet, we may see it to be expressive of a negative evaluation 
if that person pities them for supposed inferior mental capacities. Relatedly, we cannot 
even be sure whether the bias against black people that is usually found on race IATs 
is (entirely) of negative evaluative nature (Oswald and colleagues, 2013: 186-187). For 
example, the bias may just reflect (amongst others) that participants are less familiar 
with black than with white faces. Note that if it is difficult to determine for any single 
response whether it expresses a positive or negative evaluation (or no evaluation at 
all), it will be incredibly difficult to determine the overall strength and valence of a 
person’s attitude. After all, we have to aggregate over the individual response 
tendencies to estimate the overall strength and valence of the attitude. Note also that it 
remains unclear how we would make valences of cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
responses commensurable. How would we for example set off against each other the 
supposed positive valence of a person’s belief that Chinese people are clever and the 
supposed negative valence of the same person’s envy of Chinese people? In what 
follows, I will assume for the sake of the argument that these difficulties can be dealt 
with. Let us assume that there is a convincing and reliable way to determine (or at least 
estimate) the aggregate strength and valence of a person’s attitude towards a social 
group on the basis of that person’s evaluative responses towards that group. This 
leaves us still with the question as to whether this is a desirable characterisation of 
attitudes. In what follows, I will argue that it is not.  
Let us consider again the case of Sarah and assume for the moment that she 
responds slightly more often in a negative way towards black people (e.g., based on 
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various negative evaluative stereotypes that she harbours in regard to black people) 
than in a favourable manner (e.g., based on her egalitarian beliefs, her desire not to 
behave in a racist manner, etc.). On Machery’s model we would have to say that she 
has a weak negative attitude towards black people. Note that this characterisation 
obscures the evaluative conflict that Sarah is experiencing. If someone told us that she 
has a weak negative attitude towards black people, we may get the false impression 
that all her cognition, affect, and behaviour in regard to black people has a somewhat 
negative valence. This is clearly different from Sarah’s actual evaluative stance towards 
black people, which is not that homogeneous. 
Let us now suppose a slightly different scenario. Suppose that Sarah responds as 
frequently in a favourable manner towards black people (e.g., based on her egalitarian 
beliefs, her desire not to behave in a racist manner, etc.) as she responds in a negative 
way towards black people (e.g., based on various negative evaluative stereotypes that 
she harbours in regard to black people). On Machery’s attitude model, we would have 
to say that Sarah lacks an attitude towards black people in this case. This is because 
her “aggregate behavior cannot be predicted (even imperfectly) by postulating a trait” 
(Machery, 2016: 124). That this is unconvincing becomes clear when we compare her 
to a person, say Liang, whose entire cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses 
towards black people are pretty much neutral in valence. We may consider that Liang’s 
beliefs about black people do not have any particular valence, that he does not 
experience any noteworthy affect in regard to black people, and that his behavioural 
responses in regard to black people are not any different to his behavioural responses 
towards white people. On Machery’s trait view, both Sarah and Liang would be 
characterised as lacking an attitude towards black people. After all, both Liang’s and 
Sarah’s responses towards black people are neutral on balance.  Yet, describing them 
in the same way is clearly problematic because this obscures crucial differences 
between Liang and Sarah. Note that Sarah and Liang will rarely respond to black 
people in the same manner. Whereas Liang may in fact be said to lack an attitude 
towards black people, Sarah’s attitude seems to be conflicted rather than non-
existent.133 We cannot just average across Sarah’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
dispositions in regard to black people if we want to give an accurate account of her 
attitude. Only a model of attitudes that does justice to the complexities of Sarah’s 
aversive racism will allow for accurate predictions of her responses and an appropriate 
evaluation of her character (see functions F1 and F2 of the attitude notion as 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). In the next section, I will outline such a 
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 Yet, note that even in the case of Liang, we may not want to say that he lacks an attitude 
towards black people (or that he possesses a neutral attitude towards black people) but that his 
attitude towards black people is one of indifference. 
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model. Before I turn to this account, however, it is worth emphasising that aversive 
racism is not the only phenomenon that Machery’s model struggles to give an 
appropriate account of. 
This becomes clear when we turn our attention to a phenomenon that Glick and 
Fiske (1996, 1997) have called “ambivalent sexism”. They provided evidence that 
people’s (both men’s and women’s) attitudes towards women often combine hostile 
and benevolent sexist elements. Women are, for example, often stereotyped as warm, 
friendly, nurturing, gentle, or understanding (Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). These 
stereotypes are benevolent in the sense that the stereotype holder perceives them as 
positive characteristics and that they lead to behaviour that is generally considered to 
be favourable (e.g., the protection of women from potential threats). Yet, people who 
hold these benevolent stereotypes are also more likely to harbour distinctively negative 
stereotypes that characterise women for example as incompetent. Benevolent and 
hostile sexism often go together because “benevolent sexism may be used to 
compensate for, or legitimate, hostile sexism” (Glick & Fiske, 1996: 492). Moreover, 
benevolent and hostile sexist beliefs jointly justify existing social power relations (Jost & 
Kay, 2005). For example, a man, say Jack, who believes that women in high-status 
occupations (e.g., university professor, judge, CEO) are not fit for their job and must 
have been lucky to obtain these positions (hostile sexism) may also believe that 
women have great social skills, which makes them supposedly better suited for 
assisting or caring roles (benevolent sexism). Note that ambivalent sexism is also 
reflected in Richeson and Ambady’s (2001) aforementioned finding that men who 
expect to interact with a woman in a superior role relative to them, exhibit a bias 
against women on a gender Eval-IAT, whereas men who anticipate to interact with an 
equal-status or subordinate-status female partner exhibit a bias in favour of women on 
the same measure (see section 4.5.2). Following Machery’s trait view, ambivalent 
sexists like Jack may appear to lack an attitude towards women because the 
disposition to show negative responses towards women in superior roles and the 
disposition to be kind to women in same status or subordinate roles may balance each 
other. Recall that according to Machery “the trait picture denies (except perhaps in 
pathological cases) that people have ambivalent attitudes” (p. 124). Yet, contra 
Machery, it seems intuitive to say that Jack has a (non-pathological) ambivalent attitude 
towards women. 
Note that ascribing an ambivalent sexist attitude to Jack fulfils both an 
explanatory/predictive and a character evaluative function (see functions F1 and F2 of 
the attitude notion as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). While Machery 
(2016) may be right that we cannot predict Jack’s “aggregate behaviour” on the basis 
of such an ascription (p. 124), we can make specific predictions about Jack’s likely 
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responses in regard to different kinds of women. Knowing about his ambivalent sexism 
(and not just about the aggregate strength and valence of his attitude), we may for 
example predict that he will likely feel uncomfortable about having a female supervisor 
at work and that he will feel approval towards females who spend a lot of time with their 
kids. Moreover, this ascription gives us information about Jack that we can take into 
account when assessing Jack’s character. I will further elaborate on the nature of 
ambivalent sexist attitudes in the next section.  
For now though, it is important to point to another problem with Machery’s (2016) 
trait model: it obscures the variety of affects involved in attitudes. In the last chapter, I 
stressed following Madva and Brownstein (2016) that prejudice is not just a matter of 
generic feelings of like or dislike but often of specific emotions such as anger, disgust, 
fear, or pity. For example, I mentioned experiments that indicated that in many people 
prejudice towards homosexuals is linked to disgust, while prejudice towards Arabs is 
linked to anger (Dasgupta et al., 2009; see section 3.3.3). On Machery’s account, both 
the person who is disgusted by homosexuals and the person who is angered by Arabs 
will likely be described as having a negative attitude towards the respective group (if 
most of their response dispositions towards these groups are reflective of negativity). 
However, characterising their attitudes merely in terms of negative valence obscures 
the affective differences between these attitudes. Note that disgust and anger are not 
only experienced differently by the subject but are also linked to different kinds of 
behaviour. While one may be inclined to avoid the person whom one is disgusted by, 
one may approach and confront the person who is the target of one’s anger. Hence, 
acknowledging the particular nature of the affective reaction of a person towards a 
social group helps us making better predictions about that person’s responses to 
members of that group (see section 3.4.2 in the previous chapter). A model of attitudes 
should do justice to these affective complexities. 
To sum up, I have argued in this section that Machery’s account of attitudes 
problematically obscures crucial details that are characteristic of people’s attitudes. It 
obscures evaluative conflicts that are often characteristic of people’s attitudes, such as 
when people are alienated from their own racial biases or when people exhibit both 
benevolent and hostile sexist dispositions. Moreover, describing attitudes just in terms 
of strength and generic positive or negative valence does not do justice to relevant 
differences in the emotional reactions that people exhibit in response to different social 
groups. Taken together, Machery’s trait model obscures factors that would help us to 
predict people’s evaluative responses and to assess their character. In the following, I 
will argue for an alternative characterisation of attitudes that is supposed to do justice 
to these aforementioned complexities but still allows conceptualising attitudes as traits. 
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4.7  Profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions 
 
I propose that we can address the complexity of attitudes by characterising them as 
complex profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions. In the following 
sub-sections, I will give substance to and flesh out this characterisation. I will start with 
an elaboration on Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) influential cognitive-affective personality 
system model (CAPS) because it provides the framework for my proposed account of 
attitudes (section 4.7.1).134 In response to the situationist challenge against the notion 
of personality traits (see section 4.5.1), Mischel and Shoda argue that people exhibit 
stable profiles of behaviour variation across situations that can be identified with 
personality traits. In other words, traits are profiles of situation-specific behavioural 
dispositions. In section 4.7.2, I will show that this idea can also be applied to attitudes 
understood as traits. According to this, attitudes are stable profiles of situation-specific 
(cognitive, affective, and behavioural) evaluative response dispositions. For example, a 
person’s ambivalent sexist attitude can be understood as the profile to be disposed to 
respond in a benevolent manner towards women in same-status or subordinate roles 
and to be disposed to respond in a hostile manner towards women in superior roles. I 
will argue that this conception of attitudes both fends off the situationist challenge 
(mentioned in section 4.5) and gives justice to the evaluative complexities of attitudes 
(mentioned in section 4.6). In section 4.7.3, I will point out that on the proposed 
account of attitudes there are different legitimate ways to individuate attitudes, which 
depend on our interests and purposes as attitude ascribes. In section 4.7.4, I will 
elaborate on the psychological basis of attitudes as understood on this account. In 
section 4.7.5, I will point out that the proposed profile view of attitudes can equally well 
explain those findings that Machery (2016) claims are best explained on his model of 
attitudes (see section 4.3). Finally, in section 4.7.6, I will point out some significant 
similarities and differences of my model of attitudes to Schwitzgebel’s (2013) 
dispositional model of attitudes to further locate my account in the literature. 
 
                                            
134
 Another author who links attitudes to the CAPS model is Webber (2013, 2016b). However, 
his project is different from mine. Whereas I provide an account of attitudes towards social 
groups in terms of traits, he provides an account of traits such as circumspection or cruelty in 
terms of attitudes. He argues for example that circumspection can be analysed as a strong 
positive attitude towards caution or that cruelty can be analysed as a strong positive attitude 
towards other people’s suffering (Webber, 2013: 1086-1087). Due to this difference in our 
projects, I believe that my account is not necessarily incompatible with his. It could be that 
attitudes towards social groups are characterisable as specific traits that are not again 
characterisable in terms of attitudes (see section 4.7.2 below), while Webber (2013) is right that 
traits such as circumspection and cruelty are analysable in terms of attitudes. In short, our 
accounts may be concerned with different kinds of traits. Webber does not directly discuss 
attitudes towards social groups. Yet, he argues that one can reduce one’s susceptibility to 
implicit biases by “instil[ing] in oneself a few firmly held moral attitudes, such as attitudes in 
favour of fairness or against discrimination” (Webber, 2016b: 149). 
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4.7.1  Cognitive-affective personality system 
 
Mischel and Shoda (1995) developed their model of a cognitive-affective personality 
system (CAPS) in response to the situationist challenge against the notion of 
personality traits. They argue in their highly influential paper that the fact that situational 
factors strongly influence people’s behaviours does not undermine the claim that 
people possess traits and stable personalities. They stress that, quite to the contrary, 
“behavioral variation in relation to changing situations constitutes a potentially 
predictable and meaningful reflection of the personality system itself” (p. 255). This is 
because the personality system generates “stable if...then... profiles of behavior 
variability across situations” (p. 252). 
Evidence for these stable situation-behaviour profiles has been gathered, amongst 
others, in a large-scale field study in which children’s behaviour was observed across a 
variety of situations in a summer camp setting (Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1994). Over 
the course of 6 weeks, children’s behaviour was recorded on various behavioural 
dimensions (e.g., verbal aggression, whining, complying) as it occurred in five different 
types of interpersonal situations. These types of situations included situations in which 
a peer teased the child, situations in which a peer initiated positive social contact with 
the child, situations in which an adult warned the child, situations in which an adult 
punished the child, and situations in which an adult praised the child. The researchers 
found that the observed children exhibited characteristic profiles of behaviour variation 
across the five types of situations. Consider for example a child who shows a high level 
of verbal aggression when being teased by another child, a medium level of verbal 
aggression when being warned or being punished by an adult, and a low level of verbal 
aggression when being positively approached by another child or when being praised 
by an adult. To say that this situation-behaviour profile is characteristic of the child’s 
personality (i.e., reflective of a trait of the child) is to say that the child tends to show 
the same (or a very similar) situation-behaviour profile whenever it encounters this set 
of situations and that the profile can be distinguished from other children’s profiles. 
Shoda and colleagues (1994) found stable intra-individual situation-behaviour profiles 
of this sort for all behavioural dimensions that they analysed. Mischel and Shoda 
(1995) take this to show that behavioural variation across situations is not due to 
random fluctuations or “due to situation rather than the person” but in fact the product 
of a stable personality system (p. 257). They note that it is common in psychology to 
average behavioural indices of traits across different situations and stress that this is 
highly problematic because “it actually removes data that may alert us to the person’s 
most distinctive qualities and to his or her unique intraindividual patterning of social 
behaviour” (p. 251). 
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According to Mischel and Shoda, the personality system, which gives rise to the 
above mentioned situation-behaviour profiles, is characterised by the cognitive and 
affective mental states that are available to the subject, the distinct set-up of 
interrelations between these cognitions and affects, and the relation of these cognitions 
and affects to aspects of situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995: 254). They refer to these 
cognitions and affects as “cognitive-affective units” and posit that these include 
encodings (i.e., categories), beliefs (e.g., about the social world), affects (e.g., feelings 
and emotions), goals, and behavioural scripts. Aspects of situations activate and 
deactivate subsets of these cognitive-affective units. The activated units in turn activate 
or deactivate those units to which they are connected and so forth, ultimately producing 
a specific behavioural output. Mischel and Shoda call such a sequence of activation 
and deactivation of cognitive-affective units “processing dynamics” (p. 257) and 
emphasise that these dynamics may “operate at many levels of awareness, 
automaticity, and control” (p. 259). As different situational features activate different 
cognitive-affective units and thus trigger different processing dynamics, people behave 
differently in different situations. However, as the personality system is relatively stable, 
people exhibit stable situation-behaviour profiles across time. Moreover, as people 
differ in cognitive-affective units available to them and in how these cognitive-affective 
units are related to each other and to situational features (i.e., the processing 
structure), different people exhibit different situation-behaviour profiles.  
Yet, it is possible to identify personality types or personality traits that are shared 
by different individuals according to Mischel and Shoda (1995: 257-258). As the 
structure of the personality system is reflected in situation-behaviour profiles, 
commonalities in people’s situation-behaviour profiles can be taken as evidence for 
commonalities in people’s personalities (i.e., for commonalities in the organisation of 
cognitions and affects that constitute the personality system). A personality trait that 
can be identified by analysing situation-behaviour profiles is for example rejection 
sensitivity (Mischel & Shoda, 1995: 258; Ayduk & Gyurak, 2008). We can identify 
rejection sensitivity by closely observing a person’s behaviour towards his romantic 
partner (or another loved person) in various situations. If a person tends to behave in 
exceedingly kind and tender ways towards his partner across a range of situations in 
which the partner’s attention is on him but tends to show aggressive or abusive 
behaviours in situations in which his partner’s attention is on other people or behaves 
in a way that may be interpreted as uncaring, we may infer that the person is rejection 
sensitive. Rejection sensitive people share certain processing dynamics (Ayduk & 
Gyurak, 2008). They characteristically exhibit anxious expectations of rejections, which 
leads them on the one hand to behave in exceptionally kind ways towards their 
partners to prevent rejection. Yet, their anxious expectations of rejection make them on 
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the other hand more likely to perceive and interpret their partner’s behaviour as 
reflective of rejection. Such perceptions in turn lead to feelings and thoughts of hostility 
towards their partner that can result in aggressive behaviour. Thus, although the 
person’s behaviours may seem inconsistent (tender and aggressive behaviours 
towards a loved one), these behaviours are actually expressions of the same 
personality trait (i.e., rejection sensitivity), which can be analysed as a characteristic 
profile of situation-specific response dispositions towards a loved one. 
 
4.7.2  Attitudes on the profile view  
 
Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) CAPS model provides us with a useful framework for 
conceptualising attitudes in a way that neutralises the situationist challenge presented 
in section 4.5 without obscuring the evaluative complexities of attitudes that have been 
mentioned in section 4.6. Just as we can conceptualise traits such as rejection 
sensitivity as a profile of situation-specific response dispositions, I propose that we can 
conceptualise attitudes as profiles of situation-specific response dispositions. On this 
view, people can possess robust attitudes, conceptualised as traits, despite the 
pervasive influence of situational factors on evaluative responses. In order to contrast 
the proposed view to Machery’s (2016) trait view of attitudes, I will call this the profile 
view of attitudes. This should not be taken as indication that attitudes are not traits. 
They are traits, but traits of a different sort than proposed by Machery as I will outline in 
what follows.  
In section 4.6, I argued that evaluative complexities, such as when people harbour 
at the same time hostile and benevolent sexist dispositions towards women, should be 
accounted for by our model of attitudes. On the profile view, such an attitude towards 
women (i.e., an ambivalent sexist attitude) can be understood as the profile to be 
disposed to respond in a benevolent manner towards women in same-status or 
subordinate roles and to be disposed to respond in a hostile manner towards women in 
superior roles. To use an expression by Mischel and Shoda (1995), the ambivalent 
sexist, say Jack from my example in section 4.6, exhibits a “stable if...then... profile[] of 
behavior variability across situations” (p. 252).135 If confronted with a woman in an 
equal-status or a subordinate role, he shows benevolent behaviour (as well as 
                                            
135
 One may object (as already hinted at in section 4.5.2) that this attitude is not a profile of 
situation-specific response dispositions but a profile of person-specific or role-specific response 
dispositions. I grant that these would be valid ways to describe the attitude. Yet, it must be 
stressed that a broad characterisation of a social situation encompasses characteristics of the 
person that one is confronted with. I prefer to characterise attitudes as profiles of situation-
specific response dispositions because this is general enough to qualify as a characterisation of 
various different attitudes, including the aversive racist attitude as described below. As I will 
argue in the next section, we may want to individuate situations (and thus attitudes) in different 
ways dependent on our interests and purposes. 
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benevolent affective and cognitive responses) and if confronted with a woman in a 
superior role, he shows hostile behaviour (as well as hostile affective and cognitive 
responses). This stable profile, or we can say this trait, is Jack’s attitude towards 
women. It is thus wrong to assume, as situationists do, that the fact that people show 
different evaluative responses towards members of a social group in different situations 
speaks against the existence of attitudes understood as traits (see section 4.5.2). Quite 
to the contrary, it is a crucial feature of attitudes on the profile view that they 
incorporate response dispositions that are tied to particular situations.  
Recall that on Machery’s (2016) trait view, a person who exhibits hostile and 
benevolent evaluative responses towards women in equal measure would be said to 
lack an attitude towards women. After all, the person’s response dispositions are 
neutral on balance. This is a problematic characterisation because the ambivalent 
sexist clearly differs from a person whose entire responses towards women are neutral 
in valence (and who could indeed be said to lack an attitude towards women). If we 
adopted Machery’s trait view of attitudes, we would not be able to use the attitude 
notion to convey information about what responses the ambivalent sexist is likely to 
show towards different kinds of women or about the ambivalent sexist’s moral 
character (see functions F1 and F2 of the attitude notion mentioned in the introduction 
to this thesis). The profile view, by contrast, highlights the complexity of the ambivalent 
sexist’s attitude towards women and thus facilitates predictions about the agent’s likely 
responses towards women and an assessment of the agent’s moral character.  
Note also that the profile view is well suited to account for the complexity of 
Sarah’s aversive racist attitude. Sarah’s attitude can broadly be analysed as the profile 
to show favourable responses concerning black people in situations in which she has 
sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed 
egalitarian commitments and to show negative responses with respect to black people 
in situations in which she does not have sufficient time (e.g., when she has to judge 
quickly whether she is in danger) or cognitive resources (e.g., when she is occupied 
with the detection of potential threats or when she is deeply engaged in a conversation 
with her patients) to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. 
Knowing that Sarah has an aversive racist attitude helps us to predict whether she will 
respond in a favourable or negative way towards a given black person, dependent on 
the situation that Sarah is in. If Sarah is under time pressure or engaged in an 
attention-demanding task, she is likely to exhibit negative responses towards the 
person, but if she has time and the appropriate cognitive resources to reflect on her 
responses, she is likely to exhibit a favourable response towards the person. Note also 
that we may predict Sarah’s results on indirect and direct measures of attitudes based 
on the fact that she exhibits the profile of an aversive racist (see section 1.3 in chapter 
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1 for an elaboration on these measures). On an IAT, for example, Sarah is required to 
respond as fast as possible in a categorisation task that requires her full attention. We 
should thus expect that her responses will not be guided by her anti-racist 
commitments (e.g., she may respond quicker when black people and negative words 
are paired than when white people and negative words are paired). Direct measures, 
by contrast, allow Sarah to deliberate on her responses. Accordingly, we would expect 
that her responses on these measures fall in line with her egalitarian commitments 
(e.g., she may attribute as many positive and negative traits to black people as to white 
people).  
So far I have presented the profile view of attitudes by reference to the examples 
of ambivalent sexist and aversive racist attitudes. However, I would like to stress that 
attitudes can take a variety of forms on the profile view. Empirical research may reveal 
what profile attitudes are prevalent in a given population of people. Recall that Shoda 
and colleagues (1994) identified different profiles of verbal aggressiveness in children 
by observing their behaviour in different situations. I propose that we can identify 
attitudes in a similar manner by observing people’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
responses towards members of the target group in different situations.136 This research 
will likely reveal that there are many details in which the attitudes of different people 
differ. Yet, it should be possible to identify relevant similarities among these profiles 
and to group them in terms of certain attitude types. For example, relevant types of 
attitudes towards women may include the following: 
 
- Ambivalent sexist attitude: benevolent responses towards women in same status 
or subordinate roles; hostile responses towards women in superior roles. 
- Aversive sexist attitude: favourable responses towards women in situations in 
which the agent has sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be 
guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments; negative responses towards 
women in situations in which the agent does not have sufficient time or cognitive 
resources to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. 
                                            
136
 As mentioned earlier, attitudes are not only constituted by behavioural dispositions but also 
include cognitive and affective dispositions. Note that a person whose thoughts and emotions in 
regard to women in superior roles reflect hostility and whose thoughts and emotions in regard to 
women in subordinate roles are benevolent may still be said to have an ambivalent sexist 
attitude, even if this attitude is not (or only rarely) translated into overt behaviour. This implies 
that when determining the types of profile attitudes that people harbour, we should not restrict 
our investigation to the observation of overt behavioural responses (although these are of 
course as well important indicators of cognitive and affective responses). We can also use 
physiological measures to determine the affective responses that people exhibit in different 
situations or use questionnaires to determine situation-specific judgment dispositions. In short, 
to cover the whole range of attitude-relevant responses, our examination should take into 
account an array of cognitive, affective, and behavioural measures. 
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- Moralising sexist attitude: favourable responses towards women whom the agent 
perceives to be chaste or demure; hostile responses towards women whom the 
agent perceives to be unchaste or indecent. 
- Attractiveness-dependent sexist attitude: friendly responses towards women whom 
the agent perceives to be attractive; unfriendly responses towards women whom 
the agent perceives to be unattractive. 
- Firm sexist attitude: hostile responses towards women in all situations. 
- Firm egalitarian attitude: neutral or favourable responses towards women in all 
situations. 
 
This typology of attitudes towards women is not meant to be exhaustive. Nor do I claim 
that the way in which I flesh out the content of the individual profile attitudes is the only 
appropriate one (see section 4.7.3 below on attitude individuation). The above list is 
merely meant to give a first impression of the diversity of attitudes that different people 
may possibly exhibit in regard to a single social group. Note that if we would 
characterise attitudes in aggregationist terms, as Machery (2016) does, we would run 
the risk of missing this diversity. Following Machery, we would have to say that the 
ambivalent sexist, the aversive sexist, the moralising sexist, and the attraction-
dependent sexist all lack an attitude towards women if their respective positive and 
negative response dispositions in regard to women balance each other. This 
problematically obscures the differences between the evaluative stances of these 
persons towards women. Moreover, it deprives us of the ability to use the attitude 
notion to convey information about the persons’ likely responses towards women in 
different kinds of situations (or towards different kinds of women) and about their moral 
character (see functions F1 and F2 of the attitude notion).  
Yet, although I have developed the profile view of attitudes to account for 
evaluative complexities of attitudes, the profile view does not exclude the possibility of 
what we may call “uncomplex” attitudes, such as the firm sexist and firm egalitarian 
attitudes in the above typology of attitudes towards women. Some people may exhibit 
hostile (or favourable) responses towards women in all or the vast majority of situations 
in which they encounter women. In this case it may seem tempting to follow Machery 
(2016) to say that these people have a negative (or positive) attitude towards women, 
understood as a general tendency to show negative (or positive) responses towards 
women across a wide range of situations. Yet, I would like to stress that cases like this 
are the exception rather than the rule. More often than not, people exhibit a range of 
differently valenced evaluative responses towards members of a particular social group 
in different situations, and this should be reflected in our model of attitudes rather than 
be obscured. An “uncomplex” attitude can be described on the profile view as an 
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extreme case in which a person’s profile of situation-specific response dispositions is 
unusually invariant. Moreover, I suspect that attitudes are more likely to appear 
“uncomplex” when we analyse them at what I describe below as low levels of situation-
specificity and response-specificity (see section 4.7.3.2). 
 
4.7.3  Interest-dependence of attitude individuation 
 
On my view, there are often various legitimate ways to individuate a person’s 
attitude(s) towards a social group if that person’s evaluative responses vary across 
different situations. Of course, attitude ascriptions should track actual dispositions of 
the agent to be appropriate. However, these dispositions may often be so numerous 
and diverse that attitude ascribers (including psychologists, philosophers, and ordinary 
people) need to pick out especially salient or relevant patterns of evaluative responding 
to give an intelligible account of a person’s attitude(s). As I will show in what follows, 
this process of highlighting particular profiles of situation-specific response dispositions 
is influenced by our interests and purposes as attitude ascribers. In section 4.7.3.1, I 
will show that dependent on what situations and responses we take to be relevant, we 
may end up with different descriptions of a person’s attitude(s). In section 4.7.3.2, I will 
build on this and point out that we may vary how finely we differentiate between 
different situations and different responses dependent on our purposes as attitude 
ascribers. In section 4.7.3.3, I will then also stress that dependent on our purposes, we 
can ascribe relatively global (e.g., attitudes towards women) or relatively local attitudes 
(e.g., attitudes towards women in superior positions).   
 
4.7.3.1  Picking out relevant situations and responses 
 
Above I have mentioned that it is unlikely that a person’s evaluative responses towards 
members of a social group will be totally invariant across different situations. This 
becomes evident when we consider the sheer amount of different situations in which 
we may encounter members of a target group. Jack, for example, may encounter 
women in countless different contexts (at his workplace, at the supermarket, at a sports 
club, at a parent’s evening at school, etc.), and he may encounter women with 
innumerable different traits (different age, different looks, different professions, different 
status, etc.). It is extremely unlikely that Jack’s evaluative responses towards women 
will be the same under all these circumstances. Rather we would expect that he 
exhibits an immensely complex mesh of situation-specific response dispositions that 
we cannot even comprehend in its entirety, let alone convey to others in conversation. 
To give an intelligible account of his attitude(s) towards women, we need to extract 
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especially salient and noteworthy patterns of evaluative responses (i.e., profiles of 
situation-specific response dispositions) from the more complex mesh of response 
dispositions that Jack exhibits. 
Crucially, what appears salient or noteworthy to us depends on our interests and 
purposes, and these may vary. We may be interested in how Jack responds to women 
in different roles (e.g., superior, same-status, subordinate roles), which may lead us to 
realise that Jack exhibits the profile of an ambivalent sexist as described above (see 
section 4.7.2). Yet, if we are interested in how Jack responds towards women whom he 
perceives to be attractive versus women whom he perceives to be unattractive, we 
may (or may not) find that he exhibits an attractiveness-dependent sexist attitude as 
described above. Note that Jack’s responses towards women may possibly be 
influenced by both of these factors (perceived attractiveness and role), yet, dependent 
on our explanatory or predictive purposes, we may decide to emphasise only one of 
these. Consider that we notice that Jack is very friendly to some of his female co-
workers but very rude to others, although all of them occupy roughly the same level in 
the company’s hierarchy as Jack. Although Jack may harbour an ambivalent sexist 
attitude, referring to this fact does nothing to explain/predict his differential responses 
towards his equal-status female co-workers. Yet, Jack’s responses may possibly be 
explained by reference to the fact that he has an attractiveness-dependent sexist 
attitude that leads him to respond in a friendly manner towards female co-workers 
whom he perceives to be attractive and in an unfriendly manner towards female co-
workers whom he perceives to be unattractive. Thus, when asked for an explanation 
for Jack’s unequal treatment of his female co-workers, we provide valuable information 
when we hypothesise that he may have an attractiveness-dependent sexist attitude. 
Recall that I have characterised attitudes as profiles of situation-specific evaluative 
response dispositions. The foregoing shows that how we characterise a person’s 
attitude(s) depends strongly on what situational contrasts we take to be noteworthy 
(e.g., situations in which the agent is confronted with women of different perceived 
attractiveness or situations in which the agent is confronted with women of different 
status).  
At the same time, attitude individuation is partly a function of what we (as 
philosophers, academic psychologists, or folk psychologists) take to be the relevant 
kinds of responses. Note, for example, that instead of characterising Jack’s responses 
towards women of varying perceived attractiveness in terms of friendliness or 
unfriendliness, we could as well describe his responses in terms of the interest or 
disinterest/disregard that he exhibits in regard to women of varying perceived 
attractiveness. Crucially, these dimensions may be independent. Someone who 
responds in an unfriendly manner towards another person is not necessarily 
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disinterested in that person and someone who responds in a friendly manner towards 
another person is not necessarily particularly interested in that person. As a 
consequence, Jack may possess an attractiveness-dependent attitude towards women 
characterised on the friendliness/unfriendliness dimension, while lacking an 
attractiveness-dependent attitude characterised on the interest/disinterest dimension 
(and vice versa). There is no fact of the matter as to which dimension is more 
adequate. They are both legitimate, and it depends on our interests as attitude ascribes 
which one we prefer (or whether we want to take both into account).  
The fact that we can highlight those evaluative response dimensions that are of 
interest to us when ascribing attitudes allows us to mark differences in affective 
responses that would go unnoticed on Machery’s (2016) account. In section 4.6, I have 
argued that attitudes are not only a matter of generic positive or negative valence, as 
Machery’s (2016) describes them, but also of specific emotions. The profile view can 
account for this. We can, for example, characterise a person’s attitude towards 
homosexuals in terms of the degree of disgust that the person exhibits in regard to 
homosexual persons in different contexts. Moreover, for different groups different 
emotions may be of central interest (Dasgupta et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2012). When it 
comes to people’s attitudes towards Arabs, for example, we may want to characterise 
the attitude in terms of the degree of anger that people are experiencing rather than 
focussing on disgust. 
 
4.7.3.2  Situation-specificity and response-specificity 
 
Above, I showed that dependent on what we (as philosophers, academic 
psychologists, or folk psychologists) take to be the relevant kinds of situations and 
responses, our characterisations of people’s attitudes will differ. Another point that I 
want to stress is that we may also vary how finely we differentiate between different 
situations and different responses that we take to be relevant. In the above typology of 
attitudes towards women (see section 4.7.2), attitudes are characterised rather 
coarsely in terms of two (or three in the case of the ambivalent sexist) contrasting types 
of situations. For example, the attractiveness-dependent attitude is characterised in 
terms of situations in which the agent is confronted with a woman whom he perceives 
to be attractive and situations in which the agent is confronted with a woman whom he 
perceives to be unattractive. Note that we may want to make finer distinctions between 
situations to characterise the attitude in more detail. That is, we may want to describe 
the attitude on what I call “a higher level of situation-specificity”. For example, we could 
divide the space of possible situations into five classes: situations in which the agent is 
confronted with a woman whom he perceives to be (1) extremely attractive, (2) 
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somewhat attractive, (3) neither attractive nor unattractive, (4) somewhat unattractive, 
(5) extremely unattractive. In principle, we could even assume an infinite number of 
situations differing in the perceived attractiveness of the target person. This would be 
the highest possible level of situation-specificity.137 In the above typology of attitudes, 
responses, too, are characterised rather broadly (e.g., favourable vs. hostile 
responses). Again, we may choose to make finer-grained distinctions (i.e., apply a 
higher level of response-specificity) to characterise attitudes in more detail. We may for 
example divide responses into five different classes: extremely favourable responses, 
somewhat favourable responses, neutral responses, somewhat hostile responses, and 
extremely hostile responses. Alternatively, we could imagine an infinite number of 
possible responses along the favourable-hostile continuum, which would amount to the 
highest possible level of response-specificity.138  
The two dimensions that I have mentioned here, level of situation-specificity and 
level of response-specificity, are independent in the sense that we can vary the level of 
response-specificity of our attitude characterisation without varying the level of 
situation-specificity of our attitude characterisation, and vice versa. Normally, however, 
we would choose comparable levels of situation-specificity and response-specificity 
when describing profile attitudes because the reasons that speak for choosing a 
particular level of situation-specificity equally apply to the choice of a level of response-
specificity, and vice versa. Sometimes one may want to identify broad types of attitudes 
that are prevalent in a given society to get an overview of common evaluative response 
patterns towards a given social group (as in the typology of attitudes towards women in 
section 4.7.2). These broad types of attitudes that are shared among a large number of 
people (e.g., the aversive sexist attitude and the ambivalent sexist attitude) are more 
likely to be found when one chooses relatively low levels of situation-specificity and 
response-specificity. Naturally, the more we dissect different types of situations and 
different types of responses, the more differences we will find in people’s profiles of 
situation-specific response dispositions. When we want to convey information about a 
person’s attitude to others, it is convenient to draw on attitudes at low levels of 
situation-specificity and response-specificity. These attitudes can be conveyed by using 
succinct labels such as “aversive sexist” or “ambivalent sexist”, which simplifies 
communication. Yet, descriptions of attitudes on higher levels of situation-specificity 
and response-specificity also bring a clear advantage with them: they allow for better 
predictions of people’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses towards social 
                                            
137
 To put it in psychometric terms, one could model attractiveness as a continuous variable. 
138
 Note that I have tacitly chosen a high level of response-specificity when I suggested above 
that one may describe a person’s attitude towards homosexuals or Arabs amongst others in 
terms of the degree of disgust or anger that the person exhibits in response to homosexual or 
Arabian persons in different contexts. 
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groups. Obviously, the more detailed our descriptions of profile attitudes are in terms of 
responses and situations, the more precise can the predictions of future responses be. 
For example, knowing that Jack tends to respond with extreme unfriendliness to 
women whom he perceives to be very unattractive and with milder unfriendliness to 
women whom he perceives to be somewhat unattractive may help us to make more 
nuanced predictions than just knowing that Jack tends to respond with unfriendliness 
towards women whom he perceives to be unattractive. 
In short, dependent on our purposes, we may choose to describe profile attitudes 
at different levels of situation-specificity and response-specificity. If we are interested in 
making accurate predictions about a person’s likely responses towards members of a 
particular social group, we do better to describe the profile attitude at higher rather than 
lower levels of response-specificity and situation-specificity. To speak figuratively, we 
need to zoom in on the attitude. If we are, however, more interested in identifying 
common patterns of evaluative responding that are also easily conveyable to others, 
we do well to describe profile attitudes at relatively low levels of response-specificity 
and situation-specificity. In short, we need to zoom out on the attitude. Yet, we can also 
zoom out to much. This is the case with Machery’s (2016) description of attitudes. By 
aggregating across all situations in which the agent may encounter a member of the 
target group, Machery cancels out any situation-specific evaluative response tendency 
in his characterisation of attitudes. This leaves us with a characterisation that is blind to 
any of the evaluative complexities that are characteristic of attitudes (see section 4.6).  
 
4.7.3.3  Local and global attitudes 
 
Another way in which attitude individuation is interest-sensitive is marked by the 
contrast between global and local attitudes. One may wonder why we should say that a 
person, say Jack, has an ambivalent sexist attitude towards women rather than saying 
that Jack has both a hostile sexist attitude towards women in superior roles relative to 
him and a benevolent sexist attitude towards women in equal-status or subordinate 
roles. Note that this latter way of speaking about Jack’s attitude(s) is reminiscent of the 
“local attitude view” as it has been presented in section 4.5.2. I grant that these ways of 
speaking about Jack’s attitude(s) are complementary. If someone asks us about Jack’s 
general attitude towards women it is appropriate to say that he has an ambivalent 
sexist attitude (i.e., it is appropriate to refer to the “global” attitude).139 Yet, if someone 
                                            
139
 However, it would be misleading to respond to this question that Jack harbours two 
conflicting attitudes towards women. This is because hostile and benevolent sexism are 
mutually supportive rather than opposing each other. As already mentioned in section 4.6, 
benevolent sexist stereotypes can be used to legitimate hostile sexist stereotypes, and both 
forms of sexism justify and support existing social power relations.  
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asks us more specifically about Jack’s attitude towards females in superior roles and 
females in subordinate roles it is appropriate to say that he has a hostile attitude 
towards the former and a benevolent attitude towards the latter (i.e., it is appropriate to 
refer to the “local” attitudes). It must be stressed, however, that these “local” attitudes, 
too, can be analysed as profiles of situation-specific response dispositions. For 
example, Jack is likely to respond in slightly different ways to females in different roles 
superior to him, such as female police officers, female professors, female judges, and 
so on. That is, Jack shows a distinctive profile of situation-specific response 
dispositions towards women in higher ranking positions. Again, instead of saying that 
Jack has a complex attitude towards women in superior roles that is composed of his 
response tendencies towards females in different superior positions, we may equally 
well say that Jack harbours different attitudes towards female police officers, female 
professors, female judges, and so on. And again, these attitudes can themselves be 
analysed as profiles of situation-specific response dispositions. Jack may for example 
show slightly different responses towards female professors depending on their 
specialisation (e.g., female professors in the sciences vs. female professors in the 
humanities). Accordingly, his attitude towards female professors can be described as a 
profile of situation-specific response dispositions. As should be clear by now, the 
predicate “local” as used in “local attitude” is relative (and so is the predicate “global”). 
Jack’s attitude towards female professors is local in relation to his attitude towards 
females in superior roles and his attitude towards females in superior roles is local in 
relation to his attitude towards women. Dependent on our interests and communicative 
purposes, we can ascribe attitudes that are relatively local (e.g., attitudes towards 
female police officers) or relatively global (e.g., attitudes towards women).140   
 
4.7.4  The psychological basis of attitudes  
 
Recall that according to Mischel and Shoda (1995) the personality system is 
characterised by a distinctive organisation of relationships between cognitive-affective 
units. Individual traits are based on subsets of these cognitive-affective units. Rejection 
sensitivity, for example, may be based on a desire not to be rejected, anxious 
expectations of rejection, the disposition to feel anger in response to rejection, and so 
                                            
140
 It is important to note that the global-local dimension is independent of the situation-
specificity and response-specificity dimensions mentioned in the last section. Note for example 
that one can describe a global attitude (a person’s attitude towards women) at different levels of 
situation-specificity and response-specificity. Similarly, one can hold the level of situation-
specificity and response-specificity fixed while varying the attitude description along the global-
local dimension. For example, one can describe two different response dispositions that are tied 
to two different situations (a relatively low level of situation- and response-specificity) as two 
distinct attitudes of the person (local attitudes) or as two components of one attitude (global 
attitude). See the example of the ambivalent sexist in the main text. 
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forth (Ayduk & Gyurak, 2008). By attributing the trait of rejection sensitivity to a person, 
we essentially pick out these cognitive-affective units. Similarly, by attributing to a 
person an attitude towards a group X, we pick out certain cognitive-affective units in 
that person’s personality system (and the links between these) that are involved in 
evaluative responses towards members of group X. To borrow a term from Machery 
(2016), we can say that these units constitute an attitude’s “psychological basis”. In 
different situations that involve members of group X, different units that form the 
psychological basis of the attitude become activated. These units may include, 
amongst others, evaluative stereotypes as characterised in the last chapter (including 
conceptual and affective mental states), moral beliefs, desires, and behavioural scripts. 
For example, an ambivalent sexist attitude may be based on conceptual associations 
that link women to features such as incompetence, kindness, and sociability, various 
affective dispositions that are linked to these stereotypes, the belief that women are not 
apt for leadership roles, the belief that women are good carers, the desire to dominate 
women, and so forth. These various mental states may dispose the ambivalent sexist 
person to show benevolent cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses towards 
women in subordinate positions and to show hostile cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural responses towards women in superior positions.  
Recall also that according to Mischel and Shoda (1995), the personality system 
operates “at many levels of awareness, automaticity, and control” (p. 259). This is 
arguably also true for those cognitive-affective units that form the psychological basis 
of profile attitudes: some of them may be easier to introspect than others (see section 
1.2.5 in chapter 1); some of them may only be subject to indirect rational control, while 
others are subject to direct rational control (see section 2.3.1 in chapter 2); and some 
of them may only be subject to indirect intentional control, while others are subject to 
direct intentional control (see section 2.3.2 in chapter 2). That is, the psychological 
basis of profile attitudes may include both mental states that would commonly be 
described as implicit and mental states that would commonly be described as explicit 
(and possibly mental states that lie somewhere in-between).  
 
4.7.5  Attitude measurement 
 
In section 4.3, I presented Machery’s (2016) argument to the best explanation. 
According to him, his trait view of attitudes provides the best explanation for various 
findings from the attitude measurement literature, which include (1) the finding that 
scores on different indirect measures often do not correlate well with each other, (2) the 
finding that scores on indirect measures are susceptible to various context effects, and 
(3) the finding that scores on indirect measures are poor predictors of behaviour. I 
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argued that all we need to explain these findings is the assumption that different 
indirect measures often tap into different mental states that determine evaluative 
responses. Machery’s trait view is compatible with this assumption but so is my profile 
view. This is because both models assume that attitudes have a psychological basis 
which is composed of a variety of mental states. Different attitude measures may tap 
into different subsets of these mental states. Accordingly, people’s results on these 
measures will often only be weakly correlated, be influenced by different kinds of 
contextual factors, and only be predictive of a narrow range of responses (see section 
4.3). For instance, the performance of an ambivalent sexist person on an IAT may 
primarily be influenced by benevolent stereotypes that the person harbours in regard to 
women, such as associations between women and kindness or sociability. At the same 
time, the person’s performance on an affective priming task may primarily be 
influenced by stereotypes about women with negative affective implications (e.g., the 
stereotype that women are incompetent). Recall that Machery’s (2016) denies the 
existence of ambivalent attitudes. Yet, his model allows for weak attitudes that are 
based on mental states and processes with somewhat heterogeneous evaluative 
implications (see section 4.5.3). However, to reiterate, characterising attitudes in terms 
of an aggregated strength and valence is problematic because it does not do justice to 
the complexities of people’s evaluative stances towards social groups (see section 
4.6). Whereas Machery’s characterisation of attitudes obscures the fact that people 
often harbour competing evaluative dispositions in regard to a single social group (that 
are tied to particular situations), these complexities are a crucial feature of attitudes on 
my profile view.  
 
4.7.6  Relation to Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of attitudes  
 
My account of attitudes bears resemblance to Schwitzgebel’s (2013) dispositional 
account of attitudes, so it is worth pointing out where I agree and disagree with his 
characterisation. Schwitzgebel initially proposed a dispositional account of believing 
(Schwitzgebel, 2001, 2002, 2010) but has more recently extended his dispositional 
account to attitudes of different kinds, including attitudes towards groups of people 
(Schwitzgebel, 2013). This is how he characterises having an attitude, including 
propositional attitudes, reactive attitudes, but also attitudes towards groups of people: 
 
To have an attitude is, primarily, to have a dispositional profile that matches, to an 
appropriate degree and in appropriate respects, a stereotype for that attitude, typically 
grounded in folk psychology. (Schwitzgebel, 2013: 78) 
 
I agree with Schwitzgebel insofar as I also view attitudes (whereby I refer only to 
attitudes towards people qua members of social groups) as dispositional profiles. 
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Schwitzgebel (2013) characterises a dispositional profile as “a suite of dispositional 
properties, or more briefly dispositions” (p. 78). He acknowledges that the dispositions 
that form part of the dispositional profiles may include amongst others cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural dispositions (pp. 87-88), and that these dispositions are very 
often tied to particular situations (e.g., pp. 85-87). All this is in line with my description 
of attitudes as profiles of situation-specific response dispositions (although I put greater 
emphasis on the situation-specific character of these dispositions than Schwitzgebel 
does).141  
Yet, I disagree with Schwitzgebel’s suggestion that we can only say that someone 
possesses an attitude if she possesses a dispositional profile that matches a (folk 
psychological) stereotype for that attitude. Consider again the case of the aversive 
racist (referred to as the “implicit racist” by Schwitzgebel). Schwitzgebel (2013) comes 
to the conclusion that this is a case of in-between attitude possession (pp. 85-87; see 
also Schwitzgebel, 2010). According to him, the aversive racist only partly exhibits the 
dispositional profile that ordinary people would commonly regard as characteristic of an 
egalitarian attitude and only partly the dispositional profile that is commonly regarded 
as stereotypic of a racist attitude. In short, the aversive racist neither fully possesses a 
racist attitude, nor does she fully possess an egalitarian attitude. What Schwitzgebel 
apparently does not want to say is that the person in question has an aversive racist 
attitude. That is, he does not want to say that the person shows the dispositional profile 
that is commonly regarded as characteristic of an aversive racist attitude. This is 
because there is presumably no folk psychological stereotype of an aversive racist 
attitude. Note that for him “[to] have an attitude […] is mainly a matter of being apt to 
interact with the world in patterns that ordinary people would regard as characteristic of 
having that attitude” (p. 75). Ordinary people have a conception of what it is to be a 
racist or to be an egalitarian but possibly not of what it is to be an aversive racist.  
I find it problematic to tie the possession of an attitude to stereotypes for that 
attitude that are grounded in folk psychology. This may seem surprising because I 
argued previously that it is an advantage of a trait view of attitudes that it corresponds 
well with the folk psychological conception of attitudes (see section 4.4). However, it is 
important to note that saying that it is beneficial to adopt a view of the ontology of 
attitudes that corresponds to the folk conception of attitudes is not to say that the 
content of these attitudes must be restricted by folk psychology. A model of attitudes 
that psychologists, philosophers, and ordinary people can agree on (see desideratum 
D3 of a model of attitudes in the introduction to this thesis) is not necessarily a model 
                                            
141
 Schwitzgebel (2013) also emphasises the structural similarities between traits and attitudes 
(pp. 81-82). Yet, he stops short of saying that attitudes are traits. This does not necessarily 
contradict my claim that attitudes are traits because I have a narrower notion of attitudes in 
mind (i.e., attitudes towards people qua members of social groups) than Schwitzgebel. 
 150 
 
that only acknowledges the existence of attitudes for which there are already folk 
psychological stereotypes. Note that even if there is no (folk psychological) stereotype 
of an aversive racist attitude, someone may notice that Sarah tends to show favourable 
responses towards black people in situations in which she has sufficient time and 
cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian 
commitments and negative responses towards black people in all other situations. 
Irrespective of whether we have a label such as “aversive racism” for this profile that 
Sarah exhibits, it is a fact that Sarah exhibits this profile. It seems natural to me that 
someone who discovers this pattern in Sarah’s responses towards black people has in 
fact discovered an attitude of her even if there is (yet) no stereotype for such an 
attitude in the community of folk psychologists (or in a more narrowly specified 
community). 
It must be emphasised that the notion of an attitude is at least as much a scientific 
notion as it is a folk psychological one and that science can inform folk psychology. 
Even if folk psychologists are not (yet) familiar with the notion of an aversive racist 
attitude, it makes sense for psychologists (and philosophers) to ascribe this and other 
profile attitudes to people. As mentioned earlier, describing people in terms of profile 
attitudes can help to identify common patterns of evaluative responding and help 
making predictions about likely responses of an agent. Notions that scientists use may 
in turn be taken up in ordinary parlance. Schwitzgebel (2013) himself notes this in 
passing:  
 
[S]cience can legitimately lead us to adjust our superficial stereotypes, either by producing 
entirely new stereotypes or by modifying existing stereotypical structures to incorporate 
rising knowledge. Psychological research on sexism, for example, can coin a new type – 
“the implicit sexist” – and also modify our existing stereotypes of sexism and egalitarianism 
simpliciter. Folk psychological stereotypes won’t sit still, anyway, and are always to some 
extent influenced by scholarship and science, hence “phlegmatic”, “extravert”, “agnostic”, 
and our post-Freudian sense of how desires might manifest. (pp. 94-95) 
 
While Schwitzgebel’s point is a descriptive one (science may eventually change our 
folk psychological stereotypes about attitudes), my stance is a more decisively 
normative, or one could say ameliorative, one.142 Scholarship of the type that I am 
pursuing in this thesis can tell us how folk psychological stereotypes about attitudes 
should be changed given that attitude ascriptions are linked to certain functions such 
as response prediction and character assessment. In other words, science and 
scholarship can inform us how we should speak about attitudes in order for attitude 
ascriptions to optimally fulfil these purposes. It may well be that our current folk 
                                            
142
 Talking about social kind concepts Haslanger (2005) explains that “[a]meliorative analyses 
elucidate ‘our’ legitimate purposes and what concept of F-ness (if any) would serve them best 
(the target concept)” (p. 20). See also Haslanger (2000) on what she there calls the “analytical 
approach” (p. 33). 
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psychology only contains stereotypes of generic positive or negative attitudes but not 
stereotypes of more complex attitudes, such as aversive racist or ambivalent sexist 
attitudes. Yet, my claim is that we should integrate complex attitudes, such as aversive 
racist or ambivalent sexist attitudes, into our folk psychological attribution repertoire if 
science shows that these are prevalent profiles that people exhibit and if ascribing 
these profiles serves our purposes well. In particular, including more complex attitudes 
in our folk psychological attribution repertoire will help us to convey more accurate 
information about people’s evaluative stances towards other people, to make better 
predictions of people’s responses towards other people, and to reach more appropriate 
conclusions about the attitude holder’s moral character. As a consequence, the model 
of attitudes that I have proposed in this chapter is a model that ordinary people may 
find appealing, even though it allows for the existence of attitudes for which there are 
not yet folk psychological stereotypes. At the same time, it is a model that scholars in 
psychology and in philosophy may find appealing because it is a model that is not 
unduly restricted by folk psychology. In short, it is a model that psychologists, 
philosophers, and ordinary people can possibly agree on (see desideratum D3 of a 
model of attitudes).  
 
4.8  Conclusion 
 
The similarity between attitude ascriptions and trait ascriptions are undeniable. Both 
can be seen as parts of what Goldie (2004) calls “personality discourse”:  
 
Personality discourse is everywhere largely because it serves a purpose, or rather, 
because it serves several purposes. We use personality discourse to describe people, to 
judge them, to enable us to predict what they will think, feel and do, and to enable us to 
explain their thoughts, feelings and actions. (pp. 3-4) 
 
Ascribing a trait such as compassion to a person provides a description of the person 
on the basis of which we may judge the person (e.g., assessing the person’s moral 
character) and predict or explain the person’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
responses in relevant situations. We can say exactly the same about the ascription of 
an attitude to a person (see section 4.4). We describe people in terms of attitudes in 
order to predict and explain their cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses 
towards other people (see function F1 in the introduction to this thesis) and to assess 
their character (see function F2). It is evident that folk psychologists, at least, conceive 
of attitudes as traits of persons. As I showed in this chapter, there is a model of 
attitudes available that captures the notion that attitudes are traits and that may also 
appeal to scholars in psychology and philosophy (see desideratum D3 of a model of 
attitudes).  
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I started out by discussing the trait model of attitudes that has recently been 
proposed by Machery (2016). According to this model, “[attitudes] are broad-track 
dispositions to behave and cognize […] toward an object […] in a way that reflects 
some preference” (Machery, 2016: 112). These broad-track dispositions are based on 
a variety of mental states and processes, which is why Machery’s trait model can 
account for some perplexing results from the attitude literature (though it is certainly not 
the only model that can account for these findings; see section 4.3). Also, Machery can 
parry the situationist objection against the notion that attitudes are traits by 
characterising these attitudes in terms of an aggregate strength and valence (see 
section 4.5). However, this characterisation comes at a price: it obscures evaluative 
conflicts and ambivalences, and masks relevant differences in people’s affective 
responses (see section 4.6). 
I argued that these complexities are better addressed by characterising attitudes 
as profiles of situation-specific response dispositions (see section 4.7). For example, 
Sarah’s attitude towards black people can broadly be analysed as the profile to show 
favourable responses towards black people in situations in which she has sufficient 
time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian 
commitments and to show negative responses towards black people in situations in 
which she does not have sufficient time or cognitive resources to reflect on and be 
guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. It is misguided to assume, as 
situationists do, that it speaks against the existence of attitudes understood as traits if 
people exhibit different evaluative responses towards members of a particular social 
group in different situations (see section 4.5.2). Quite to the contrary, I have argued 
that it is a defining feature of attitudes that they are composed of dispositions that are 
tied to particular situations. Accordingly, the proposed profile view of attitudes both 
does justice to the evaluative complexities of attitudes and neutralises the situationist 
challenge against the notion of attitudes construed as traits. 
The assumption that attitudes are traits provides an answer to the question about 
the ontological status of attitudes (see question Q3 in the introduction to this thesis). 
These traits are based on a variety of distinct kinds of mental states, which may include 
conceptual associations, affects, beliefs, and desires. This provides an answer to the 
question about the mental states that underpin attitudes (see question Q2). Lastly, I 
have dealt with the question about attitude individuation in this chapter (see question 
Q1). In particular, I argued that we may individuate attitudes in different ways 
dependent on our interests and purposes as attitude ascribers (see section 4.7.3). 
Saying that attitude individuation is interest dependent is of course not meant to imply 
that that there are no constraints on attitude individuation. We cannot just ascribe any 
attitude to a given person. Of course, attitude ascriptions are only accurate as long as 
 153 
 
they correspond to actual dispositions of the agent. However, it is an epistemic 
requirement that we need to extract especially salient or relevant patterns of evaluative 
response dispositions if we want to give an intelligible account of people’s attitude(s). It 
is this process of highlighting relevant response patterns (i.e., highlighting profiles of 
situation-specific response dispositions) that is influenced by the attitude ascriber’s 
interests and purposes. Dependent on their interests and purposes, attitude ascribers 
may highlight different situational contrasts and different kinds of responses (section 
4.7.3.1), they may vary how finely they differentiate between different situations and 
different responses (section 4.7.3.2), and they may vary the scope of their attribution 
along the local-global dimension (section 4.7.3.3). 
Ascribing attitudes understood as profiles of situation-specific response 
dispositions to people fulfils an explanatory and predictive function (see function F1 of 
the attitude notion in the introduction to this thesis). For example, knowing that Jack 
has an ambivalent sexist attitude helps us to make specific predictions about Jack’s 
responses towards women in different roles and in different contexts (and to explain 
these responses retrospectively). If Jack is confronted with a female supervisor at 
work, we may predict that he will feel uncomfortable and will behave in a negative way 
towards her. By the same token, we can be reasonably certain that Jack will behave in 
a friendly manner towards female assistants. If we would insist, as Machery (2016) 
does, that attitudes have either a positive or a negative valence and that ambivalent 
attitudes are thus impossible (p. 124), we would not be able to use the notion of an 
attitude to make such predictions. In contrast to Machery’s model, the here proposed 
profile model of attitudes allows us to pick out exactly those features of an agent’s 
psychology that drive that person’s evaluative responses towards the target group (see 
section 4.7.4). The profile view thus fulfils desideratum D1 of a model of attitudes as it 
was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. 
I also insist that the profile notion of attitudes is well-suited to contribute to the 
moral assessment of a person’s character (see function F2 of the attitude concept). 
Note that I have described profile attitudes as being rooted in a person’s cognitive-
affective personality system. By learning, for example, about Sarah’s aversive racist 
attitude, we learn something about Sarah’s personality structure, which we can then 
consider in our moral evaluation of her. By contrast, when describing attitudes in terms 
of aggregate strength and valence, as proposed by Machery (2016), we are likely to 
miss important aspects of what would be relevant for character assessment. Following 
Machery’s model we may, for example, end up with the perplexing conclusion that 
Sarah lacks an attitude towards black people (see section 4.6).  
However, there remains one possible caveat. As I will show in the next chapter, 
one may want to argue that my model of attitudes leads to a wrong assessment of 
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Sarah’s character because it implies that Sarah’s attitude towards black people is partly 
based on those mental states that she does not identify with (e.g., her association 
between BLACK PERSON and DANGER).143 According to this objection, my model 
does not fulfil desideratum D2 of a model of attitudes: it is not appropriately sensitive to 
the difference between aspects of a person’s psychology that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of that person’s moral character and those aspects that are not part of that 
person’s moral character.  
 
 
  
                                            
143
 Note that if this argument was successful, this would be equally damaging to Machery’s 
(2016) account of attitudes as to my account because both models imply that mental states that 
a person does not identify with can form part of that person’s attitude.  
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Chapter 5: Attitudes and character evaluation 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I have presented my positive account of the nature of attitudes. 
According to this, attitudes are collections of response dispositions that form 
characteristic profiles (hence, “the profile view of attitudes”). I mentioned that an 
aversive racist attitude can be analysed as a profile that consists of broadly two 
situation-specific evaluative response dispositions: the disposition to show favourable 
responses concerning black people in situations in which the agent has sufficient time 
and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian 
commitments and the disposition to show negative responses concerning black people 
in situations in which the agent does not have sufficient time or cognitive resources to 
reflect on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. It is worth 
emphasising again that I take attitude ascriptions to fulfil a character evaluative role. 
When we learn about someone’s attitude, we learn something about that person’s 
character that we can take into account in our moral evaluation of the person (see 
function F2 of the attitude notion as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis). 
Accordingly, saying that Sarah has an aversive racist attitude suggests that we can 
evaluate her for both her positive and her negative response dispositions in regard to 
black people.  
Proponents of so-called “real self theories” (also sometimes called “deep self 
theories”) may find this implication of my account problematic (e.g., Frankfurt, 1971; 
Stump, 1988; Velleman, 1992; Watson, 1975). On these models, only those 
dispositions that the agent identifies with or that conform to the agent’s considered 
values and rational judgments constitute the persons “real self” for which she is morally 
evaluable. All other dispositions are external to what constitutes the morally evaluable 
self of the person. On the real self model, Sarah’s disposition to respond in negative 
ways towards black people (e.g., when she is under time pressure) does not count as 
part of her real self because it conflicts with her endorsed egalitarian values and 
reasoned judgments. If we would include this disposition in our moral evaluation of 
Sarah’s character, we would make a mistake according to this line of reasoning 
because this disposition is not part of what she really stands for. As attitude ascriptions 
are commonly seen as guides to character evaluation, my account of attitudes that 
describes non-endorsed dispositions as parts of attitudes would according to this 
argument invite misguided judgments about the moral characters of attitude holders. In 
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other words, my account of attitudes may fail to satisfy the second desideratum of a 
model of attitudes as it has been stated in the introduction to this thesis:  
 
(D2) To optimally fulfil its role in character assessment, our notion of a person’s 
attitude towards group X should be sensitive to any difference that there may be 
between aspects of that person’s psychology that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of that person’s moral character and those aspects that are not part 
of that person’s moral character. 
 
Note that Sarah’s disposition to show negative responses towards black people 
when she does not have sufficient time or cognitive resources to reflect on her 
endorsed egalitarian commitments is presumably (mostly) grounded in mental states 
that we would commonly regard as implicit (e.g., conceptual associations and affects 
linked to these). In chapter 2, I have already suggested that those mental states 
commonly described as implicit can be said to form part of a person’s moral character 
because they are not in fact completely outside of the agent’s control. They are subject 
to forms of ecological control (indirect rational control and indirect intentional control; 
see section 2.3). Yet still, one may object that the fact that Sarah does not identify with 
those mental states that imply a negative evaluation of black people (and thus with her 
disposition to show negative responses towards black people) suffices to establish that 
these mental states do not form part of her moral character, irrespective of whether 
Sarah could in principle take ecological control of these mental states. Accordingly, my 
account of attitudes would be at odds with desideratum D2 after all. In this chapter, I 
will refute this position and argue in support of the view that even those evaluative 
mental states (and the resulting dispositions) that an agent does not identify with can 
form part of the agent’s moral character. This supports my account of attitudes, 
according to which attitudes may be composed of both endorsed and non-endorsed 
response dispositions. I will point out that this account is not only in line with relevant 
pre-theoretical intuitions but also commendable for pragmatic reasons. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 5.2, I will present the real self view and 
elaborate on its possible implication that evaluative response dispositions that an agent 
does not identify with do not form part of that agent’s attitudes. In section 5.3, I will 
stress that if the real self perspective should be right, we need to give up on the 
common conception that attitude ascriptions can fulfil at the same time an 
explanatory/predictive and a character evaluative function. In section 5.4, I will show by 
reference to the case of Huckleberry Finn (which plays a prominent role in the 
philosophical moral psychology literature) that we routinely take non-endorsed 
response dispositions into account when evaluating other persons’ characters, which is 
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at odds with real self theory. In section 5.5, I will stress that many of us also take non-
endorsed response dispositions into account when evaluating our own character. I will 
further argue that when people judge that their problematic non-endorsed response 
dispositions are not part of their real self, this is likely the result of a self-serving bias 
rather than an honest assessment. In section 5.6, I will build on this and show that 
there is also a pragmatic reason for including non-endorsed response dispositions in 
our conception of attitudes: it nudges people to tackle their problematic biases that are 
harmful to others.  
 
5.2  Real self and attitudes 
 
Real self theories hold that there is a distinction to be made between mental states and 
processes that profoundly belong to an agent (thus constituting the “real self” of the 
agent) and those mental states and processes that, albeit operating within the agent, 
cannot be attributed to the agent.144 Many contemporary real self models are 
influenced by or take as reference point Harry Frankfurt’s (1971; 1988) model of the 
structure of volition. Frankfurt proposes a hierarchical model of volition according to 
which a person has first-order desires to perform one or another action and second-
order volitions concerning what first-order desires she wants to be effective in action.145 
He illustrates this model by reference to the example of an unwilling drug addict 
(Frankfurt, 1971: 12-13). Frankfurt describes this person as having two first-order 
desires that stand in conflict with each other: based on his substance dependence, he 
has a desire to consume the drug, but at the same time he also has a desire to refrain 
from taking the drug (a desire that may, for example, be driven by health concerns). 
The unwilling drug addict wants the latter desire to gain the upper hand over his 
behaviour. That is, he has the second-order volition that his first-order desire to refrain 
from taking the drug may become effective in action. According to Frankfurt, through 
this kind of second-order endorsement the unwilling drug addict makes the desire to 
refrain from taking the drug “more truly his own” (Frankfurt, 1971: 13). To be sure, his 
behaviour may still be driven by the first-order desire to take the drug, but as the 
person does not identify with this particular desire, it constitutes “a force other than his 
own” (Frankfurt, ibid). One can say, although these are not Frankfurt’s own words, that 
the desire to take the drug does not reflect his “real self” (Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999: 
165).  
                                            
144
 See Arpaly and Schroeder (1999), Lippert-Rasmussen (2003), or Sripada (2016) for reviews 
of real self accounts. 
145
 Frankfurt (1971) attaches a special meaning to the term “person”. According to him, an agent 
is only a person if she is capable of having second-order volitions. I will not follow this distinction 
and instead use the terms “agent” and “person” interchangeably in what follows. 
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The details of Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of volition have been subject to wide 
criticism and a range of modified and alternative models have been suggested to 
account for the assumed difference between mental states that form part of a person’s 
real self and those that are external to it.146 For example, it has been suggested that 
the real self is grounded in second-order volitions that are the result of reasoning 
(Stump, 1988), a person’s “valuational system” (Watson, 1975: 215), or an agent’s 
“desire to act in accordance with reason” (Velleman, 1992: 479).147 Despite these 
differences in real self accounts, these views have in common that they divide the self 
in two parts that can broadly be described as “Reason” and “Appetite” as is aptly 
described by Arpaly & Schroeder (1999): 
 
[T]hese theories all share the assumption that there is a sharp separation in the structure of 
the self which roughly follows the Platonic distinction between reason and the appetites, 
and they all identify the agent's Real Self with the part of her self that is the counterpart of 
reason in the Platonic model. If there is a clash between what a person desires or prefers 
to do and what she decisively thinks she should desire or prefer, these theorists identify the 
person's Real Self with her conviction regarding what she should desire rather than with 
the conflicting desire. Whether they will interpret the situation as a clash between a desire 
and a second-order volition, a desire and a value, a desire and a reasoned second-order 
volition, or a desire and the desire to be rational, they will all identify the agent with the 
conviction or judgment rather than with the conflicting desire, with the equivalent of Platonic 
reason (hereafter "Reason") rather than the equivalent of Platonic appetite (hereafter 
"Appetite"). (p. 170) 
 
Although Arpaly & Schroeder (1999) focus on desires here, it should be noted that not 
only desires but also other kinds of mental states, such as emotions, associations, or 
propositional mental states, can clash with what they describe as “Reason”.148 Note for 
example, that one may be afraid of black people, associate black people with violence, 
and think that black people are dangerous, although one may have rationally formed 
higher-order desires not to be afraid of black people, not to associate black people with 
violence, and not to think that black people are dangerous. Accordingly, one may want 
to say that these mental states are not part of the person’s real self.149 When I speak of 
                                            
146
 Frankfurt himself has modified his original account as presented in his 1971 paper to some 
extent. See for example Frankfurt (1988).  
147
 See Arpaly & Schroeder (1999: 165-166) for a short review of these real self models.  
148
 Presumably, real self views have focused on desires because cases in which an action 
follows from a desire that the agent is estranged by are seen as paradigm cases in which an 
agent’s autonomy or freedom is compromised. 
149
 The question whether there can be beliefs that are not part of a person’s real self is trickier 
because the answer depends on one’s stance on belief fixation (Mandelbaum, 2014; see also 
section 2.2.1.2 on this). On what can be seen as the standard view of belief fixation, the 
Cartesian view, people have the ability to entertain propositions in their mind without assenting 
to the proposition. In a separate step they may endorse or deny the proposition. By virtue of 
endorsing the proposition they form a belief with the respective proposition as content. On this 
common view, it is incoherent to say that one believes a certain proposition but that one does 
not endorse the belief. By contrast, on what has been described as the Spinozan view of belief 
fixation, people automatically believe those propositions that they entertain (Huebner, 2009, 
2016, Mandelbaum, 2014). On Mandelbaum’s (2014) interpretation of this account, the 
automatic acceptance of a proposition is a subpersonal process that can be followed by a 
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“real self theory” in what follows, I refer to those models that identify the real self 
broadly with what Arpaly and Schroeder (1999) describe as “Reason”. I take this to be 
the predominant type of model of the real self in the philosophical literature. This being 
said, there are alternative models of the real self (e.g., Sripada, 2016), but these will 
not be the target of my argument in this chapter.  
The distinction between “Reason” and “Appetite” is reminiscent of the distinction 
between reason-responsive explicit and reason-insensitive implicit attitudes as 
reviewed in chapter 1 (see especially section 1.2.3). Recall that I have argued in 
chapter 2 that implicit mental states are not completely reason-insensitive. In fact, they 
are at least indirectly reason-responsive (i.e., they are subject to indirect rational 
control) and can thus potentially be brought into line with the agent’s commitments (see 
section 2.3.1). Yet still, according to real-self theory it does not suffice that a mental 
state can potentially be brought into line with “Reason” (i.e., the agent’s second-order 
volitions, values, the desire to be rational, etc.) for that mental state to be part of that 
person’s real self. On this view, only those mental states that de facto align with 
“Reason” (i.e., the agent’s second-order volitions, values, the desire to be rational, etc.) 
can be regarded as part of the agent’s real self. 
In what follows, I will say that a person identifies with a mental state or endorses a 
mental state if that mental state is in accordance with that person’s (reasoned) second-
order volitions, values, and the desire to be rational (i.e., when it is in line with 
“Reason”). Conversely, I will say that a person does not identify with or does not 
endorse a mental state (“non-identification”) if that mental state conflicts with that 
person’s (reasoned) second-order volitions, values, and the desire to be rational (i.e., 
when it conflicts with “Reason”).150, 151 Of course, different real self accounts will 
                                                                                                                                
reflective endorsement or rejection of the belief on person-level. This view thus allows for the 
existence of beliefs that the person does not endorse or would indeed reject on reflection and 
which accordingly may be said to be external to the real self of the person. This is not the place 
to adjudicate between these different accounts of belief fixation. For my present purposes, it 
suffices to point out that both views agree that a person can reject the truth of mentally 
entertained propositions (be they beliefs or not). 
150
 Sometimes people may neither identify nor disidentify with a mental state (Lippert-Rasussen, 
2003: 371-373). For example, a person may not possess any values that would conflict with or 
conform to a particular desire. We may treat this as a border-line case: it is neither a prototypical 
case of a mental state that forms part of the real self of the person, nor is it a prototypical case 
of a mental state that is external to the real self of the person. In what follows, when I speak 
about “non-identification” I mean to refer to clear cases of a mental states being at odds with 
(reasoned) second-order volitions, values, and the desire to be rational and when I speak of 
identification, I have prototypical cases of endorsement in mind, in which the agent is not just 
indifferent in regard to the mental state. 
151
 Instead of saying that a person does not identify with a mental state, one may choose to say 
that the person is alienated from the mental state (Glasgow, 2016). However, this terminology 
does not quite capture what I mean by non-identification. Alienation is usually understood as a 
negative feeling state and not simply as a relation between a mental state and the agent. Note 
that Sarah, for example, need not be aware of a mental state (e.g., her association between 
BLACK PERSON and VIOLENCE) to “non-identify” with the mental state in my proposed sense 
of the term “non-identification”. All that non-identification implies is that a mental state is in 
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sometimes imply different verdicts about whether a person identifies with a given 
mental state and, consequently, about whether a given mental state belongs to the real 
self of a person (dependent on whether they focus on second-order volitions, values, 
the desire to be rational, etc.). Yet, for my present purpose, which is to outline what the 
real self view may imply for our understanding of a person’s attitude, it suffices to 
attend to clear cases in which different real self accounts of the kinds mentioned above 
would lead to the same conclusion.   
Let us again consider the case of Sarah the aversive racist. Sarah tends to exhibit 
favourable (cognitive, affective, and behavioural) responses towards black people 
when she has sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by her 
endorsed egalitarian commitments and tends to show negative responses with respect 
to black people when she does not have sufficient time or cognitive resources to reflect 
on and be guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. Sarah’s former disposition 
(her disposition to show favourable responses towards black people) is presumably 
grounded in her endorsed egalitarian values, her belief that it is morally reprehensible 
to treat people differently because of their skin colour, and her higher-order desire not 
to discriminate against black people. Let us also assume that Sarah’s disposition to 
show negative responses towards black people is grounded, amongst others, in 
stereotypes that link black people to negative attributes such as danger or violence, an 
emotional disposition to feel afraid of black people, and perhaps a barely conscious 
desire to keep distance to black people (in short, the evaluative stereotype “black 
people are dangerous”; see section 3.4.1). We can say that Sarah does not identify 
with these mental states (and thus with her disposition to show negative responses 
towards black people in certain situations) because they are in conflict with her 
endorsed egalitarian values, her conviction that it is wrong to treat people differently 
because of their skin colour, and her higher-order desire not to discriminate against 
black people. Hence, following the real self view, those mental states on which Sarah’s 
situation-specific disposition to show negative responses in regard to black people is 
based are not part of who Sarah really is. Sarah’s real self is rather to be identified with 
her endorsed values, her higher-order desires, or considered judgments, which ground 
her situation-specific disposition to show positive responses towards black people. On 
this account, it would be unfair to base our moral evaluation of Sarah (even partly) on 
her situation-specific disposition to show negative responses towards black people. As 
attitude ascriptions are commonly taken as a guide to moral character evaluation, it 
would accordingly be problematic to include Sarah’s problematic response disposition 
                                                                                                                                
conflict with the person’s values, second-order volitions, the desire to be rational, etc. (i.e., with 
“Reason”). Yet, there is a relation between non-identification and feelings of alienation: when 
Sarah becomes aware of the mental state that she does not identify with, she would likely 
experience feelings of alienation. 
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towards black people in our notion of her attitude towards black people. Rather than 
saying that she has an aversive racist attitude towards black people as proposed on 
my model of attitudes, we may want to say that she has a favourable attitude towards 
black people.152 This would provide us with a more accurate description of Sarah’s 
moral character according to the real self view.153 
 
5.3  Prediction and character evaluation revisited 
 
It should be noted that saying that Sarah has a favourable attitude towards black 
people is not particularly helpful when it comes to the prediction of Sarah’s responses 
towards black people. Some of Sarah’s responses towards black people will be driven 
by those mental states that she does not identify with (e.g., her association between 
BLACK PERSON and VIOLENCE). Thus, if we are told that Sarah has a favourable 
attitude towards black people, we may form wrong expectations about her likely 
responses towards black people. Saying that Sarah has a favourable attitude towards 
black people directs our attention to her endorsed egalitarian values, her conviction 
that it is wrong to treat people differently because of their skin colour, and her higher-
order desire not to discriminate against black people. On the basis of this attribution we 
would expect her to respond exclusively in a neutral or favourable manner towards 
black people. Note that we are more likely to form correct predictions about her 
responses when we are told that she has an aversive racist attitude. That is, we will 
form more accurate predictions when our attention is drawn to the fact that she also 
harbours an emotional disposition to feel afraid of black people, stereotypes that link 
black people to negative attributes such as violence, etc. Yet, if we include these non-
endorsed mental states in our notion of Sarah’s attitude, we include mental states that 
are, according to real self theory, not part of Sarah’s moral character. As a result, if the 
                                            
152
 Instead of saying that Sarah has an aversive racist attitude, my profile view of attitudes also 
licences to say that Sarah has a favourable attitude towards black people that is tied to 
situations in which she has sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided 
by her endorsed egalitarian values, and a negative attitude towards black people that is tied to 
situations in which she does not have sufficient time or cognitive resources to reflect on her 
egalitarian commitments (see section 4.7.3.3). From a real self perspective, this way of 
speaking about Sarah’s attitudes is just as problematic as saying that she has an aversive racist 
attitude. Sarah only identifies with her disposition to show favourable responses towards black 
people and thus only this disposition should be referred to as her attitude, given that attitude 
ascriptions are a guide to moral character evaluation.  
153
 It shall be stressed that even if the real self perspective is correct, it may still be legitimate to 
ascribe ambivalent sexist attitudes to people. Note that the ambivalent sexist may identify both 
with those mental states that ground his disposition to show hostile responses towards women 
in superior roles (e.g., an association between WOMAN and INCOMPETENCE) and with those 
mental states that ground his disposition to show benevolent responses towards women in 
same status or subordinate roles (e.g., an association between WOMAN and SUPPORT). That 
is, even on the real self view, both of these dispositions may be regarded as components of the 
person’s moral character.  
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real self view is right, attitude ascriptions cannot adequately fulfil a predictive and a 
character evaluative function at the same time. On this view, we could either say that 
Sarah has a favourable attitude towards black people and thus fulfil the character 
evaluative function but give up on the predictive function, or we could say that Sarah 
has an aversive racist attitude towards black people and thus fulfil the predictive 
function but give up on the character evaluative function.  
As I have mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, we (as folk psychologists) 
normally take an attitude ascription to be informative about a person’s likely cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural responses towards other people (function F1) as well as 
about the person’s moral character (function F2). Is this common conception thus 
misguided? In what follows, I will argue that it is not. I will show that the real-self view is 
not unequivocally supported by our intuitions and that there are good reasons not to 
take those intuitions that speak in favour of the real self view at face value. When we 
evaluate the characters of other people, we tend to base our judgment on both 
endorsed and non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions (section 5.4). We often 
do the same when we evaluate our own character, and when we do not, this is likely 
due to a self-serving bias rather than an honest assessment (section 5.5). Building on 
this, I will stress that including both endorsed and non-endorsed evaluative response 
disposition into our conception of attitudes has pragmatic benefits: when we 
acknowledge that non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions are part of our 
attitudes, we are more likely to tackle problematic biases than when we regard them as 
aspects of our psychology for which we are not morally evaluable (section 5.6). 
 
5.4  Third-person moral character assessment 
 
That we intuitively take into account non-endorsed response dispositions of an agent 
when evaluating the agent’s character can be shown by reference to the case of Mark 
Twain’s (1884) fictional character Huckleberry Finn, which plays a prominent role in the 
moral psychology literature (e.g., Arpaly, 2002; Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999; Bennet, 
1974; McIntyre, 1993; Smith, 2004). On the one hand, Huckleberry Finn (henceforth 
“Huck”) identifies with the racist principles of the society that he grew up in. On the 
other hand, he feels deep compassion towards his slave friend Jim, which leads him to 
help Jim escape from his owner Miss Watson. On reflection, Huck comes to the 
conclusion that it was wrong to help Jim escape and feels deep regret about his deed. 
There is no doubt in his mind that Miss Watson is the rightful owner of Jim. On their 
journey on the Mississippi, Huck is on the verge of turning Jim in to the authorities. Yet, 
ultimately his non-endorsed sympathy for Jim wins over his conviction. When he is 
asked by bounty hunters whether the other man on his raft is black or white, he lies to 
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them. He fails to do what he believes to be the right thing to do and considers himself 
weak for this. In a way, Huck represents the reversal of an aversive racist. The 
aversive racist endorses non-racist ideals, yet frequently behaves in a racist manner. 
Huck, by contrast, endorses racist ideals, yet tends to behave in a non-racist manner 
towards Jim and would probably behave in a similar manner towards other black 
people. Accordingly, we may say that Huck is an aversive egalitarian. 
On a real self account as specified in section 5.2, we would have to say that 
Huck’s sympathy towards Jim is not part of his real self and thus not part of his moral 
character (Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999). Huck does not want to be moved by his 
sympathy towards Jim (his sympathy is at odds with his second-order desires), he 
believes that helping Jim is immoral (helping Jim is in conflict with his values), and his 
reasoned judgment is that he should turn Jim in (Huck’s sympathy towards Jim is at 
odds with his desire to be rational). On this view, Huck is a racist. Yet, this verdict does 
not match our intuitions as readers of Twain’s (1884) novel. It seems to us that Huck is 
at the core of his heart a good person, who is somewhat led astray by the ideals that 
the racist society that he lives in has imposed on him (Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999; 
Smith, 2004). Our intuition is presumably guided by the fact that Huck’s disposition to 
feel sympathy towards Jim is very deep. This sympathy is expressed in much of his 
affective, cognitive, and behavioural responses towards Jim. His racist ideals manifest 
themselves in the guilt that he feels about helping Jim, but they do not actually motivate 
him to action. The fact that Huck’s sympathy towards Jim persists despite his 
questionable moral convictions underlines the deepness of these feelings (Smith, 2004: 
343). This being said, we would appreciate Huck’s moral character even more if he did 
not buy into racist ideals at all (other things being equal). Just as Huck does not seem 
to us to be a pure racist, he does not seem to us to be a pure egalitarian either. In 
short, we intuitively take into account both Huck’s non-endorsed response dispositions 
and his endorsed values or reasoned judgments when evaluating his moral character. 
That is, our intuitions are at odds with real self theory when it comes to the assessment 
of Huck’s character.154 Note that if we did not know about Huck and were told by 
someone that Huck exhibits a racist attitude, we would likely form an impression of 
Huck that would diverge from the impression that we would form of him as readers of 
Twain’s Novel. We would form the impression of a person whose evaluative 
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 It shall be emphasised again that what I label as “real self theory” encompasses models that 
identify the real self roughly with what Arpaly and Schroeder (1999) have described as 
“Reason” (see section 5.2). Hence, to be precise, my argument is that our intuitions about 
Huck’s case are at odds with the predominant model of the real self as I have specified it in 
section 5.2. This being said, one may of course choose to defend a different type of model of 
the real self (or deep self) on which Huck’s sympathy towards Jim turns out to be reflective of 
his real self. In fact, Arpaly and Schroeder (1999) defend a model (which they call “Whole Self 
theory”) that captures the intuition that Huck’s non-endorsed dispositions reflect on his character 
due to their “deepness” (see also Sripada, 2016). 
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dispositions in regard to black people are unequivocally negative. If we were instead 
told that Huck exhibits an aversive egalitarian attitude, we would form a much more 
appropriate impression of Huck: we would form the impression of a person who shows 
egalitarian dispositions but who does not identify with these.155  
Note that if it is appropriate to say that Huck has an aversive egalitarian attitude, it 
should also be appropriate to say that Sarah has an aversive racist attitude. After all, 
the two cases are structurally similar except for the fact that Sarah shows racist 
dispositions that she does not endorse, while Huck shows egalitarian dispositions that 
he does not endorse. If we are happy to include Huck’s non-endorsed disposition to 
show favourable responses towards Jim in our evaluation of his character, we should 
also be happy to include Sarah’s non-endorsed disposition to show negatively 
valenced responses towards black people in our assessment of her character. 
What I have presented in this section may not provide a knockdown argument 
against the real-self view as presented in section 5.2. For my present purposes, it 
suffices to have shed some doubt on the intuitiveness of the claim that only response 
dispositions that the agent identifies with reflect on the moral character of the agent. I 
will continue with this programme in the next section, where I will emphasise that not 
only in third-person but also in first-person character evaluations, we often take non-
endorsed response dispositions into account. Together the evidence from third-person 
and first-person character evaluation indicates that including non-endorsed evaluative 
response dispositions in our attitude model is in line with common intuitions about the 
scope of people’s morally evaluable self.  
 
5.5  First-person moral character assessment 
 
If real self theory as outlined in section 5.2 was right, we should base the evaluation of 
our own moral character only on those cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
dispositions that we identify with. All other dispositions (i.e., non-endorsed dispositions) 
do not express our real self. This view is at odds with how many of us react when we 
become aware of response dispositions that we do not identify with. Smith (2004) 
correctly notes that we often treat it as deeply revelatory about us and as a call for 
moral self-improvement when we realise that we respond in ways that conflict with our 
considered judgments and values (p. 344). Cases in which we learn about ourselves by 
paying attention to our spontaneous reactions are in fact ubiquitous: by noticing our 
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 Obviously, we would form the most accurate impression of Huck if we were told in detail 
about his various dispositions. This is arguably what happens when we read Twain’s novel. 
However, in ordinary conversational contexts what we can say is limited. Therefore, we 
sometimes need to rely on simple labels such as “aversive egalitarian attitude” or “aversive 
racist attitude” (see also section 4.7.3.2).  
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surprise about the fact that the CEO of a company is female, we may realise that we 
associate men more strongly with leadership than women (Valian, 1999); by noting that 
we mistook an object in a black person’s hand for a gun, we may realise that we are in 
fact disproportionately afraid of black gun violence (Payne, 2001); and by realising that 
we prefer to keep distance to obese people, we may become aware of the fact that we 
are disgusted by them (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000). In all these cases we may 
genuinely be surprised by our reactions because they are in conflict with our endorsed 
beliefs and values: we may not endorse the belief that men are better leaders then 
women, we may find it unjustified to be afraid of black gun violence, we may consider it 
wrong to react with disgust to obese individuals. Nevertheless, as Smith (2004) notes, 
we often treat these incidents as revelatory of what kind of person we are rather than 
as mere lapses that happened to us. This is indicated by the fact that we are often 
genuinely embarrassed about these incidents (Smith, 2004: 344; Smith, 2005: 264). 
Arguably, struggling against non-endorsed motives is experienced as being so painful 
because we in fact wrestle with ourselves in these cases and not just with some 
external influence on our behaviour (Smith, 2004: 339). We are not merely motivated to 
tackle our non-endorsed dispositions because they are potentially harmful to others. 
Instead, much of our motivation arguably stems from the fact that these dispositions 
reflect negatively on us as persons. Certainly, endorsed response dispositions belong 
to us in a profound way as they reflect sincere commitments of us. Yet, it is not 
uncommon for us to also ascribe to ourselves – and crucially to take to reflect on 
ourselves – evaluative response dispositions that we do not endorse.  
To be sure, what I have said here is certainly not true of all people all of the time. 
While some people (at least sometimes) tend to regard it as revelatory about their 
moral character when they learn about response dispositions that they do not endorse, 
other people are certainly happy to accept, in line with real self theory, that problematic 
dispositions that they do not endorse do not reflect on their moral character. For 
example, some people would certainly deny that it is reflective of their character that 
they tend to keep excessive distance to black people in conversation because this is at 
odds with their non-racist commitments. In short, people’s intuitions about what 
belongs to their morally evaluable self differ. However, note that this alone suffices to 
establish that real self theory, as characterised in section 5.2, is not unanimously 
supported by our intuitions. 
Moreover, there is reason to question the credibility of people’s judgments that 
non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions do not reflect on their moral character. 
These judgments may well be the result of a self-serving bias rather than an honest 
assessment (Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008). We generally want to see ourselves 
in a positive light and real-self theory allows for such a positive self-image if only we 
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endorse the right values. That is, we can boost our self-esteem by declaring 
problematic response dispositions to be external to our real selves. For example, 
denying that it is reflective of one’s moral character when one tends to keep excessive 
distance to black people in conversation will help to keep up or establish a positive self-
image. However, the fact that the real self perspective helps us to boost our self-
esteem is certainly not a good reason to believe that it is true. Being a good person is 
certainly not only to endorse the right values but also to live up to them (Schwitzgebel, 
2010: 546-548; Schwitzgebel, 2013: 87-88). This leads me to my pragmatic argument 
for the inclusion of non-endorsed response dispositions in our attitude model. 
 
5.6  A pragmatic argument 
 
So far I have argued that when making third-person and first-person moral character 
assessments, we in fact often take non-endorsed response dispositions into account. 
When we do not take them into account in first-person moral character evaluations, this 
may well be due to a self-serving bias rather than an honest assessment. As a 
consequence, even on the assumption that attitude ascriptions fulfil a character 
evaluative function (and not only on the assumption that attitude ascriptions fulfil an 
explanatory/predictive function), it is justifiable to include non-endorsed evaluative 
response dispositions in our model of attitudes. Now I will turn to a pragmatic argument 
to further support the claim that we should include non-endorsed response dispositions 
in our model of attitudes (see Schwitzgebel, 2010: 546-548, and Schwitzgebel, 2013: 
87-88, for a related argument). In particular, I will argue that it may help to reduce 
problematic biases if we encourage people to regard non-endorsed evaluative 
response dispositions as part of their attitudes. 
My point is this: if Sarah regards her disposition to show negative responses 
towards black people as alien to her real self, and thus not to be reflective of her moral 
character (maybe because of a self-serving bias; see last section), she is less likely to 
do something against her problematic responses than in the case in which she takes 
ownership of this response tendency. My argument is based on the well supported 
assumption that people normally want to see themselves (and want to be seen by 
others) in a positive light and accordingly tend to be motivated to modify response 
tendencies that reflect negatively on them in order to avoid feelings of self-
dissatisfaction (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993; Rokeach & Cochrane, 1972; 
Rokeach & McLellan, 1972). People presumably lack this motivation if they regard 
problematic response dispositions as being external to their morally evaluable self.156 
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 My point is not that people lack any motivation to tackle problematic biases if they do not 
regard them to be reflective of their moral character. They may, for example, still be motivated 
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As a consequence, if Sarah does not believe that the biases that she exhibits (e.g., 
keeping excessive distance to black interlocutors) reflect negatively on her moral 
character, she is less likely to tackle these biases, which in turn makes it likely that 
these biases will persist. Note that there is the danger of a vicious circle: the tenacious 
persistence of the bias may reinforce Sarah’s impression that she is the passive victim 
of the bias, which will in turn keep her from tackling the bias and so forth (Smith, 2004: 
347). 
To effectively reduce problematic biases in people’s behaviour, it would thus be 
beneficial if we could nudge people to regard these biases as reflections of their moral 
character (if they do not already do so; see last section). As has been mentioned 
numerous times now, attitude ascriptions are commonly regarded as fulfilling a 
character evaluative function. By ascribing attitudes to people that include non-
endorsed response dispositions, we thus encourage the perception that these 
dispositions are expressive of people’s moral characters. It certainly makes a difference 
for our self-image whether we (or others) ascribe to us a favourable attitude towards 
black people, even though we show negatively valenced responses towards black 
people in a subset of situations, or whether we (or others) ascribe to us an aversive 
racist attitude. In the former case, the negatively valenced response dispositions are 
readily ignored. In the latter case, by contrast, it is highlighted that we exhibit these 
racist dispositions and we are nudged to try to get rid of these because they reflect 
negatively on us.  
However, there remains a caveat. Saul (2013) has remarked that it may create 
“defensiveness and hostility” if we encourage people who exhibit problematic biases to 
view themselves as “one of those bad racist or sexist people” (p. 55). It must be 
stressed that ascribing a negative trait to a person is not yet to say that the person is 
blameworthy for the trait. As Holroyd and colleagues (2017a) note we “might invoke an 
evaluative judgement about the agent and her character – she is cruel, or she is racist 
– without taking a stance on whether this is her fault” (p. 5; see also Watson, 2004). 
However, Saul’s worry may remain. People may feel blamed when racist dispositions 
are ascribed to them and accordingly react with defiance rather than with determination 
to tackle their biases. In response, it shall be emphasised that when we say that 
someone is an aversive racist we highlight both desirable characteristics of the agent 
(the agent’s anti-racist commitments) and undesirable characteristics (the agent’s non-
endorsed racist tendencies). Yet still, one may argue that someone who is called an 
aversive racist may feel blamed for the biases that he exhibits despite the fact that his 
                                                                                                                                
to tackle biases because they sympathise with the victims of the bias. My point is merely that 
the motivation to tackle the bias is likely to be stronger if the bias is perceived as being reflective 
of one’s moral character rather than as external to the morally evaluable self.  
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egalitarian commitments are also acknowledged. I do not believe that this undermines 
the here presented pragmatic argument for the inclusion of non-endorsed response 
disposition in our attitude model. Quite to the contrary, there is evidence that people 
who feel blamed for their own biases are more likely to form the intention to do 
something against these biases than people who do not feel blamed (Czopp, Monteith, 
& Mark, 2006; Scaife et al., 2016). In a study by Scaife and colleagues (2016), 
participants took part in a shooter task that required them to distinguish quickly 
between armed and unarmed individuals that appeared on the computer screen in front 
of them and to “shoot” only the armed individuals (experiment 3; see also Correll et al., 
2002, 2007). Subsequently, participants in the experimental group were blamed by the 
experimenter for a bias against black individuals that they allegedly had exhibited on 
the task. Participants in the control group, by contrast, were not blamed for their 
performance on the task. After having completed some other tasks, all participants 
were then asked the generic question “Do you intend to try to change your future 
behaviour as a result of your experience in this experiment?” (p. 17). Participants who 
had been blamed reported on average a stronger intention to change their future 
behaviour than participants in the control group. Moreover there was a positive 
correlation between the strength of their intention to change future behaviour and the 
extent to which they felt blamed and felt guilty, as assessed with a questionnaire. This 
indicates that blaming people for their biases in fact motivates them (at least when they 
are egalitarian minded as most participants in the experiment were) to tackle their 
biases rather than producing resistance. Accordingly, it may in fact be a positive side 
effect if people feel blamed (or feel guilty) for their biases when they are called an 
aversive racist. 157 
The here presented pragmatic argument rests on the assumption that people can 
in fact do something about their troubling non-endorsed evaluative response 
dispositions. This may seem questionable because these response dispositions (e.g., 
Sarah’s tendency to keep excessive distance to black interlocutors) would not be as 
problematic as they in fact are if they could readily be modified. However, I would like 
to reiterate that those mental states on which these response dispositions are based 
are not completely outside of our control. Recall that I argued in chapter 2 that people 
have at least some indirect rational control over their implicit mental states (see section 
2.3.1). Sarah, for example, may decide to think more often about positive experiences 
                                            
157
 In the experiment by Scaife and colleagues (2016) no significant effects of the blame 
intervention on indirect attitude measures that were taken shortly after the intervention could be 
detected. In two experiments by Czopp and colleagues (2006; experiment 1 and 2), by contrast, 
people in fact provided less stereotypic responses on a sentence completion task after they had 
been confronted for their stereotypic responses on a previously completed version of the same 
task. The extent of behavioural change correlated with the extent to which participants 
experienced negative self-directed affect such as guilt.  
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with black individuals to countercondition her mental associations between black 
individuals and negative attributes such as violence or crime. Moreover, I argued in 
chapter 2 that people can exert some indirect intentional control over implicit mental 
states (see section 2.3.2). Sarah could for example form the intention to think the word 
“safe” whenever she encounters a black person in a deprived neighbourhood to 
suppress her fear response and the activation of danger or violence related 
stereotypes (Stewart & Payne, 2008). If non-endorsed evaluative response disposition 
were not modifiable by the agent, it may seem unfair to encourage people to view them 
as reflective of their moral character. Yet, as there are strategies that people can adopt 
to mitigate these response tendencies (ecological control strategies; see section 2.3.3), 
it is justifiable, and indeed prudent, to foster the conception that these tendencies form 
part of their character in order to promote positive change. This can be done by 
ascribing attitudes to people that include non-endorsed response dispositions (such as 
aversive racist attitudes). 
  
5.7  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have presented and refuted a possible objection against the profile 
model of attitudes that I introduced in the last chapter. On my proposed account, 
attitudes are dispositional profiles consisting of various evaluative response 
dispositions that are tied to particular situations. For example, an aversive racist 
attitude can be analysed as a profile that consists of two broad response dispositions: 
(1) the disposition to show favourable responses concerning black people in situations 
in which the agent has sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be 
guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments, and (2) the disposition to show 
negative responses concerning black people in situations in which the agent does not 
have sufficient time or cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by her endorsed 
egalitarian commitments. On my view, both of these dispositions are reflective of the 
moral character of the attitude holder. This is at odds with predominant models of the 
“real self” in philosophy according to which dispositions that the agent does not identify 
with cannot be reflective of the person’s moral character. On this alternative view, a 
person who sometimes shows negative responses towards black people (see 
disposition 2 above) but who endorses egalitarian values and does not want to 
discriminate against black people (see disposition 1 above) must be said to have a 
favourable attitude towards black people if we want to convey accurate information 
about that person’s moral character (see section 5.2). As there are evaluative response 
dispositions that do not form part of the person’s attitude on this view (see disposition 2 
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above), part of what would help us to explain and predict the person’s behaviour is 
excluded from the attitude notion (see section 5.3). 
I argued in this chapter, contra the real self view, that non-endorsed response 
dispositions can and should be seen as being reflective of a person’s moral character 
and thus be included in our model of attitudes. I used the case of Huckleberry Finn to 
show that it would be deeply counterintuitive if we would base our evaluation of other 
people’s moral character exclusively on their endorsed commitments (see section 5.4). 
I also showed that it is not uncommon for people to treat it as revelatory about 
themselves and as a call for moral self-improvement when they realise that they 
respond in ways that conflict with their considered judgments and values (see section 
5.5). Yet, I also conceded that this is not how all people react (all of the time) when they 
discover response dispositions that they do not identify with. I grant that it may seem 
intuitive that problematic response disposition that we do not endorse do not reflect on 
our real self and thus on our moral character. However, we should be careful about 
taking this intuition at face value. This is because this intuition may be the result of a 
self-serving bias. The real self view allows us to see ourselves in a positive light 
despite our problematic response dispositions, if only we endorse the right values, and 
this is at least part of the appeal of this view. It should be clear, however, that the fact 
that the real self view helps us to keep up a positive self-image is not a good reason to 
believe that this view is appropriate. 
Quite to the contrary, I regard it as problematic that the real self-perspective helps 
us to feel good about ourselves despite our problematic response dispositions because 
this makes us less likely to tackle these dispositions (see section 5.6). We should 
rather encourage people to view non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions as 
parts of their morally evaluable self. If they take these dispositions to reflect negatively 
on them, they are more likely to be motivated to do something against them. Attitude 
ascriptions play a crucial role in this respect because they are commonly taken to 
convey information about a person’s moral character. By ascribing attitudes that 
include non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions to people, we encourage the 
perception that these dispositions are expressive of people’s moral characters, and this 
may motivate people to tackle these dispositions. 
In a nutshell, we have good reason to include not only endorsed but also non-
endorsed evaluative response dispositions in our model of attitudes. Firstly, the real 
self view, according to which we should only include endorsed response dispositions in 
our model of attitudes (on the assumption that attitude ascriptions are to fulfil a 
character evaluative function), is at odds with how we would intuitively describe the 
attitudes of other people (see section 5.4). Secondly, the appeal that the real self view 
may have when we think about our own attitudes results likely from a self-serving bias 
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(see section 5.5). Thirdly, including non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions in 
our model of attitudes has pragmatic benefits in so far as it may nudge people to tackle 
problematic biases (see section 5.6). 
To conclude, including both endorsed and non-endorsed response dispositions in 
our model of attitudes does not violate desideratum D2 of a model of attitudes as the 
real self view would suggest. That is, there is good reason not to treat the distinction 
between endorsed and non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions as a distinction 
between aspects of a person’s psychology that can be said to be constitutive of that 
person’s moral character and aspects of a person’s psychology that are not part of that 
person’s moral character. By including both endorsed and non-endorsed response 
dispositions in our notion of an attitude, attitude ascriptions can fulfil both an 
explanatory/predictive and a character evaluative function. If we are told, for example, 
that Sarah has an aversive racist attitude, we can infer that Sarah is likely to behave in 
negative ways towards black people when she is under time pressure or engaged in an 
attention demanding task but in a favourable manner when she has time to deliberate. 
Also, we learn something important about Sarah’s character that we can base our 
moral evaluation of Sarah on. To be sure, how exactly one evaluates the quality of 
Sarah’s character depends on one’s values, but I believe that many of us would come 
to the conclusion that Sarah neither is as morally corrupt as an outright racist nor as 
laudable as a pure egalitarian. Our moral assessment of her would be more nuanced 
(see Levy, 2017b, for a related argument). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I raised three questions concerning the nature of 
attitudes, broadly understood as people’s evaluative tendencies in regard to social 
groups:  
 
(Q1) How should we individuate attitudes? 
(Q2) What mental states underpin attitudes? 
(Q3) What is the ontological status of attitudes? 
 
Also, I have mentioned three desiderata for a model of attitudes: 
 
(D1) To optimally fulfil its explanatory and predictive function, our notion of a 
person’s attitude towards group X must pick out exactly those features of that 
person’s psychology that drive that person’s evaluative responses towards 
group X. 
(D2) To optimally fulfil its role in character assessment, our notion of a person’s 
attitude towards group X should be sensitive to any difference that there may 
be between aspects of that person’s psychology that can rightly be said to be 
constitutive of that person’s moral character and those aspects that are not part 
of that person’s moral character. 
(D3) To facilitate communication on attitudes between academic disciplines as well 
as between academia and the wider public, our notion of a person’s attitude 
towards group X should ideally be a notion that psychologists, philosophers, 
and ordinary people can agree on. 
 
Now it is time to summarise, with an eye on desiderata D1, D2, and D3, what answers I 
have found to questions Q1, Q2, and Q3. 
 
I.  Rejecting the standard view 
 
Let us consider again the case of Sarah the aversive racist as it has been introduced in 
the introduction to this thesis. Sarah endorses egalitarian values and exhibits deliberate 
responses in regard to black people that are in line with her anti-racist commitments 
(e.g., she participates in rallies against the oppression of black people). Yet, she also 
exhibits spontaneous responses towards black people that are at odds with her anti-
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racists commitments (e.g., she keeps above average spatial distance to black 
interlocutors).  
Following an account that is popular in the philosophy and psychology of attitudes, 
which I have called “the standard view” (see chapter 1), we could say that Sarah’s 
responses are the result of two different classes of attitudes (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Levy, 2014b; see section 1.2). Her deliberate 
responses in regard to black people are the result of explicit attitudes, such as her 
belief that racism is morally reprehensible, while her spontaneous responses are the 
result of implicit attitudes, such her association between BLACK PERSON and 
DANGER. On this account, attitudes are mental states (answer to Q3). In particular, 
explicit attitudes are typically described as reason-responsive, propositionally 
structured mental states that contribute to intentionally controlled responses, while 
implicit attitudes are commonly thought to be reason-insensitive, associative mental 
states that operate in an automatic manner (answer to Q2).158 As Sarah likely harbours 
a range of different associative mental states and a range of different propositional 
mental states in regard to black people, it is implied that she harbours a range of 
implicit and a range of explicit attitudes in regard to black people (answer to Q1). 
Indirect measures of attitudes, such as the IAT or the affective priming task, are 
assumed to tap into implicit attitudes, while direct measures of attitudes, such as 
semantic differentials or feeling thermometers, are supposedly assessing explicit 
attitudes (see section 1.3.1).  
I pointed out that several reasons to distinguish between implicit and explicit 
attitudes do not hold up to scrutiny and that, accordingly, the standard view is not all 
that well supported as is often suggested. To start with, the finding that results on 
indirect and direct measures of attitudes are often dissociated does not establish, as is 
often implied, that there are two different kinds of attitudes (see section 1.3.2). In fact, 
this finding is compatible with various different ways to individuate attitudes (including 
my preferred interpretation that attitudes can be construed as complex traits that are 
based on various mental states). 
Moreover, there is evidence that sheds doubt on the claim that we need to 
distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes (as measured on indirect and direct 
measures of attitudes) in order to optimally explain and predict people’s spontaneous 
vs. deliberate evaluative responses (see desideratum D1 of a model of attitudes). 
Oswald and colleagues’ (2013) meta-analysis suggests that results on indirect 
measures of attitudes (which are supposedly reflective of implicit attitudes) are no 
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 Although it shall be noted, as mentioned in chapter 1 (section 1.2.6), that not every 
proponent of the standard view regards all of these dimensions (rational control, mental 
structure, and intentional control) as characteristic of the implicit-explicit distinction.  
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better predictors of people’s spontaneous evaluative responses than results on direct 
measures of attitudes (which are supposedly reflective of explicit attitudes). Moreover, 
results on direct measures of attitudes are no better predictors of people’s deliberate 
evaluative responses than results on indirect measures of attitudes (see section 1.3.3). 
If indirect and direct measures tapped into different kinds of attitudes (i.e., implicit and 
explicit attitudes), we would expect them to be predictive of different kinds of responses 
(spontaneous and deliberate responses, respectively), but this is not what we find. 
I also suggested that the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes does not 
mark, as it often implied, a difference between mental states that form part of a 
person’s moral character and mental states that do not form part of a person’s moral 
character (see desideratum D2). It is often claimed that implicit attitudes cannot reflect 
on a person’s moral character because they are outside of the agent’s rational and 
intentional control (Levy, 2014a, 2015; Glasgow, 2016). I argued, by contrast, that 
people can take at least indirect rational control and indirect intentional control of their 
so-called implicit attitudes even if these are associative mental states (see section 2.3). 
Sarah, for example, could take indirect rational control by engaging more frequently in 
positive thoughts about black individuals (Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, 2009) or by placing 
photos of admired black individuals in her office environment (Holroyd & Kelly, 2016) in 
order to countercondition her negative associations with black people. Moreover, Sarah 
could take indirect intentional control by forming the intention to think the word “safe” 
whenever she encounters a black person in order to inhibit the activation of negative 
associations with black people (e.g., her association between BLACK PERSON and 
DANGER; Stewart & Payne, 2008). Drawing on Holroyd & Kelly (2016), I suggested 
that the fact that people can take indirect control (or what they call “ecological control”) 
of their so-called implicit attitudes implies that these mental states can reflect on 
people’s moral character. The fact that both so-called explicit and so-called implicit 
attitudes may reflect on a person’s moral character undermines an important motivation 
to distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes (see desideratum D2). 
I emphasise that I do not claim that we cannot make sense of the standard view of 
attitudes at all. For example, one possible reformulation of the standard view may be 
that implicit attitudes are associative mental states that are subject to indirect forms of 
control (ecological control), while explicit attitudes are propositional mental states that 
are subject to direct forms of control (see section 2.4).159 My claim is just that the 
standard view is not the optimal model of attitudes, provided that we want to adopt the 
model that accords best with desiderata D1, D2, and D3.  
 
                                            
159
 Yet, one may want to reply that even paradigmatic examples of explicit attitudes, such as 
beliefs, are not (always) subject to direct forms of control (e.g., Hieronymi, 2008; Holroyd, 2012).  
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II.  An alternative conception of attitudes 
 
Rather than identifying attitudes with individual implicit or explicit mental states, I 
suggested in this thesis that attitudes are better conceived of as traits of people 
(answer to Q3), each of which is grounded in a cluster of different kinds of mental 
states (e.g., conceptual associations, affects, beliefs, desires, etc.; answer to Q2; see 
chapter 4). The view that attitudes are traits is appealing because there are striking 
similarities between the explanatory, predictive, and character evaluative roles of trait 
ascriptions (e.g., ascribing arrogance to a person) and attitude ascriptions (e.g., 
ascribing a racist attitude to a person; see section 4.4). There is reason to assume that 
psychologists, philosophers, and ordinary people may possibly find common ground in 
a trait model of attitudes (see desideratum D3). The view that attitudes are traits is at 
the core of the folk psychological conception of attitudes with which everyone is 
familiar. When we say that someone has a negative attitude towards immigrants, for 
example, we do not normally refer to a particular implicit association or explicit belief of 
the agent. Rather we want to convey that the agent is generally disposed to respond in 
negative ways towards immigrants. In short, we refer to a general trait of the agent. 
Scholars in philosophy and psychology will find it immensely difficult to inform public 
discourse with their attitude research if their notion of an attitude is very different from 
this folk psychological conception. Of course, folk psychological conceptions may 
sometimes be misguided, in which case scholars may want to revise these conceptions 
(P. M. Churchland, 1981; P. S. Churchland, 1986; Stich, 1983). However, as I argued 
in this thesis, there is in fact a scientifically sound model of attitudes as traits available 
and there are good reasons to favour this model over alternative accounts of attitudes.   
To start with, note that much can be said in favour of the idea that attitudes cannot 
be identified with individual mental states but rather have a broad psychological basis 
that is composed of different kinds of implicit and explicit mental states (conceptual 
associations, affect, beliefs, desires, etc.; answer to Q2). In chapter 3, I highlighted that 
it would be wrong to identify attitudes merely with affective mental states (Sarah’s fear 
of black people) or merely with mental stereotypes (e.g., Sarah’s association between 
BLACK PERSON and VIOLENCE or her propositional mental state with the content 
“black people are violent”) because these classes of mental states tightly interact in the 
production of people’s evaluative responses towards other people (i.e., they form 
“evaluative stereotypes”; Madva & Brownstein, 2016). If we want that the notion of an 
attitude can optimally fulfil its explanatory and predictive role, we should acknowledge 
that attitudes are based at the same time on affective and conceptual/stereotypic 
mental states. However, conceptual/stereotypic and affective mental states cannot be 
the only components of attitudes. I emphasised that Sarah does not only harbour 
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certain black person stereotypes and affective dispositions but also certain moral 
beliefs (e.g., her belief that it is morally reprehensible to treat people differently 
because of their skin colour) and desires (e.g., the desire not to discriminate against 
black people; see section 4.1; see also Besser-Jones, 2008). These mental states also 
sometimes determine the nature of her evaluative responses towards black people. If 
we want to optimally explain and predict Sarah’s evaluative responses towards black 
people in the various situations in which she encounters them, we need a model of 
attitudes that takes all of the above mentioned mental states into account (see 
desideratum D1). I argued that the view that attitudes are traits, each of which is 
grounded in a variety of mental states (conceptual associations, affect, beliefs, desires, 
etc.) provides just such a model.  
 
III.  Attitudes as traits: dispositional profiles 
 
However, not any characterisation of these traits will do. On Machery’s (2016) trait 
view, attitudes are characterised in terms of an aggregate strength and valence (see 
section 4.2). This view implies that Sarah lacks an attitude towards black people if she 
is as strongly inclined to respond in a positive manner towards black people (e.g., 
based on her egalitarian beliefs, her desire not to behave in a racist manner, etc.) as 
she is inclined to respond in negative ways towards black people (e.g., based on 
various negative evaluative stereotypes that she harbours in regard to black people). I 
find this implication of Machery’s account deeply problematic. Sarah’s evaluative 
stance towards black people is clearly different to the evaluative stance of a person 
whose entire cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses towards black people are 
more or less neutral in valence (see section 4.6). Yet, Machery’s model implies that 
both these persons lack an attitude towards black people.  
To be sure, situationists would also come to the conclusion that Sarah lacks an 
attitude towards black people. However, they go further than Machery by claiming that 
no one possesses any traits, including attitudes conceived as traits. According to them 
people’s responses are entirely dependent on situational factors and not on inner 
response dispositions of the kind that traits are usually identified with (e.g., Doris, 2002; 
see section 4.5). I disagree with this position. Mischel & Shoda (1995) have 
convincingly argued that some traits at least can be analysed as “distinctive and stable 
patterns of behavior variability across situations” (p. 246). I propose accordingly that we 
can identify attitudes, construed as traits, with stable patterns of evaluative response 
variation across situations (see section 4.7). On this view, situational variation in 
evaluative responding does not speak against the existence of attitudes understood as 
traits but is actually a crucial feature of these. Sarah, for example, can be said to 
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exhibit an aversive racist attitude towards black people, which is a stable profile of 
situation-specific evaluative response dispositions. This profile may consist of Sarah’s 
disposition to respond in a favourable manner towards black people in situations in 
which she has sufficient time and cognitive resources to reflect on and be guided by 
her endorsed egalitarian commitments and of her disposition to respond in negative 
ways towards black people in situations in which she does not have sufficient time 
(e.g., when she has to judge quickly whether she is in danger) or cognitive resources 
(e.g., when she is deeply engaged in a conversation with a patient) to reflect on and be 
guided by her endorsed egalitarian commitments. This characterisation does justice to 
the evaluative complexity of Sarah’s attitude and thus provides us with a good basis to 
explain and predict Sarah’s responses towards black people (see desideratum D1). 
Moreover, I hold that this characterisation provides us with an important insight 
about Sarah’s moral character (see chapter 5). Sarah is neither a pure egalitarian nor 
is she a pure racist. Her aversive racist attitude lies somewhere in-between (see 
Schwitzgebel, 2010, 2013, and Levy, 2017b, for related arguments). Proponents of a 
real self account may object that Sarah’s negative evaluative response disposition in 
regard to black people can hardly reflect on her moral character because she does not 
endorse this disposition and regrets her unfortunate responses (see section 5.2). My 
proposed model of attitudes may thus fail to satisfy desideratum D2. In response, I 
showed that the real self perspective (which gives priority to the agent’s endorsements) 
is not unanimously supported by our intuitions, and might just seem appealing due to a 
self-serving bias: it allows us to see ourselves in a positive light despite the 
discriminatory responses that we often exhibit (see sections 5.4 and 5.5). Building upon 
this, I pointed out that there is a pragmatic reason for including non-endorsed 
evaluative response dispositions in our model of attitudes: it may increase people’s 
motivation to tackle their problematic biases (see section 5.6). If we ascribe to Sarah 
an aversive racist attitude, this encourages her to perceive her problematic biases as 
part of “who she is”. This may in turn motivate her to do more to get rid of these biases 
because she certainly does not want to be (perceived as) an aversive racist. As 
mentioned above, there are indeed some strategies that Sarah could adopt to tackle 
her biases. In a nutshell, my model of attitudes does not violate desideratum D2 
because there is good reason to treat both Sarah’s endorsed evaluative response 
dispositions and her non-endorsed evaluative response dispositions to be reflective of 
her moral character. In other words, the distinction between endorsed and non-
endorsed evaluative response dispositions should not be treated as a distinction 
between aspects of a person’s psychology that can be said to be constitutive of that 
person’s moral character and aspects of a person’s psychology that are not part of that 
person’s moral character. 
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IV. Attitude individuation 
 
So far I have described Sarah as exhibiting an aversive racist attitude. However, it 
needs also emphasising that there are different legitimate ways to individuate attitudes 
(answer to Q3; see section 4.7.3). As I described the case of Sarah, it may be salient 
that the interesting aspect about her responses towards black people is that she shows 
different evaluative responses dependent on whether she has currently the resources 
to reflect on and be guided by her egalitarian commitments. However, my description of 
Sarah can of course only be incomplete. Sarah may encounter black people in all kinds 
of contexts (in her surgery, when walking home through a deprived neighbourhood, at 
the supermarket, at a sports club, at a parent’s evening at school, etc.) and she may 
encounter black people with all kinds of different traits (different gender, different age, 
different profession, different socio-economic status, etc.). Sarah’s evaluative 
responses towards black people may vary dependent on all these situational factors. 
To give a comprehensible account of her attitude towards black people, we thus need 
to identify salient or especially noteworthy patterns in Sarah’s complex mesh of 
response dispositions (i.e., identify profiles of situation-specific response dispositions). 
This pattern detection is clearly, and legitimately, influenced by our interests and 
purposes as attitude ascribers (see section 4.7.3.1). For example, someone may not 
be particularly interested in how Sarah responds towards black people dependent on 
the time and the resources she has available to reflect on her egalitarian values but in 
how Sarah’s evaluative responses towards black people vary dependent on their socio-
economic status (e.g., black people who are better off than her, black people who have 
a comparable status as her, black people who are worse off than her, etc.). Note that 
on this dimension, too, a noteworthy pattern may be detectable. For example, it may 
turn out that Sarah tends to feel envious of black people who are better off than her, a 
mix of pity for and anxiety of black people who are worse off than her, and no particular 
affective reaction towards black people with comparable status (while there is no such 
pattern detectable in her responses to white people). We may say that this is Sarah’s 
social status dependent attitude towards black people. Note that describing Sarah as 
an aversive racist and describing Sarah as a social status dependent racist may both 
be legitimate if each of these descriptions tracks actual dispositions of her. Which on 
we choose (or whether we want to take into account both) depends on our interests 
and also on our explanatory and predictive purposes.  
Dependent on our purposes, we may also characterise people’s attitude(s) in more 
or less detail (i.e., we may vary the level of situation-specificity and response-
specificity; see section 4.7.3.2). Characterising profiles of situation-specific response 
dispositions in broad terms (“zooming out on the attitude”) allows identifying 
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commonalities between people’s attitudes. People are likely to differ in many details of 
their situation-specific response dispositions, but once we abstract from these 
specifics, we may find that different people exhibit the same broad patterns of 
evaluative responding. Note, for example, that the profile of an aversive racist as 
defined above is presumably shared by many people. Also, it is easier to convey 
information about a person’s attitude to other people if we can denote the attitude with 
a simple label such as “aversive racist attitude”. However, characterising a person’s 
attitude(s) in more detail (“zooming in on the attitude”) provides of course a more 
accurate basis for explanation and prediction of that person’s responses and for an 
evaluation of that person’s moral character.  
Lastly, the scope of the attitudes that we ascribe to people is dependent on our 
interests and purposes (see section 4.7.3.3). Instead of being interested in Sarah’s 
attitude towards black people, we may be interested in her attitude towards black men 
or her attitude towards strong black men. We can say that her attitude towards black 
men is “local” in relation to her attitude towards black people and that her attitude 
towards strong black men is “local” in relation to both her attitude towards black men 
and her attitude towards black people. Yet, all these attitudes can be analysed as 
profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions.  
 
V.  Summary of key claims 
 
In a nutshell, my answers to questions Q1, Q2, and Q3 are as follows. In regard to the 
question about the ontological status of attitudes (Q3), I hold that attitudes are traits of 
people that can be analysed a profiles of situation-specific evaluative response 
dispositions. In regard to the question about the mental states that underpin attitudes 
(Q2), I claim that attitudes (construed as traits) are based on a variety of different 
mental states, which may include amongst others moral beliefs, desires, mental 
stereotypes (which may have associative or propositional structure), and affective 
mental states. In regard to the question about attitude individuation (Q1), I grant that 
there are different legitimate ways to individuate attitudes, which are contingent on the 
attitude ascribers interests and purposes. The described model is conducive to the 
explanation and prediction of people’s evaluative responses (see desideratum D1) and 
to the assessment of people’s moral characters (see desideratum D2), and may thus 
appeal to different parties who use the notion of an attitude (psychologists, 
philosophers, ordinary people; see desideratum D3). 
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VI.  Future directions 
  
I would like to conclude with some brief remarks on how the model of attitudes 
presented here may guide future attitude research in psychology and philosophy. On 
my view, it is a crucial feature of attitudes that they are composed of situation-specific 
response dispositions. My model of attitudes thus encourages psychologists to 
examine how people respond to members of a target group in different contexts (or to 
members of a target group with different features). All too often researchers regard 
these situational influences as noise that needs to be eliminated when measuring 
attitudes or they average across situations to estimate a person’s mean evaluative 
tendency (Ajzen, 1988, chapter 3; Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). This masks the rich texture 
of people’s attitudes towards members of social groups, resulting in a low predictive 
validity (Oswald et al., 2013; Forscher et al., 2016). To assess this rich texture of 
attitudes, I propose that psychologists should focus more on the situation-dependency 
of people’s evaluative responses. For example, they could develop standardised tests 
to assess people’s profiles of situation-specific response dispositions. The Ambivalent 
Sexism Inventory by Glick and Fiske (1996, 1997) is a shining example of such a test 
(see section 4.6). Which evaluative response patterns scientists will focus on will 
depend, as indicated above, partly on the scientist’s interests as well as explanatory 
and predictive intentions. Yet, I trust that researchers can find a broad consensus 
concerning the relevant responses and situations that should be examined. As I have 
suggested in chapter 4, another valuable project would be to examine which attitudes, 
construed as profiles of situation-specific response dispositions, are prevalent in 
particular groups of people (see sections 4.7.2 and 4.7.6). For example, one may 
examine what patterns of evaluative responses towards immigrants are especially 
salient in a particular country. Relevant evidence can come from observations of 
people’s responses in real-world settings or from lab experiments in which relevant 
situational factors are systematically manipulated. Another strand of psychological 
research could examine what responses and what situations folk psychologists take to 
be relevant when they assess the attitude of a person towards a social group, and 
which factors influence which responses and situations they find relevant.  
My model of attitudes may also guide further philosophical research on attitudes. I 
emphasised that an agent’s attitude(s) (which may include both endorsed and non-
endorsed evaluative response dispositions) reflect on the agent’s moral character. 
Building on this, one may ask what sort of moral appraisal the possession of an attitude 
warrants. As Holroyd and colleagues (2017a) point out, we “might invoke an evaluative 
judgement about the agent and her character – she is cruel, or she is racist – without 
taking a stance on whether this is her fault” (p. 5; see also Watson, 2004). Following 
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this line of reasoning, saying that someone is an aversive racist (or possesses an 
aversive racist attitude) expresses a character evaluation but does not yet commit us to 
say that the agent is blameworthy for her problematic biases or praiseworthy for her 
egalitarian commitments. Future research may examine accordingly what appraisals 
are warranted in regard to people’s attitudes if these are understood as traits (that can 
be analysed as profiles of situation-specific evaluative response dispositions). Note that 
one possible conclusion could be that different attitudes (aversive racist attitudes, 
ambivalent sexist attitudes, etc.) warrant different kinds of appraisals due to their 
different structure. Another question worth pursuing is how we should conceive of self-
knowledge in relation to attitudes if these are understood as outlined above. It seems 
that we can be mistaken about our own attitudes. After all, the evidence that we can 
gather about how we respond to members of a target group in different situations will 
always be limited (considering that there may be countless relevant kinds of responses 
and situations) and some parts of the psychological bases of our attitudes may be 
easier to introspect than others. This again may have implications for the question of 
moral responsibility for our attitudes and the question of what moral appraisals are 
appropriate in relation to these attitudes. 
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